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Much has been written about the consequences for companies of criminal convictions for 
bribery and other corrupt practices.  However, less attention has been paid to the sanctions 
regimes that have been developed by multilateral development banks in order to combat 
fraud and corruption in their operations.  This is likely to change in view of the fact that on 
9 April 2010, the heads of five leading multilateral development banks (MDBs) – the 
African Development Bank, the Asian Development Bank, the European Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development, the Inter-American Development Bank and the World 
Bank Group – signed the Agreement for Mutual Enforcement of Debarment Decisions, 
which provides for mutual and reciprocal enforcement of debarment decisions taken by 
any one of them against parties that engage in fraud, corruption, coercion or collusion in 
connection with MDB-financed projects.  For parties that are seeking financing form an 
MDB or are competing for contracts funded by an MDB, this means that a sanctionable 
practice committed in a single country could result in global sanctions.   
 
Against this background, this thesis examines the type of due process rights that should 
characterise MDBs’ sanctions procedures.  More particularly, the thesis analyses the 
extent to which MDBs’ sanctions regimes should be bound by the rules of law, analogous 
to those of national judicial bodies, and the level of due process and transparency that 
should be required from these ever-evolving regimes.   In other words, (how) can the 
tension between the administrative and business considerations of MDBs’ sanctions 
regimes (coupled with their immunity from judicial review) be reconciled with due 
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On 9 April 2010, the heads of five leading multilateral development banks 
(collectively, “MDBs” and each, an “MDB”) – the African Development Bank (“AfDB”), 
the Asian Development Bank (“ADB”), European Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development (“EBRD”), Inter-American Development Bank (“IADB”) and the World 
Bank Group (“WB”) 1 – signed the Agreement for Mutual Enforcement of Debarment 
Decisions (the “Cross-Debarment Agreement”), which provides for mutual and 
reciprocal enforcement of debarment decisions taken by any one of them against parties 
that engage in fraud, corruption, coercion or collusion (collectively, “sanctionable 
practices” and each, a “sanctionable practice”) in connection with MDB-financed 
projects.  For parties that are seeking financing form an MDB or are competing for 
contracts funded by an MDB, this means that a sanctionable practice committed in a single 
country could result in global sanctions.   
 
The main purpose of MDBs’ sanctions regimes is ensuring that MDBs’ funds are 
used properly.  Namely, each of the treaties establishing the five MDBs that are 
signatories of the Cross-Debarment Agreement – and subjects of this work – expressly 
provides that the relevant MDB has to take all necessary measures to ensure that the 
proceeds of its financing are used solely for the purposes for which such financing was 
granted.
2
  The view of the MDBs has been that the sanctions and debarment process is 
“essentially administrative in nature.”3  As a consequence, none of the MDBs has adopted 
                                                     
1
 For purposes of this thesis, the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD), the 
International Development Association (IDA), the International Finance Corporation (IFC), and the 
Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA) are collectively referred to as the “World Bank Group” 
or “WB.”   
2
 See Agreement Establishing the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, Article 13(xiii) 
(1990), available at: http://www.ebrd.com/downloads/research/guides/basics.pdf; IBRD Articles of 
Agreement, Article III, § 5(b) (as amended effective 16 February 1989), available at: 
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/EXTABOUTUS/Resources/ibrd-articlesofagreement.pdf; Agreement 
Establishing the Inter-American Development Bank, Article III, §9(b) (as amended effective July 1995), 
available at: http://IADBdocs.iadb.org/wsdocs/getdocument.aspx?docnum=781584; Agreement Establishing 
the Asian Development Bank, Chapter III, Article 14(xi) (1966), available at: 
http://www.adb.org/sites/default/files/institutional-document/32120/charter.pdf; and Agreement Establishing 




 Anne-Marie Leroy and Frank Fariello Jr.: The World Bank Group Sanctions Process and Its Recent 
Reforms (2012), available at: 
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTLAWJUSTICE/Resources/SanctionsProcess.pdf,   at 29; see also 
General Principles and Guidelines for Sanctions, available at: 
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the full range of rules that typify national civil or criminal systems, such as formal rules of 
evidence, cross-examination of witnesses or detailed sanctioning guidelines. WB justifies 
such stance by arguing that “sanctions, while serious, cannot compare in severity of result 
to civil penalties, let alone the deprivation of liberty that may result from criminal 
proceedings.”4  
  
 However, it has also been argued that a debarment decision should be made only at 
the end of a quasi-judicial process.  This argument is predicated on the fact that (i) first, 
MDBs are not private business entities that can make decisions without any restrictions 
(within the boundaries of the applicable laws); (ii) second, just like states and 
governments, international organisations must be bound by the rule of law, especially in 
cases where international organisations take actions that affect a company or an 
individual;
5
 and (iii) third, the far-reaching consequences of the MDBs’ sanctions 
proceedings, particularly in view of the Cross-Debarment Agreement, could be interpreted 
as a “corporate death penalty”6 and deprivation of property.  Moreover, in view of MDBs’ 
immunity from judicial review, derived primarily from treaty law, the question arises as to 
what (if any) measures exist to prevent MDBs from arriving at entirely arbitrary and 
unjustifiable decisions.   
 
 Given that, as a result of the Cross-Debarment Agreement, a sanctionable practice 
committed in a single country could result in global sanctions, the hypothesis that this 
thesis sets out to prove is that, despite their immunity from judicial review, MDBs’ 
sanctions regimes should be characterised by robust due process rights and would benefit 
from substantial improvements in the areas of respondents’ discovery rights, oral hearings 
and right to witnesses, publication of decisions, referrals to national authorities, the use of 
negotiated settlements, and the composition, appointment and independence of the 
Sanctions Board members, as well as the treatment of corporate groups.  The thesis 
therefore examines the extent to which MDBs’ sanctions regimes should be bound by the 
rules of law, analogous to those of national judicial bodies and the level of due process 




 Leroy and Fariello, supra note 3, at 29. 
5
 Hans-Joachim Priess: Questionable Assumptions: The Case for Updating the Suspension and Debarment 
Regimes at the Multilateral Development Banks, The Geo. Wash. Int’l L. Rev., Volume 45 (2013), at 281.   
6
 See Adam K. Lasky and Oles Morrison: The Rise of the Corporate Death Penalty: Understanding 
Suspensions and Debarments, Navigant (2012). 
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and transparency that should be required from these ever-evolving regimes.   The key 
theme of this research is examining how the tension between the administrative and 
business considerations of MDBs’ sanctions regimes (coupled with their immunity from 
judicial review) can be reconciled with due process considerations and principles of 
fairness that underpin a national judicial model, in view of the far-reaching consequences 
of MDBs’ sanctions regimes.   
    
Methodology 
The main approach of this thesis is doctrinal, in the sense that the thesis provides a 
systematic exposition of the rules governing a particular legal category, and analyses the 
relationship between these rules, explains areas of difficulty and predicts future 
developments.
7
   
 
The main sources of data for the doctrinal research of this thesis are MDBs’ 
sanctions procedures, cases and decisions generated under them, as well as the discussions 
in treatises and textbooks on public international law, anti-corruption and sanctions 
legislation and due process rights.  These materials are then analysed and conclusions are 
drawn.   
 
Admittedly, the doctrinal approach has been subject to criticism.  For example, it 
has been described as being too formalistic, which can sometimes lead to oversimplifying 
the legal doctrine and often does not provide enough of a basis on which to support the 
thesis and the questions it seeks to answer.
8
   This thesis therefore uses the doctrinal 
approach merely as a starting point. 
 
Moreover, a purely doctrinal approach would not be suitable for a project that has 
obvious cross-country and cross-jurisdictional elements. Rather, the determination of best 
practices for MDBs’ sanctions regimes requires research on a comparative law basis.9 
Comparative law has been described as the “critical method of legal science”, because of 
                                                     
7
 Desmond Manderson and Richard Mohr: From Oxymoron to Intersection: An Epidemiology 
of Legal Research, Law Text Culture, Volume 6, No. 1 (2002), at 159; and Council of Australian Law 
Deans: Statement on the Nature of Legal Research (2005), at 3. 
8
 See, e.g., Michael Slater and Julie Mason: Writing Law Dissertations: An Introduction and Guide to the 
Conduct of Legal Research (Pearson 2007), at 99 and 108. 
9
 Vernon Valentine Palmer:  From Lerotholi to Lando: Some Examples of Comparative Law Methodology, 
The American Journal of Comparative Law, Volume 53, No. 1 (2005), 261-290. 
10 
 
its focus on “the juxtaposing, contrasting and comparing of legal systems or parts thereof 
with the aim of finding similarities and differences.”10  The act of comparison requires a 
careful consideration of the similarities and differences between multiple legal data points, 
and then using these measurements to understand the content and range of the legal 
material under observation.
11
    
 
To do this, one must look quite carefully at the legal data points under review, and 
assess and understand their content, meaning and application.  One must also understand 
what meaning the words have within the context of the case, statute, or other legal norm.  
That is, how does the legal rule fit within the broader framework of the legal system?
12
  
After one has undertaken the careful evaluation of the legal data points, one must proceed 
to the next step of comparative methodology: comparing and contrasting the similarities 
and differences between the legal points under review in different legal points.  When 
analysing the similarities, this thesis considers how the multiple data points are similar (by 
word, rule, meaning, application, impact, or some other underlying basis), what provides 
the basis for the similarity, and how the similarity translates across legal cultures.  The 
same technique is then applied to the assessment of differences, and the thesis considers 
how and in what way the legal data points are different, what the concrete meaning of the 




Once the systematic study of the similarities and differences between legal points 
has been completed, the thesis moves on to the next step: exploring the reasons behind 
these similarities or differences and evaluating their significance within their legal culture.  
As in all comparative analyses, one needs to compare and contrast the points so that one 
can arrive at a fully considered and understood conception of the object under study.
14
  
Once the results of the investigation have been recorded, one can start posing questions: 
For example, why are the legal rules or data points similar or different?  What are the 
reasons for the substance of the data point?  Have we looked only at the law on in the 
                                                     
10
 Esin Örücü: Developing Comparative Law, in Esin Örücü and David Nelken: Comparative Law: A 
Handbook, Hart Publishing (2007) at 44. 
11
 Günter Frankenberg: Critical Comparisons: Re-thinking Comparative Law, 26 Harvard International Law 
Journal, 411 (1985), at 412. 
12
 Edward Eberle: The Method and Role of Comparative Law, Washington University Global Studies Law 








books, and is there a difference between the law in the books and the law in action?  These 




The comparative analysis in this thesis has been undertaken with a clear 
understanding that it is not possible to simply transpose solutions from another legal 
system, but rather that it is necessary to analyse different approaches to due process rights 
in order to be able to make recommendations on best practices for MDBs’ sanctions 
systems.  After all, legal rules are a product of historical and social development of the 
relevant country and a direct transplant of a rule or body of law may not have the same 
measure of success as it did in its home jurisdiction.
16
  One of the aims of the thesis is to 
use comparative law approaches to assess how due process rights are addressed under 
different regimes, bearing in mind their fundamental differences with the MDBs’ 
sanctions regimes, and to assess whether MDBs’ sanctions procedures could be enhanced 
to provide a better solution to the same set of problems.   
 
The thesis proves its hypothesis by examining possible sources of best practice 
standards for MDBs’ sanctions regimes, ranging from the US and UK judicial review 
standards, the case law of the European Convention on Human Rights and MDBs’ 
administrative tribunals.  Specifically, the thesis first compares due process rights under 
the systems that most closely resemble MDBs’ sanctions regimes: the United States 
(“US”) Federal Acquisition Regulation (the “FAR”), the jurisprudence of international 
organisations’ administrative tribunals and of the European Convention of Human Rights 
(“ECHR”), and to a more limited extent, international arbitration rules.  The selection of 
these sources was guided by the following considerations: First, MDBs’ sanctions regimes 
are based on the FAR.  Further, in view of MDBs’ supranational status, MDBs’ 
administrative tribunals face similar due process considerations as MDBs’ sanctions 
decision-making bodies, although they concern employment disputes, which are 
substantially different from sanctions cases, and this difference has to be considered when 
comparing the two regimes.  Moreover, Article 6(1) of the ECHR is considered by many 
as the most influential regional treaty that addresses due process rights.  Finally, 
international arbitration rules (such as the IBA Rules on the Taking of Evidence in 
                                                     
15
 Edward Eberle: The Method and Role of Comparative Law, Washington University Global Studies Law 
Review, Volume 8, Issue 3 (2009), at 461. 
16
 Otto Kahn-Freund: On Uses and Misuses of Comparative Law, The Modern Law Review, Volume 37, No. 
1 (1974), at 6. 
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International Arbitration (the “IBA Rules”), the Rules of the Arbitration Institute of the 
Stockholm Chamber of Commerce (the “SCC Rules”), the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules 
(the “UNCITRAL Rules”) and the London Court of International Arbitration Rules (the 
“LCIA Rules”)) may prove useful in filling specific, procedural gaps in MDBs’ sanctions 
procedures, given there is no basis for MDBs’ sanctions decision-making bodies to choose, 
by way of example, one country’s approach towards the collection and assessment of 
evidence over another country’s approach.  Therefore, any national law rules on such 
procedural matters would not be applicable to the MDBs’ sanctions procedures.   
 
Second, the thesis analyses due process rights and the liability of corporate group 
members under the US and UK laws.  The selection of these two jurisdictions was guided 
by two factors: (1) first, the fact that MDBs’ sanctions regimes are based on the FAR and 
thus founded on common law principles and (2) second, the fact that three out of the five 
MDBs are headquartered in the US and the UK and any respondents challenging the 
MDBs’ due process standards under their sanctions regimes are therefore likely to bring 





 The thesis develops the arguments in three Chapters:  
 
The first Chapter sets the scene by describing the negative impact that corruption 
has on MDBs’ underlying development goals, and analyses the origins of MDBs’ 
sanctions regimes, starting with the WB’s regime.  Namely, WB was the first MDB that 
introduced a formal sanctions regime, which was based on the FAR.  Given the 
comparative nature of the thesis, the first Chapter compares similarities and differences 
between the WB’s sanctions procedures and the FAR, taking into account the underlying 
differences between the purpose and context of the two systems: The debarment system 
under the FAR is an informal extension of the US federal contracting process, and the 
main enquiry focuses on the performance risk posed by the contractor, while reputational 
risk plays a relatively minor role.  By contrast, the WB sanctions system does not focus on 
the performance risk that corrupt contractors may pose, but rather on mitigating the risks 
that corruption will divert development resources and cause reputational harm to WB.  
The Chapter then proceeds with the critical analysis of each of the five MDB’s sanctions 
13 
 
procedures, and sets out a comparison of key elements of these five regimes.  It finds that, 
while many similarities exist between the five regimes (for example, notice requirements, 
two-step decision-making process, and consideration of mitigating and aggravating 
circumstances), the regimes also differ on key due process issues, such as the composition 
of appellate bodies, right to oral hearing and to live witness testimony, publication of 
reasoned decisions, referral to national authorities, the range of sanctions that can be 
imposed, the right to settlement, etc.  It is precisely these issues that are then analysed in 
the subsequent Chapters with the aim of proposing best practices that all MDBs should 
consider following.   
 
In order to be able to propose best practices, however, it is necessary to find 
suitable comparator regimes.  This is not easy, as MDBs are immune from court 
jurisdiction.  The second Chapter therefore embarks on the analysis of possible benchmark 
regimes: It starts off by describing due process rights established under the US and UK 
judicial review regimes, particularly in relation to those issues where MDBs’ sanctions 
procedures differ, such as the right to oral hearing and live witness testimony, and 
publication of reasoned decisions, which are later considered in the context of best 
practices for MDBs’ regimes.  As noted above, the jurisprudence from these two 
jurisdictions is relevant because MDBs’ sanctions regimes are based on common law 
principles and three out of the five MDBs are headquartered in the US and the UK, so any 
respondents challenging MDBs’ due process standards under their sanctions regimes are 
therefore likely to bring their claims in these two jurisdictions.  The Chapter also analyses 
the reasons behind the MDBs’ immunities from judicial review and how such immunities 
have been tested before the courts of the countries that host a large number of international 
organisations (not just MDBs).  Notably, although immunities continue to be the 
cornerstone of the law of international organisations and thus leave little or no redress 
against MDBs’ decisions in courts, there is a trend in the case law of domestic courts 
towards abandoning the traditional view of immunity of international organisations whose 
decisions fail to consider what courts consider to be fundamental due process rights.  
Finally, the Chapter examines possible benchmark regimes for MDBs’ sanctions regimes: 
from customary law and legal principles, and Global Administrative Law, which the thesis 
finds to be too high-level and therefore not particularly useful for determining appropriate 
due process standards, to Article 6(1) of the ECHR and MDBs’ administrative tribunal 
jurisprudence.  Case law under Article 6(1) of the ECHR provides useful guidance on such 
14 
 
issues as the right to oral hearing, the impartiality and independence of decision-making 
bodies and the need to provide reasoned decisions.  The same matters are also examined 
under the MDBs’ administrative tribunal jurisprudence.    
 
The third Chapter applies the principles articulated in the second Chapter to MDBs’ 
sanctions proceedings and proposes enhancements in the main due process rights: from 
discovery rights and range of sanctions to the publication of decisions, the composition of 
appeals bodies, and settlements.  The analysis of optimal discovery rights introduces the 
possibility of looking at international arbitrations rules for filling very specific, procedural 
gaps in MDBs’ sanctions procedures, such as the treatment of experts’ reports and 
assessment of evidence.  The proposals for improvements to MDBs’ sanctioning 
guidelines and settlement regimes are based on the analysis of the US and UK sanctioning 
guidelines and settlement regimes, respectively.  The Chapter concludes this analysis by 
providing a table-form summary of concrete proposals for the enhancement of MDBs’ 
sanctions regimes set out at the end of Chapter 3, section 1. 
 
Finally, the Chapter also analyses the treatment of corporate groups under MDBs’ 
sanctions regimes.  Specifically, section 2 of Chapter 3 examines four main areas of 
corporate liability: (i) liability of a company for its employees’ wrongdoing, (ii) liability 
of a parent company for its subsidiaries’ wrongdoing, (iii) liability of a subsidiary for its 
parent company’s wrongdoing, and (iv) successor liability under the US and UK laws, and 
proposes recommendations for enhancements of MDBs’ sanctions regimes in this area.  
The reason corporate liability under MDBs’ sanctions regimes was analysed in Chapter 3 
is because (a) it is an area separate and distinct from the respondent’s basic due process 
rights and (b) this part provides concrete recommendations for improvements of MDBs’ 
sanctions regimes, which fall squarely within Chapter 3.  
The thesis concludes by placing MDBs’ sanctions regimes in the broader context 
of the global fight against corruption. 
Finally, this thesis is purely academic in its intention and is in no way biased by 
the affiliation of the author, who serves as the Secretary of the EBRD’s Enforcement 
Committee.  The analysis and findings of this thesis are based primarily on publicly 




CHAPTER 1: PURPOSE AND ORIGINS OF MDBs’ SANCTIONS REGIMES 
Introduction 
 
The profile of MDBs has significantly evolved over the last few decades.  MDBs 
have become exposed to new demands and, in response, they have developed innovative 
rules and procedures which in turn have required specific policy measures.  These policies 
include, among others, sanctions mechanisms in an effort to combat fraud and corruption.   
 
In addition to safeguarding proper use of MDBs’ funds, MDBs’ sanctions regimes 
provide meaningful support for the core development aims of the MDBs: First and 
foremost, sanctions regimes are primarily protective, designed to exclude proven 
wrongdoers from access to MDB financing in MDB-financed operations. At the same time, 
arguably, sanctions regimes have valuable spill-over effects: providing specific and 
general deterrence for would-be wrongdoers, encouraging prevention by companies and 
anti-corruption enforcement activities by member national governments and inspiring 
public confidence in jurisdictions in which fraud and corruption enforcement are still in 
their early stages.
17
    
 
This Chapter starts off by putting MDBs’ sanctions regimes within the broader 
context of the global fight against corruption by analysing the relationship between 
corruption and development, and the role that MDBs’ sanctions regimes play as one of the 
possible solutions to curbing corruption and mitigating its effects on MDBs’ development 
efforts.  It then analyses the origins of MDBs’ sanctions regimes, starting with the WB’s 
regime, given that the WB was the first MDB that introduced a formal sanctions regime.  
The Chapter then examines the characteristics of the current sanctions procedures of each 
of the five MDBs and differences between them, as well as harmonisation efforts and the 
cross-debarment regime. 
1.  Relationship between corruption and development 
  
It has been well established that corruption slows down the wheels of business and, 
consequently, hinders economic growth and distorts the allocation of resources.  In the 
past few years, a number of studies have suggested that corruption has a negative impact 
                                                     
17
 John Coogan et al.: Transparency, accountability and due process in multilateral development banks’ 
sanctions regimes, The Company Lawyer, Issue 7 (2016), at 215. 
16 
 
on the economic growth.  For example, Mauro’s study demonstrates that corruption 
reduces investment and this, in turn, reduces national economic growth. However, his 
study did not find strong proof of a link between corruption and growth.
18
  In a follow-up 
study, Mauro examined the influence of corruption on investment, economic growth, and 
government expenditure using cross-country data for 101 countries and regressions for 
various time periods. In this study, he managed to find that corruption adversely affects 
economic growth largely by reducing private investment and possibly by altering the 





In the same vein, three IMF working papers all highlight corruption’s negative 
impact on GDP per capita growth.
20
  In particular, Tanzi and Davoodi find that corruption 
reduces the productivity of public investment and of a country’s infrastructure.  Moreover, 
it reduces tax revenue, mostly because of the impact that it has on the tax administration 





Mo finds that a 1% increase in the corruption level reduces the growth rate by 
about 0.72% and the most important channel is political instability, accounting for about 
53% of the total effect. He also finds that corruption lowers the level of human capital and 
the share of private investment.
22
 Akçay finds that a country-level dependent variable 
measuring human development (which contains a one-third weighting on GDP per capita 
in terms of purchasing power parity) is negatively affected by corruption.
23
 Similarly, 
                                                     
18
 Paolo Mauro: Corruption and Growth, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 110 (1995). 
19
 Paolo Mauro: The effects of corruption on growth, investment, and government expenditure, International 
Monetary Fund, Working Paper No. 98 (1996). 
20
 George Abed and Hamid Davoodi: Corruption, Structural Reforms, and Economic Performance in the 
Transition Economies, IMF Working Paper 00/132 (2000); Carlos Leite and Jens Weidmann: Does Mother 
Nature Corrupt? Natural Resources, Corruption, and Economic Growth, IMF Working Paper 99/85 (1999); 
and  
Vito Tanzi and Hamid Davoodi: Corruption, Public Investment and Growth, IMF Working Paper 97/139 
(1997). 
21
 Vito Tanzi and Hamid Davoodi: Corruption, Public Investment and Growth, IMF Working Paper 97/139 
(1997).  See also Issac Ehrlich and Francis T. Lui: Bureaucratic Corruption and Endogenous Economic 
Growth, Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 107, No. 6 (1999), at 270-293. 
22
 Pak Hung Mo: Corruption and Economic Growth,  Journal of Comparative Economics, Vol. 29 (2001), at 
66-79. 
23
 Selcuk Akcay: Corruption and Human Development, Cato Journal, Volume 26, No.1 (Winter 2006).  See 
also Keith Blackburn, Niloy Bose and M. Emranul Haque: The Incidence and Persistence of Corruption in 
Economic Development,  Journal of Economic Dynamics & Control, Vol. 30 (2005), at 2447-67; and Fabio 
17 
 
using data on foreign and local direct investments in 111 countries over a five-year period 
(1994-98), Habib and Zurawicki demonstrated the negative impact of corruption on 
foreign direct investments. Interestingly, local direct investment seems to be substantially 
(on average 2 times) less affected than foreign direct investment.
24
   
 
In another study, Kaufmann and Wei test the “speed money” hypothesis and 
conclude that there is no support for the “efficient grease” hypothesis25 (advocated by 
Nathaniel Leff in the 1960s, who suggested that graft can provide a direct incentive 
necessary to mobilise the bureaucracy for more energetic action on behalf of 
entrepreneurs
26
).  They demonstrate that high levels of corruption are positively associated 
with the amount of time the managers waste with bureaucrats, suggesting that bribe 
payments do not in fact result in less delays or lower administrative burden.  Similarly, 
Aidt concludes that the evidence supporting the “greasing the wheels hypothesis” is very 
weak and shows that there is no correlation between a new measure of managers’ actual 
experience with corruption and GDP growth. Instead, he reports a strong negative 
relationship between growth in per capita wealth (not per capita GDP) and corruption – 
suggesting that corruption may be associated with unsustainable wealth generation even if 
its effect on GDP is not certain.
27
  Along the same lines, using a survey of Ugandan firms, 
Fisman and Svensson demonstrate that a 1 percentage point increase in the bribery rate is 
associated with a reduction in firm growth of 3.5 percentage points.
28
   
 
Finally, Hostetler suggests that multinational corporations play an active role in 
sabotaging the development process by using fraud and corruption to circumvent bidding 
process and operating regulations.  This, according to Hostetler, obstructs MDBs’ 
development objectives in three ways: First, corruption negatively influences a country’s 
economic productivity, the stability of its political institutions and democracy, and its 
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social development. Second, corruption on large-scale infrastructure projects also creates 
an environment of tolerance of corruption that may instil a public conception that 
corruption is acceptable.  And, finally, corrupt deals made to win infrastructure 
development projects encourage officials to seek aid money for projects that promise 
profits in the form of bribes and kick-backs, rather than for projects that are more 
beneficial but less profitable for the officials.
29
   Thus, in the case of biased resource 
allocation, corruption may lead to unsustainably high levels of public investment financed 





Illustrating the fact that corruption greatly diminishes the likelihood of the project 
being successful, Hostetler quotes one of the WB task managers who noted:  
 
“If you let out a contract for $2 million, and you get the few civil servants at the top 
sharing $600,000 or 30 percent, do they care if the contractor puts in concrete that is just 
sand and water?  Do they care if the contractor doesn’t put reinforcing steel in the 
structures?  They don’t care.  So when Bank people say we’re at least getting 70 cents of 
good development on the dollar, no you don’t.  Because the contractor either has to make 
back the money that he’s kicked back, or he just figures ‘hey, it’s open season, I do what I 
want and no one is going to challenge me.’  And so you have this feeding frenzy, and the 
end result is you get very little development.”31 
 
Furthermore, mistakes during construction may require costly repairs and 
limit the relevant facility’s operational capacity.  The inferior projects then require 
maintenance that would not otherwise have been needed.  Yet, the upfront costs of the 
projects tainted with corruption mean that the government may not have the resources to 




Interestingly, Sindzingre and Milelli suggest that the relationship between 
corruption and economic growth is difficult to demonstrate: First, the methods of 
measurement are usually based on the building of indices, modelling and econometrics 
techniques, which are inappropriate measures for a concept such as “corruption”, which 
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reflects complex and heterogeneous phenomena that are difficult to subsume in a single 
and stable definition.  Second, in all of these methods, causality depends on specific 
contexts.  The effects of corruption on an economy depend on its particular history, its 
economic structures, its political economy and types of institutions, which is why they 
vary across countries and regions.  For example, they argue, in East Asia, corruption exists 
but is controlled, channelled, and submitted to growth objectives because states have the 
capacity to achieve this.  In contrast, in Sub-Saharan Africa, weak states, predatory 
political regimes, generalised corruption, commodity-based market structures and windfall 
gains reinforce each other.
33
  Indeed, causality is something that all of the above-
mentioned studies have difficulty establishing: Is corruption the main cause of any 
statistical relationship or also a consequence?  For example, does a relationship between 
low public sector salaries and the level of corruption reflect the weakening of the tax base 
to fund public expenditure (corruption causing low pay) or does it reflect the need for 





Notably, the OECD’s Issues Paper on Corruption and Economic Growth 
demonstrated that, “while the direct link between corruption and GDP growth is difficult 
to assess, corruption does have significant negative effects on a host of key transmission 
channels . . .  which impact significantly on economic welfare and, in the case of trust, 
also a country’s development potential.”35  A subsequent OECD study, Consequences of 
Corruption at the Sector Level and Implications for Growth and Economic Development, 
provides an analysis of the impact of a range of corrupt practices on economic growth and 
development in four key sectors: utilities and infrastructure, extractive industries, health 
and education.  The study shows corruption causing higher prices in all the sectors; higher 
prices for medicine, health services, textbooks, utility services, infrastructure, extra 
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In addition, increasing attention is now being paid to the link between human 
rights and corruption, with the UN treaty bodies having concluded that, where corruption 
is widespread, states cannot comply with their human rights obligations,
37
 and the High 
Commissioner for Human Rights issuing a compilation of best practices to counter the 
negative impact of corruption on the enjoyment of human rights developed by states, 





Undoubtedly, the relationship between corruption and growth depends on a 
country’s institutional environment (including political system, political stability, 
protection of property rights, culture), and studying corruption without considering the 
interdependencies between corruption and other institutions, as much of the theoretical 
literature does, tends to downplay the cross-country variance in the relationship between 
corruption and growth.
39
  And while institutional reform is therefore necessary, in and of 
itself it is unlikely be effective.  Instead, it may be more useful to focus on understanding 
and reforming the forces that keep bad institutions in place, such as political institutions 
and the distribution of political power, as well as the nature of economic institutions in 
thinking about potential institutional reform or institution building.  Understanding 
underdevelopment implies understanding why different countries get stuck in political 
equilibria that result in bad economic institutions. Solving the problem of development 





Still, no matter how tenuous the relationship between corruption and development 
per se, corruption has a negative impact on growth because it imposes very high additional 
costs to any economic activity, particularly in private firms, and results in  inefficient 
allocation of public and private resources, which are diverted from productive use.  As 
noted above, from the broadest perspective, corruption distorts prices throughout the 
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economy, as the costs of bribes are passed onto the end consumer and it creates delays in 
economic transactions and additional uncertainty, which may be a crucial factor in 
deterring investment.
41
   
 
MDBs’ sanctions cases are also illustrative of the negative impact of fraud and 
corruption on economic development.  For example, the WB’s Sanctions Board Decision 
No. 69 arose in the context of the WB-financed Ba'albeck Water and Wastewater Project 
in Lebanon. The project sought to, among other things, improve access to satisfactory 
water supply and wastewater services, and rationalise the use of water through the 
introduction of water meters.
42
  The WB’s Sanctions Board found that the winning bidder 
won the contract worth USD 2.12 million by fraudulently misrepresenting its 
qualifications in the bid.  Specifically, the bidder used the forged experience documents to 
circumvent an explicit bidding requirement designed to identify bidders’ relevant 
construction experience.  The wrongdoer thereby exposed the country to serious 




Similarly, the WB’s Sanctions Board Decision No. 71 arose in the context of the 
WB-financed Emergency Health Rehabilitation and Disabilities Projects in Iraq.  The 
WB’s Sanctions Board found that the respondent had paid an agent a 15% commission on 
two contracts intended as bribe payments to the government officials in exchange for 
contract awards, thereby steering the contracts to the respondent and away from other 
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2.  Solutions to curbing corruption and the role of MDBs’ sanctions regimes in the 
fight against corruption 
 
In view of a widespread recognition that corruption has a detrimental effect on the 
social and institutional fabric of a country, various suggestions on how to reduce 
corruption and mitigate its effects have been put forward.  They range from paying civil 
servants well, creating transparency and openness in government spending, cutting the red 
tape, establishing international conventions,
45
 to a strong civil society with access to 
information and a mandate to oversee the state and the presence of rule of law.
46
  Notably, 
states themselves may exert a negative or a positive influence on corruption investigations: 
they may opt to protect the wrongdoers from investigations and withhold funding from 
anti-corruption efforts.  Alternatively, they may financially or politically support 
corruption proceedings and share relevant financial information with the third-party states 
that have jurisdiction over offending corporations or other actors involved in corruption, 
which in turn may be willing to criminalise corrupt practices that their corporations 
undertake in foreign territories, the US Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (the “FCPA”) being 




WB itself has developed a broad and elaborate set of policies aimed at reducing 
corruption.  Huther and Shah mention four dimensions of the WB’s policy:  
 
(i) preventing fraud and corruption in the WB’s projects,  
(ii) “mainstreaming” a concern for corruption in the organisation, 
(iii) lending support to international efforts to curb corruption, and 
(iv) helping countries that request assistance to fight corruption.48 
 
While (i) and (ii) focus on WB as an organisation, (iii) and (iv) focus on corruption as a 
general policy issue. 
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 These types of prevention policies, however, are less effective when they do not 
include enforcement mechanisms, particularly when corruption is entrenched in a sector, 
country or corporate culture.
49
  It takes time to implement anti-corruption regulations and 
oversight, and even longer to change a corporation’s or country’s culture.  Thus, arguably, 
punishing project-based corruption can fill the gap in the effectiveness of prevention 
policies because when the investigations and punishments are sufficiently costly to the 
firm, they can be effective deterrence mechanisms that quickly change the firm’s cost-
benefit calculus with respect to corruption.
50
   
 In reality, however, MDBs are not law enforcement agencies and simply are not 
vested with the powers usually associated with law enforcement, such as the authority to 
investigate, obtain evidence and subpoena parties to court.  Hence, MDBs’ power to 
enforce laws and sanction offences independently of national criminal justice systems and 
sanctions regimes is limited.  What MDBs can do, however, is exclude players from the 
financial services they provide and make their financing conditional on satisfactory 
integrity regimes.  Despite this limited ability to use force, MDBs have attempted to 
develop their own sanctions regimes, and this step can be understood as an attempt to 
compensate for law enforcement weaknesses in recipient countries as part of the banks’ 
strategies towards the overall goal of development.
51
  This is why the sanctions regime can 
be seen as a pragmatic response to the risks of fraud and corruption, built on the authority 
that MDBs do have.   
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3.  Origins of MDBs’ sanctions regimes 
 
 Given that WB was the first MDB to introduce formal sanctions procedures, the 
story of MDBs’ sanctions regimes has to start with the development of the WB’s sanctions 
regime.   
 
WB was created in 1944 at the Bretton Woods International Treaty in accordance 
with its Articles of Agreement.  Its purpose is to extend loans, grants and credits to 
developing and transitioning countries to assist in the reconstruction and development of 
various projects.
52
    While the focus of WB has always been strictly economic, throughout 
the years issues of governance and corruption have come into play as substantial barriers 
to WB’s goals and targets.  With the wide recognition that weak legal and governmental 
institutions along with a high level of corruption can have devastating effects on a state’s 
economic growth, WB has been forced to consider these factors within its own 
operations.
53
   
 
As noted above, WB started paying more attention to matters involving fraud and 
corruption in the early 1990s.  Until that point, when instances of fraud or corruption 
occasionally came to the attention of the WB personnel, they were more frequently 
considered as “irritating impediments” to the WB’s principal mission than as examples of 
criminal conduct warranting official disapproval and condemnation.
54
 No policy existed to 
guide procurement officers in responding to such matters.  One of the arguments for this 
approach stemmed from the WB’s unwillingness to interfere in the domestic affairs of the 
organisation’s members.55 
 
 By the mid-1990s, however, the WB had undergone a dramatic change with 
respect to its recognition of problems of fraud and corruption.  It acknowledged openly – 
initially through the President Wolfensohn’s famous “cancer of corruption” speech to the 
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Board of Governors in 1996 – that fraud and corruption constituted a major problem for 
the WB and for the nations the WB was attempting to assist.
56
   
 
 A number of developments ensued: the WB’s procurement guidelines were revised, 
providing that if the WB determined that a bidder, supplier, contractor or consultant had 
engaged in fraudulent or corrupt practices in competing for, or in executing, a Bank-
financed contract, the WB would declare the offending firm to be ineligible, for a stated or 
indefinite period of time to be awarded future WB-financed contracts.
57
   During this 
development stage of the WB’s debarment regime, several models were considered, 
including those of diverse national agencies, intergovernmental organisations and other 
development banks.  A committee tasked with reviewing the WB’s anticorruption 
procedures observed that the US government agencies’ debarment practices “would be the 
most pertinent . . . for the reason that those are the practices that are most familiar to the 
majority of lawyers appearing before the WB as counsel for respondents in debarment 
proceedings.”58  The committee specifically referred to the suspension and debarment 
provisions within the FAR.  Indeed, the WB’s sanctions system reflects many similarities 
with  FAR.
59
  The following section describes debarment and suspension procedures under 
FAR, as well as due process safeguards accorded to contractors, as a result of a series of 
court decisions finding deprivations of due process relating to suspension and debarment. 
A.  Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) 
 
As the world’s largest buyer of products and services,60 the US government has an 
interest in ensuring its funds are being used appropriately.  Indeed, as a matter of policy, 
the federal government seeks to prevent the improper use of public funds in its contracting 
activities by doing business only with responsible contractors.
61
  To that end, the United 
States employs a suspension and debarment system that seeks to preclude US government 
agencies from entering into new contractual dealings with contractors whose actions 
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suggest they are not responsible in fulfilling their legal or contractual obligations.
62
  
Because the system is not designed to punish contractors, debarment only applies to future 
contracts, task orders and options to extend existing contracts – it does not impact existing 




(i) Causes for debarment 
 
FAR allows agency officials to debar a contractor when, among others, a 
contractor is convicted of or found civilly liable for any integrity offence.  Integrity 
offences include, among others, the following: fraud or criminal offence in connection 
with obtaining, attempting to obtain, or performing a public contract or subcontract;
64
 
commission of embezzlement, theft, forgery, bribery, falsification or destruction of 
records, making false statements, tax evasion, violating Federal criminal tax laws or 
receipt of stolen property;
65
and commission of any other offence indicating a lack of 
business integrity or business honesty that seriously and directly affects the “present 
responsibility” of a government contractor or subcontractor.66   
 
Broadly speaking, the concept of “present responsibility” refers to a contractor’s 
ethical integrity and, practically speaking, focuses on the contractor’s ability to perform 
without violation in the future, given the context of past conduct and performance.
67
  Thus, 
the questions of whether a party acted responsibly and whether they are presently 
responsible are two separate issues: the former requires the agency official to analyse the 
alleged misconduct, while the latter requires the agency official to examine whether and to 
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Most debarments in this category have been based on conviction of criminal 
offences in dealing with the federal government, such as bid rigging and mail fraud, 
bribing public officials, perjury before a grand jury in connection with investigation of 
another government contractor, submitting false income tax information, taking kickbacks, 






Frequently, a contractor’s first encounter with FAR results from the receipt of a 
Notice of Suspension.
70
  Suspension under FAR is a mechanism that permits any agency 
to temporarily debar a contractor for the duration of the agency’s investigation or ongoing 
legal proceedings.
71
  It is possible when an agency official suspects, “upon adequate 
evidence”, pending the completion of investigation or legal proceedings, when it has been 
determined that immediate action “is necessary to protect the Government’s interest.”  
This allows for considerable discretion, because the test is “suspicion, upon adequate 
evidence”, rather than conviction or civil judgment.  “Adequate evidence”, in turn, means 
information sufficient to support the reasonable belief that a particular act or omission has 





 Once a contractor has been suspended, the agency publicly lists its name and the 
fact of the suspension on the General Services Administration’s List of Parties Excluded 
from Federal Procurement and Non-Procurement Programs.
73
  This appears quite harsh, 
given that, at this stage, the contractor’s culpability has not been established, but is based 
on a mere suspicion.   
 
(iii) Debarment procedures 
 
If the contractor is not suspended, then its first encounter with FAR is a Notice of 
Proposed Debarment, which informs the recipient that debarment is considered, provides 
notice of the conduct on which the proposed debarment is based, states the causes for the 
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proposed debarment, explains that the contractor may submit, within 30 days after receipt 
of the Notice, information and arguments contesting the allegations, informs the contractor 
of the agency’s procedures governing debarment decision-making and explains the effects 
of the issuance of the Notice and the potential effect of debarment.
74
  The Notice 




 In any action in which the proposed debarment is not based on a conviction or civil 
judgment, the cause for debarment must be based on “preponderance of evidence.”76  If a 
cause for debarment exists, the burden of proof then shifts to the contractor, who has the 
burden of demonstrating, to the satisfaction of the debarring official, its present 




The contesting entity will only be entitled to a hearing where (1) material facts are 
in dispute, (2) the action was not based on an indictment, conviction or civil judgment, 
and (3) substantial interests of the government in pending or contemplated legal 
proceedings will not be prejudiced by a hearing.
78
   Agencies have been granted 
considerable discretion in deciding whether there is a genuine dispute of fact to justify a 
hearing.
79
  The debarring official may also refer the matter to a fact-finder who 
conducts an independent proceeding.80 
 
FAR provides that debarment should be commensurate with the seriousness of the 
cause(s) forming the bases for the debarment, but that “generally” debarment should not 
exceed three years.
81
  In considering debarment, agency officials should consider such 
mitigating factors as (1) the presence of effective standards of conduct and internal control 
systems in place when the misconduct occurred or adopted before any government 
investigation, (2) whether the contractor timely brought the misconduct to the agency’s 
attention, (3) whether the contractor fully investigated the misconduct and provided the 
                                                     
74
 FAR, Section 9.406-3(c). 
75
 Ibid., Section 9.405(a). 
76
 Ibid., Section 9.406-3(d)(3). 
77
 Ibid., Section 9.406-1(a)(10). 
78
 Ibid., Section 9.407-3(2). 
79
 See Robinson v Cheney, 876 F.2d 152 (D.C. Cir. 1989), affirming the agency’s denial of a hearing on the 
grounds that the alleged factual disputes were minor in nature and did not go to the central issues in the case; 
see also IMCO, Inc. v United States, 33 Fed. Cl. 312 (1995), affirming the debarring official’s denial of a 
hearing on the basis that there were no seriously contested facts. 
80
 FAR, Sections 9.406-3(d)(2)(ii) and 9.407-3(d)(2)(ii). 
81
 Ibid., Section 9.406-4(a)(1). 
29 
 
results of the investigation to the agency, (4) the contractor’s cooperation, (5) payment of 
fines, restitution, and reimbursement of the government’s investigation costs by the 
contractor, (6) whether the contractor has taken appropriate disciplinary action against the 
responsible individuals, (7) implementation of remedial measures, (8) institution of a new 
or revised review and control process and ethics training programmes, (9) whether 
adequate time has passed to eliminate the cause of the misconduct, and (10) management’s 
recognition of the seriousness of the misconduct and role in implementing programmes to 
prevent recurrence.
82
   
 
Finally, notice of the final decision must be promptly provided to any debarred 
entity and involved affiliates, and if debarment is imposed, the notice must state the 





Once a contractor is either suspended or debarred, its status as a blacklisted 
company is made public through the Excluding Party Listing Service (EPLS),
84
 and the 
Federal Government maintains the Federal Awardee Performance and Integrity 
Information System (FAPIIS),
85
 which adds deterrence since the information is readily 
accessible to all parties and hence the reputational impact is widespread.   
 
(iv) Judicial review and due process rights  
 
An agency suspension or debarment decision is reviewable in federal district court 
under the Administrative Procedure Act.
86
 The scope of review, however, is deferential to 
the agency and a court will not set aside an agency decision unless it finds that decision 
“arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law.”87  
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The procedures required by FAR were developed in response to a series of court 
decisions finding deprivations of due process relating to suspension and debarment.  
Although the courts and FAR itself indicate that debarment is not intended to be punitive, 
and is designed to protect the government from the risk of dealing with non-responsible 
contractors,
89
 the effects of debarment may have such far-reaching consequences for a 
contractor that they amount to a “corporate death penalty.”90  As such, the law is fairly 
settled that these procedures adequately represent the process that is due under the 
Constitution, and that it is unlikely that an excluded entity can make out a claim for 
violation of constitutional due process.
91
  For example, in 1964, in Gonzalez v Freeman, 
the claimants challenged the temporary debarment by the Commodity Credit Corporation, 
arguing that the Corporation’s action was imposed without procedural rules specifying the 
grounds for the suspension and that they were not given notice and a meaningful 
opportunity to contest the charges against them.  Holding in the claimants’ favour, the US 
Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit held that: 
 
“[d]is qualification from bidding or contracting for five years directs the power and 
prestige of government at a particular person and, as we have shown, may have a serious 
economic impact on that person.  Such debarment cannot be left to administrative 
improvisation on a case-by-case basis. . . Considerations of basic fairness require 
administrative regulations establishing standards for debarment and procedures which will 
include notice of specific charges, opportunity to present evidence and to cross-examine 
adverse witnesses, all culminating in administrative findings and conclusions based upon 
the record so made.”92 
 
Over a decade later, the court in Mathews v Eldridge established a framework for 
analysing whether the government’s administrative procedures comply with due process.  
The facts before the Supreme Court did not concern suspension or debarment practices, 
but procedures associated with the termination of Social Security benefits, which the court 
recognised as due process property interests.  Nonetheless, the court articulated a general 
balancing test to be applied to all government actions adversely affecting due process 
rights, including life, liberty and property interests.
93
  Importantly, the court made clear 
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that a due process enquiry must be conducted on the basis of the particular procedures in 
question as applied to the interests at stake by stating that “due process is flexible and calls 
for such procedural protections as the particular situation demands.”94  The court then 
identified three competing interests that must be balanced by: 
 
“[f]irst, the private interest that will be affected by the official action; second, the risk of 
an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedure used, and the probable 
value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and finally, the 
Government’s interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative 




A few years later, in Transco Security, Inc. of Ohio v. Freeman,
96
 the Court of 
Appeals for the Sixth Circuit had to consider the adequacy of a notice given to the 
debarred contractor.  Specifically, Transco’s due process claim was predicated on the fact 
that the General Services Administration denied it a hearing based on the Department of 
Justice’s advice that a hearing would prejudice its ongoing criminal investigation and that 
Transco was provided with an inadequate notice, which deprived it of a “meaningful 
opportunity” to rebut the charges against it.  The court first noted that “what process is due 
requires a balancing between the government’s interest and the private interest.”  The 
court distinguished this case from Horne Brothers, Inc. v Laird, on which the appellant 
relied, where the plaintiff was not given any opportunity to challenge the charges against it.  
By contrast, under the then effective suspension regulations, promulgated following 
Horne Brothers, suspended contractors denied a hearing were provided the opportunity to 
present information or argument, in person, in writing, or thorough representation in 
opposition to the suspension.  Thus, the court held that “under the current regulations, 
suspended contractors will not ‘dangle in suspension for a period of one year or more’ 
before being given an opportunity to rebut charges.”  Consequently, if it wishes to obtain a 
hearing, a contractor that is proposed for debarment or is suspended must demonstrate that 
there are significant factual disputes.   
 
Obtaining a hearing does not necessarily give the contractor the same due process 
rights it would have in civil litigation.  For example, in Electro-Methods, Inc. v United 
States, the court, commenting on a suspension, held that the “concept of due process 
cannot be extended so far, in the circumstances of this case, as to mandate that a 
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‘meaningful’ hearing include permitting the contractor to subpoena and examine FBI 
agents involved in an on-going criminal investigation, as well as other government and 
industry officials, to prove its case.”97 
 
What type of hearing is required?  The issue was addressed in Lion Raisins, Inc. v 
United States, in which the claimant argued that the hearing failed to comply with due 
process, relying on section 9.407-3(b)(2) of FAR (which, as described above, provides the 
respondent with the right to a hearing only if (1) material facts are in dispute, (2) the 
action was not based on an indictment, conviction or civil judgment, and (3) substantial 
interests of the government in pending or contemplated legal proceedings will not be 
prejudiced by a hearing).
98
  The court noted that “FAR requires that administrative 
hearings comport with due process notions of ‘fundamental fairness’”, which require 
“notice and an opportunity for [a] hearing appropriate to the nature of the case”  The court 
found that, in this case, the section 9.407-3(b)(2) was not applicable “because the plaintiff 
had not established the requisite issue of material fact.”99 
 
Although FAR served as the basis for the development of the WB’s sanctions 
system, it is important to note that the purpose and context of the two systems are quite 
different: The debarment system under FAR is an informal extension of the federal 
contracting process and, as such, the main enquiry focuses on the performance risk posed 
by the contractor, while reputational risk plays a relatively minor role.
100
  Therefore, the 
core enquiry under FAR is on the “present responsibility” and the performance risk posed 
by the contractor.  Reputational risk plays a relatively small role and the system is 
expressly not intended to punish contractors’ misdeeds or deter misconduct in other 
contractors.
101
  By contrast, the WB sanctions system (and the sanctions systems of other 
MDBs, for that matter) appears to focus not on the performance risk that unqualified and 
corrupt contractors pose (given that WB does not actually administer contracts during 
performance), but rather on mitigating the risks that corruption will divert development 
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resources and cause WB reputational harm.
102
 As such, the WB’s system defines 
sanctionable practices much more narrowly than FAR and is much more strictly structured, 




B.  Evolution and description of the WB’s sanctions system 
 
(i) First sanctions regime 
 
WB has had a formal sanctions regime since 1996.  The establishment of the formal 
sanctions regime coincided with an increased focus on corruption as a development 
issue,
104
 as suggested by James Wolfensohn in his “cancer of corruption” speech, in which 
he declared that, for developing countries to achieve growth and poverty reduction, “we 
need to deal with the cancer of corruption.”105   Around this time, other international 
organisations, such as the United Nations (UN) and the Organisation for Economic 
Cooperation and Development (OECD), commenced policy work on corruption, including 
the initial development of the UN and OECD conventions on corruption.  In 1997, OECD 
adopted the OECD Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in 
International Business Transactions (the “Convention”), subsequently ratified by 38 
countries.
106
 Unsurprisingly, given the strong influence of the United States, the 
Convention incorporates many concepts of the FCPA, which had been enacted already in 
1977, pioneering the criminalisation of corrupt practices abroad.
107
 The Convention sets 
forth binding undertakings by its member countries to enact domestic legislation against 
the bribing of foreign public officials, and its implementation is systematically monitored 
through the OECD’s peer review process.108  The Convention criminalises acts of offering 
or giving bribes, but not of soliciting or receiving bribes, and it covers only bribery aimed 
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 It was in the same year (1997) that the WB’s Board of Directors adopted the anti-
corruption strategy, following which the WB’s sanctions process was implemented in a 
January 1998 Operational Memorandum.
110
  This process was managed entirely by the 
WB staff and overseen by the Internal Auditing Department. First, allegations of 
fraudulent or corrupt practices were reported to the Legal Officer.  If the Legal Officer 
made a prima facie determination that the allegation was supported by substantial 
evidence, he/she would recommend to the WB’s General Counsel that the matter be 
submitted for consideration to the Sanctions Committee.
111
  The General Counsel would 
then advise the relevant Managing Director whether further investigation should be 
conducted by the WB staff, by specialised outside investigators or auditors or by law 
enforcement authorities of the government affected by the matter.  With respect to the 
investigation conducted by the WB staff, the Operational Memorandum provided that the 
investigation would be “conducted in a manner that fairly protects the privacy of the 
accuser and the rights of the accused firm; in particular, (a) the accused firm has the right 
to be assisted by legal counsel; (b) if the accuser is willing to submit to cross-examination, 
the Bank arranges for the accused firm to question the accuser in the presence of Bank 
staff; and (c) the accuser may also be requested to answer under oath questions submitted 
by the accused.”  This approach was later criticised as “illusory”, given that the WB would 
have no authority to compel the accuser to submit to any such questioning.  Consequently, 
this approach was replaced by the approach “common in administrative proceedings” 
where “neither [party] can require a person’s attendance and testimony.”112   The results of 
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 The Sanctions Committee comprised five senor WB staff members – two 
Managing Directors, the General Counsel and two Vice Presidents.  If the Sanctions 
Committee found that a reasonably sufficient evidence existed that the accused party had 
engaged in fraud or corruption, the Committee would consider appropriate sanctions, 
weighing the various aggravating and mitigating factors.  It would then transmit its 
recommended sanction to the WB President, who would then decide whether to concur in, 
or to modify, the Committee’s recommendations and proposed sanction.114 
 
 Public announcement of the sanction was posted on the WB’s website, with the 
underlying purpose to demonstrate the seriousness of the WB’s initiatives against fraud 




 Following the adoption of the Operation Memorandum, the WB’s investigative 
capacity expanded greatly and the small Investigations Unit that had been established in 
early 1998 within the Internal Auditing Department eventually became the new 
Department of Institutional Integrity (the “INT”), which quickly grew to include a number 





(ii) The Thornburgh report 
 
The first major reform of the WB’s sanctions regime occurred in 2004, following 
the review of the sanctions panel by the Thornburgh panel in 2002.  The Thornburgh 
report made several noteworthy observations, which led to the overhaul of the then 
existing process and establishment of the regime that still operates today.  Specifically, the 
report noted the inherent conflict of interest faced by internal staff members on the 
Committee, which had been raised “particularly strongly by counsel for respondents.”117  
Arguably, WB managers cannot fairly judge matters concerning loans that their 
subordinates have evaluated and supervised, and that they themselves may have 
approved.
118
  Consequently, such managers/members of the Sanctions Committee may be 
inclined to rule either (a) against sanctioning on the ground that a manager would be 
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embarrassed in acknowledging that a firm had successfully manipulated the WB in the 
course of negotiating or performing a contract within that manager’s oversight; or (b) in 
favour of sanctioning on the ground that a manager would be angered by a firm that had 
violated its responsibilities under such contract.
119
   
 
In view of these concerns that were recognised as “costly to the Bank in terms of 
the credibility of the debarment process,” 120  the Thornburgh report considered two 
options: (i) establishing a Sanctions Committee composed solely of external members and 
(ii) establishing a Sanctions Committee composed of majority external members, and 
opted for the latter, rationalising its choice by the fact that internal members bring detailed 
knowledge of the WB’s methods of operation and procurement practices. 
 
Further, it was at this time that a first-tier review by the Reviewing Officer 
(currently called the Suspension and Debarment Officer) was introduced, which was 
intended to allow for the relatively quick disposition of cases.  The Reviewing Officer was 
tasked with reviewing the INT’s proposed notice of debarment and, if he/she found that 
the evidence was sufficient to support a finding that the accused party had engaged in a 
fraudulent or corrupt practice, he/she would issue the notice to the respondent.  If the 
respondent failed to request a review by the Sanctions Committee within the deadline 
prescribed in the notice, the Reviewing Officer would impose a sanction.
121
  The report 
envisioned that this process would reduce the number of cases that go to the Sanctions 
Committee. 
 
Similarly, the report proposed the introduction of a temporary suspension 
mechanism, whereby, at the time of the issuance of the notice of debarment, the 
respondent would be notified that its eligibility to be awarded new Bank-financed 
contracts would be temporarily suspended pending a final disposition of the matter.  The 
respondent would then have the right to present a statement to the Reviewing Officer 
articulating the arguments for why the suspension should not remain in effect during the 
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The rationale for this mechanism was to protect the WB against awarding contracts 
during the pendency of a matter before the Sanctions Committee to contractors whom the 
evidence showed had engaged in fraud and corruption.  Moreover, such procedure would 
also remove the incentive for the respondent to contest the case at the Sanctions 
Committee level solely for the purpose of delaying a debarment decision.
123
  Unlike under 
FAR, however, the party’s name and the fact of the suspension are not published. 
  
(iii) Expansion of sanctions regime beyond procurement and launch of the 
voluntary disclosure programme 
 
In 2006, further reforms to the WB’s sanctions regime ensued, which resulted in 
the expansion of the sanctions regime beyond procurement to cover more generally 




Notably, until that time, the WB’s sanctions regime applied only in the context of 
the procurement of goods, works and services, but not in the context of WB-financed 
projects outside the procurement process.  The WB’s fiduciary duty under its Articles of 
Agreement to ensure the proper use of its proceeds certainly extends to all WB-financed 
projects and, consequently, there is no reason for the difference in treatment between those 
projects with the procurement process and those without.  The expansion of the sanctions 
regime was therefore intended to ensure consistency of treatment of sanctionable offences 
in relation to all WB-financed operations.
125
   
 
 In addition, in 2006, WB formally launched its voluntary disclosure programme 
(VDP).
126
  Under this programme, an entity or an individual not being investigated by the 
INT may report to the WB past sanctionable behaviour.  Consequently, the party will have 
to (a) cease corrupt practices and abstain from future misconduct; (b) implement a “best 
practices” internal compliance programme monitored by a WB-approved third party for 
three years and (c) disclose to the WB the results of an internal investigation into any 
misconduct in connection with a WB-financed contract, that the party committed within 
the preceding five years.  In exchange for its full cooperation, the VDP participants enjoy 
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immunity from sanction on disclosed misconduct, anonymity and the ability to continue to 
bid on the WB-financed projects.
127
  If, however, a participant continues to engage in 
misconduct after entering the VDP or otherwise materially violates the programme’s terms 




VDP has been praised by experts as an exemplary tool for combatting 
corruption.
129
 On the other hand, it has been criticised for failure to impose any restitution 
of funds that may have been obtained through corrupt practices
130
 and for favouring 
wealthier firms and individuals.
131
  In addition, it has been argued that the compulsory 
independent monitor requirement subjects participants to enormous costs and burdens, 
while the provision that any future violation will result in a mandatory ten-year debarment 
poses an “unacceptable level of risk to a contractor, despite any assurances that the 
provision will not be strictly applied.”132 
  
(iv) Early harmonisation efforts with other MDBs 
 
 At about the same time, WB started working with other MDBs on the 
harmonisation of approaches to sanctionable practices in projects, which led to the 
formation of the International Financial Institutions Anti-corruption Task Force (the 
“Task Force”) in 2006.  The Task Force was formed by the five MDBs, together with the 
International Monetary Fund and the European Investment Bank in order to consider a 
catalogue of measures aimed at harmonising the efforts of the participating institutions 
against fraud and corruption.  The Task Force recommendations were published in 
September 2006 in a document titled Uniform Framework for Preventing and Combating 
Fraud and Corruption (the “Uniform Framework”), which was subsequently endorsed 
by the participating institutions
133
 and hence was a crucial first step in the MDBs’ efforts 
to coordinate their efforts against fraud and corruption.  The Uniform Framework 
contained a set of harmonised definitions for sanctionable practices to be used by the 
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participating institutions in all their operations.  It also included a commitment to adopt 
harmonised investigative procedures, as well as an undertaking to explore whether 
debarment decisions of any one of the participating institutions could be recognised by the 
other institutions. 
 
The Uniform Framework recognises four sanctionable practices – corrupt practice, 
fraudulent practice, coercive practice and collusive practice – and defines them as follows:   
(1)  A corrupt practice is defined as the offering, giving, receiving, or soliciting, 
directly or indirectly, anything of value to influence improperly the actions of another 
party.
134
  Notably the word “improperly” was inserted in the definition to ensure that it 
would not inadvertently capture legitimate conduct.  Otherwise, the definition could be 
interpreted to cover legitimate conduct (e.g., the payment of a salary to “influence” an 
employee to perform his or her job).   
 
An example of corrupt practice would involve a situation where a company is awarded an 
MDB-financed contract from government in exchange for a bribe or kickbacks.  
Kickbacks generally occur when a company that is awarded a contract “kicks back” 
money to the ministry official(s) who steered the award of the contract to the company.
135
   
For example, the WB’s Sanctions Board Decision No. 50 concerns a case in which the 
respondent was debarred because it was found to have engaged in corrupt practices by 
offering (and agreeing) to pay the officials of the implementing agencies for the Thailand 
Highways Management Project 17% of the total contract price to influence the technical 
score of one of the bidders.
136
  Similarly, the WB’s Sanctions Board Decision No. 60 
concerns a case in which the respondent was debarred because it was found to have 
engaged in corrupt practices by offering to pay 5% of the value of each awarded contract 
to a WB consultant involved in the procurement process in relation to the Kyrgyz 
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Notably, whereas the FCPA prohibits bribery of foreign public officials,
138
 in the MDBs 
context, the term “corrupt practice” applies to bribes given to or received by another party, 
giving it a broader context.  The definition of “corrupt practice” also makes no exception 




(2) A fraudulent practice is defined as any act or omission, including a 
misrepresentation, that knowingly or recklessly misleads, or attempts to mislead, a party to 
obtain a financial or other benefit or to avoid an obligation.
140
  To act recklessly requires 
that the actor is indifferent as to whether the information or representation is true or false.  
Mere inaccuracy in information or representation, committed through simple negligence, 
is not tantamount to a fraudulent practice.
141
   
 
An example of fraudulent practice might involve a scenario where, during the 
implementation of a project, the poor performance of a key consulting company raises 
suspicion that the capacities and qualifications of the company might have been 
misrepresented.  An investigation reveals that the experience and credentials of the 
principal, as well as the qualifications and certifications of the consulting firm were 
misrepresented in order to meet the selection criteria of the tender.
142
 For example, the 
WB’s Sanctions Board Decision No. 48 concerns a case in which a bidder was debarred 
because it submitted fraudulent documentation evidencing its prior experience in relation 
with the Sudan Emergency Transport and Infrastructure Project.  Specifically, the 
respondent submitted three letters purportedly issued by the Nigerian government to 
confirm the respondent’s substantial completion of the Nigerian road project.  After 
additional due diligence, the Bid Evaluation Committee concluded that several of the 
letters contained false and/or misleading information.
143
  Similarly, the WB’s Sanctions 
Board Decision No. 51 concerns a case arising in the context of the West Bank and Gaza 
Local Government Capacity Building Project, in which bidders’ proposals had to include 
the names of the professional staff who would work under the contract.  The bidder, which 
was subsequently debarred, included a CV of a consultant who had never agreed to be part 
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  Fraudulent practice has been by far the most common sanctionable 
practice under the MDBs’ sanctions regimes thus far. 
 
(3) A coercive practice is defined as impairing or harming, or threatening to impair or 
harm, directly or indirectly, any party or the property of the party to influence improperly 
the actions of a party.
145
  An example would be a project where procurement for two 
MDB-financed roads is found to be tainted by the use of intimidation of competing 
bidders.  An investigation reveals that a company that was pre-determined to win contracts 
in a collusive scheme used a combination of threats to the future business interests of 
competitor companies or threats to the physical well-being of competitors’ staff, in 
addition to payments to “losing” bidders, to ensure that other bidders submitted inflated 
bids.
146
  For example, in 2010, ADB debarred a consultant working with village groups 
under an ADB-financed project, found to have misappropriated project funds by falsely 
representing to the groups that a share of the funds should be channelled through him 
(fraud) and threatening that the funds would be withheld if this was not done (coercion).
147
   
 
(4) A collusive practice is defined as an arrangement between two or more parties 
designed to achieve an improper purpose, including influencing improperly the actions of 
another party.
148
  An example would involve a situation where a borrowing government 
arrests an official of an agency that is responsible for implementing an MDB-financed 
project on charges of financial impropriety.  On the basis of that arrest and subsequent 
information from a contractor, an investigation of the relevant contracts is carried out, and 
reveals that the agency official had arranged a collusion “ring” to steer a large number of 
contract awards to his own company and to the companies of people known to him/her.  
To implement the collusion, the agency official influenced local officials who had a role in 
awarding the contracts.
149
  For example, in 2010, the WB’s Sanctions Board debarred a 
party found to have engaged in collusion constituting a fraudulent practice in connection 
with a WB-financed water sector project.  Specifically, the respondent was found to have 
coordinated bid prices with the other two firms bidding for the same small works tender to 
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ensure the respondent would win the contract.
150
 Similarly, in 2011, the WB’s Sanctions 
Board debarred a party found to have engaged in collusive practices in connection with a 
WB-financed transport sector project.  Specifically, the respondent and another firm had 





 In addition to the above four practices, each of the MDBs has subsequently 
(although not concurrently with each other) incorporated “obstructive practice” in its 
Sanctions Procedures.  Interestingly, the definition of “obstructive practice” slightly varies 
across all five MDBs.  At AfDB, IADB and WB, it is defined, in general terms, as  “(i) 
deliberately destroying, falsifying, altering or concealing of evidence material to the 
investigation or making false statements to investigators in order to materially impede a 
Bank investigation into allegations of a corrupt, fraudulent, coercive or collusive practice; 
and/or threatening, harassing or intimidating any party to prevent it from disclosing its 
knowledge of matters relevant to the investigation or from pursuing the investigation, or 
(ii) acts intended to materially impede the exercise of the Bank’s contractual rights of 
audit or inspection or  access to information.”  An example of such practice would involve 
a situation where, based on an allegation of corruption, investigators contacted a company 
that was awarded a contract on an MDB-financed project to audit the financial records.  
While the company is required under its contract to allow access to these records, it 
refused to do so.  This refusal of access is itself an offence that could make the company 




 For example, in 2017, WB debarred a party for obstruction in relation to a  health 
sector development program in Bangladesh. Following the procurement of ultrasound 
machines under this project, INT requested to audit the accounts and records of the 
respondent, a company that was among the losing bidders.  Despite initially agreeing to 
cooperate with INT, the respondent ultimately refused to permit the audit. To justify this 
refusal, the respondent claimed, inter alia, that INT did not allege misconduct separate 
from obstruction, and that WB had no audit rights over losing bidders. In its decision, the 
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Sanctions Board observed that, in order to detect, deter, and prevent fraud and corruption 
effectively, WB must be able to exercise its audit rights without interference – especially 
considering that INT has no powers to compel the production of evidence or witness 
testimony. The Sanctions Board further observed that, per the bidding documents, the 
respondent not only undertook an obligation to comply with audit requests by WB, but 
also expressly agreed that failing to do so could, in and of itself, lead to sanctions for 
obstruction. Emphasising that this obligation is not limited to the winning bidder, the 




At ADB and EBRD, the definition of “obstructive practice” also captures “failing 
to comply with requests to provide information, documents or records in connection with 
[an ADB/EBRD] investigation.”154  In addition, at EBRD, which was the last MDB to 
incorporate “obstructive practice” in its Sanctions Procedures in November 2015, the 




Some MDBs have also incorporated other sanctionable practices.  ADB, for 
example, may also sanction for conflict of interest, retaliation against whistleblowers or 
witnesses, violations of ADB sanctions and failure to adhere to the highest ethical 
standards.
156





Notably, all of the sanctionable practices are broadly defined and provide the 
MDBs with fairly wide scope to sanction.  They deliberately omit the mens rea 
requirement in order to shift the focus from the subjective state of mind of the relevant 
party to the more easily provable objective facts.  In addition to harmonising the 
definitions of sanctionable practices, the Framework also established agreed minimum 
standards by which each of the signatories conducts investigations of the sanctionable 
practices, while continuing to maintain its own sanctions system.   
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(v) Description of current WB Sanctions Procedures 
 
(a) Two-step decision-making process 
 
WB sanctions cases begin with an INT investigation into possible misconduct 
under a WB-financed activity.  As INT does not have law enforcement powers, it relies on 
the audit and inspection rights provided in WB-financed contracts and in tender 
documents for WB-financed activities.
158
   
 
The WB’s jurisdiction is established through the application of any of the 
Procurement, Consultant or Anti-Corruption Guidelines that include provisions 
establishing the WB’s right to sanction to the project where the sanctionable practice 
allegedly took place.
159
  This application typically occurs through the incorporation by 
reference of the relevant guidelines into the loan or other legal agreement governing the 
project.
160
  Further, just like all other MDBs, WB does not need the agreement of third 
parties to sanction because the right to sanction is one that carries with it no corresponding 
obligation on the part of the sanctioned party.  Even in cases where conditions are placed 
on non-debarment or release from debarment, these are not contractual obligations, but a 
unilateral decision by WB that it will either debar a party, or not release a party from 
debarment if these conditions are not met.  Notably, however, the inclusion of appropriate 
provisions regarding the WB’s sanctions and fraud and corruption generally, in bidding 
documents and contracts, while not necessary to establish the authority to sanction, serves 
two important purposes relevant to the sanctions regime: (i) first, as a matter of 
fundamental fairness, it puts bidders and contractors on notice that they are subject to the 
sanctions regime and (ii) second, these provisions would strengthen the WB’s defences 
against potential claims of tortuous interference with contract or defamation by sanctioned 
parties. 
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The WB’s sanctions system follows a two-step process: In step one, if an INT 
investigation concludes that a party has engaged in a sanctionable practice, INT presents 
the case to a Suspension and Debarment Officer (the “SDO”), who conducts a first, 
internal review of the written record presented by INT to determine whether it appears 
sufficient to support a finding of sanctionable misconduct.  In addition, if INT finds 
evidence indicating that a sanctionable practice has occurred, but continues to investigate 
related matters, INT may seek an Early Temporary Suspension of a party’s eligibility to 
receive WB-financed contracts pending the completion of the remaining investigative 
work.
161
   
 
Where the Officer determines that INT has presented evidence sufficient to 
conclude that a party (at this stage called a “respondent”) engaged in sanctionable 
practice, the Officer will issue to the respondent a Notice of Sanctions Proceedings that 
contains INT’s allegations and evidence and the Officer’s recommended sanction.  In 





The respondent may then file: (i) an Explanation, explaining why the case should 
be withdrawn or its temporary suspension lifted
163
; and/or (ii) a Response, contesting the 
case.
164
  In theory, this model can lead to a conflict of jurisdictions, in that the respondent 
may submit its Explanation and Response simultaneously to the Officer and the Sanctions 
Board. 
 
If the respondent does not contest the allegations, the Officer will automatically 
impose the recommended sanction.  In addition, since September 2011, the Officer’s 
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determinations have been publicly disclosed on the WB’s website.165  If, however, the 
respondent contests the allegations, the matter proceeds to the second step and moves 
before the WB’s Sanctions Board.  The Sanctions Board is a seven-member body 
comprised entirely of non-staff members.  The Sanctions Board provides a full and 
independent review based on an adversarial process with exchanges of written 
submissions of arguments and evidence.  The Sanctions Board may also convene a 
hearing, either upon a party’s request or at the Sanctions Board Chair’s discretion, at 
which Sanctions Board members hear the parties’ oral presentations and may question the 




This stage of WB’s Sanctions Procedures resembles the FAR’s Notice of Proposed 
Debarment phase in that, under both systems, the Notices serve the same purpose – to 
notify the accused party of a potential debarment.  Moreover, both systems provide for 
additional proceedings after the accused party has submitted a response contesting the 
allegations.
167
  Notably, however, under FAR, oral hearings are available only when the 
respondent’s response to the Notice raises a “genuine dispute over the material facts.”168  
Conversely, under the WB’s Sanctions Procedures, a respondent may obtain a hearing 
before the Sanctions Board upon request, regardless of whether a dispute regarding 
material facts exists.
169
   
 
Sitting in a plenary or panel session, the Sanctions Board considers cases de novo, 
which means that it does not give any deference to the SDO’s determinations.  In 
reviewing contested cases, the Sanctions Board considers a more expansive record than 
the SDO, including at least one additional round of pleadings containing additional 
arguments and/or new evidence.
170
  The Sanctions Board also conducts oral hearings, as 
requested by any of the parties or convened at the discretion of the Sanctions Board Chair.  
In 2018, oral hearings were held in 60% of the cases before the Sanctions Board.
171
 The 
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Sanctions Board may also call witnesses, who may be questioned only by Sanctions Board 
members.   
 
The Sanctions Board then issues a fully reasoned decision as to whether it is more 
likely than not that the respondent engaged in a sanctionable practice.  Where the 
Sanctions Board finds that a respondent engaged in a sanctionable practice, the Sanctions 





For cases initiated from 2011 onward, the Sanctions Board has published full texts 
of its decisions in accordance with the Sanctions Procedures.
173
  In addition, the Sanctions 
Board has published a Law Digest that summarises the legal principles applied in 
decisions that predate the start of publication.
174
  Publication of Sanctions Board decisions, 
and particularly their rationales, has created a body of jurisprudence that will hopefully 
supplement the sparse substantive legal framework for the MDBs’ sanctions regimes.175 
 
(b) Range of sanctions  
 
WB’s Sanctions Procedures provide for five different types of sanctions that may 
be imposed:  
 
(1) Debarment with conditional release: The “baseline” or default sanction176 is to 
impose  a  minimum  period  of  debarment  (i.e., ineligibility  to  be  awarded  a  WB-
financed contract  or  otherwise  participate  in  WB-financed activities) of three years, 
after which the sanctioned party may be released from debarment if it has complied with 
certain prescribed conditions.
177
  If they fail to do so, the sanction converts into an 
indefinite debarment.  The conditions typically include the  sanctioned  party  putting  in  
place,  and  implementing  for  an  adequate  period,  an  integrity  compliance  program  
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satisfactory  to  the  WB.  Sanctioned parties must apply for release and must provide 
evidence that they have met the conditions for release.
178
   
 
(2)  Debarment for  a  fixed  term: In  cases  where  no  appreciable  purpose  would 
be served by imposing conditions for release, sanctioned parties may be debarred for a 
specified   period   of   time,   after   which   they   are   automatically   released   from  
debarment.  This may occur,  for  example,  in  cases where  a  sanctioned  firm  already  
has  in  place  a  robust  corporate  compliance  program,  the  sanctionable  practice  
involved  the  isolated  acts  of  an  employee  or  employees  who  have  already  been  
terminated,  and  the  proposed  debarment  is  for  a  relative  short  period  of  time  (e.g., 
one  year  or  less).  At  the  opposite  extreme,  where  there  is  no  realistic  prospect  that 




(3)  Conditional non-debarment: Under   this   sanction,   the   sanctioned   party   
is   not debarred   provided   that   the   sanctioned   party   complies   with   certain 
defined  conditions within a set time frame.  If the conditions of conditional non-
debarment  are  not  met, the sanctioned party is debarred for a defined period of time. 
Conditional non-debarment may be applied, for example, in cases where the respondent 
already has taken   comprehensive   voluntary corrective measures and the   circumstances 
otherwise indicate  that  it  need  not  be  debarred.
180
   
 
(4) Letter  of  reprimand: In  some  cases,  debarment  or  even  conditional  non-
debarment may  be  disproportionate  to  the  offense.  In such cases, and in other 
appropriate cases,  a  letter  of  reprimand  is  issued  to  the  sanctioned  party.  A letter of 
reprimand  may be  issued,  for  example,  in cases  where  an  affiliate  of  the  respondent  
has  been  found to have some shared responsibility for the misconduct because of an 
isolated  lapse in   supervision,   but   the   affiliate   was   not   in   any   way   complicit   
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 (5) Restitution: Under this sanction, the respondent is required to make restitution 
to the borrower of the WB’s funds, to the WB itself or another party sufficient to, at a 
minimum, disgorge illicit profits, remedy harm done to the borrower or others, or to the 
public good, or to undertake other remedial measures.
182
  The WB’s Sanctioning 
Guidelines state that this sanction is to be used “in exceptional circumstances, including 
those involving fraud in contract execution where there is a quantifiable amount to be 
restored to the client country or project.”183  Moreover, given that the WB, just like all 
other MDBs, lacks enforcement powers of a court, such sanction is typically imposed as 
one of the conditions under the conditional non-debarment or debarment with conditional 
release.  
 
Comparing the WB’s Sanctions Procedures with FAR, it is noteworthy that FAR 
only provides for a fixed-term debarment, whereas the WB’s Sanctions Procedures 
provide for a range of five types of sanctions.   
 
Finally, the WB’s Sanctions Procedures include a non-exhaustive list of 
aggravating and mitigating factors to be considered when determining appropriate 
sanction.
184
  In addition, the WB’s Sanctioning Guidelines include more detailed treatment 
of these factors, with indicative ranges for increases (in the case of aggravating factors) 
and decreases (in the case of mitigating factors) of the debarment period.
185
   These have 
been subsequently encapsulated in the General Principles and Guidelines for Sanctions, to 
which all other MDBs have subscribed186 and are analysed in greater detail in Chapter 3.  
 
 Notably, FAR’s mitigating factors are broadly similar to those enumerated in the 
WB’s Sanctions Procedures.187  However, while the WB uses a specific list of potentially 
aggravating factors, FAR does not name any aggravating factors.  The following table 
illustrates key differences between FAR and the WB’s Sanctions Procedures:188 
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 FAR WB’s Sanctions 
Procedures 
Causes of debarment Broadly defined (for 
discretionary, i.e., non-
statutory debarments) 
Corrupt, fraudulent, coercive, 
collusive and obstructive 
practices 
Referral and sources of 
evidence 
Any source INT investigation 
Temporary suspension Allowed in case of suspicion, 
upon adequate evidence 
Allowed if sufficient evidence 
Standards of debarment Preponderance of evidence; 
then contractor must be shown 
responsible (“present 
responsibility”) 
Preponderance of evidence; 
Sanctions Board is the ultimate 
decision-maker 
Hearing allowed? Yes, only in case of a genuine 
dispute over material facts 
Yes, before the Sanctions 
Board 
Range of sanctions From debarment to 
administrative agreement 
From debarment to reprimand 
Cross-debarment  All federal agencies Four other MDBs 
Judicial review Yes No 
 
(c) Settlements   
WB’s Sanctions Procedures allow for the negotiated resolution of cases at any 
stage of the sanctions process up to the issuance of a decision by the Sanctions Board.  All 
firms or individuals under investigation are given the option of resolving a matter through 
a settlement in lieu of a sanctions process.  The INT may consider a variety of factors 
when determining whether a settlement is appropriate, including the potential resource 




The admission of culpability is not a requirement for settlement and settlement 
may be appropriate in certain cases for a respondent who, although unwilling to admit 
culpability, is willing to resolve the matter. For example, a respondent may be keen to 
resolve the matter quickly, thus reducing the expenditure of resources on sanctions 
proceedings, or having certainty as to the outcome.
190
   Settlements are subject to review 
by the WB General Counsel and the Suspension and Debarment Officer.  Further, 
sanctions imposed through settlements are implemented identically to any sanction 
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imposed through the traditional sanctions process, including the application of cross-
debarment
191
 (described in more detail in section G(ii) below). 
 
 In 2009, in what remains the largest WB case in terms of monetary settlement, 
Siemens reached a settlement with WB over bribery allegations, agreeing to make USD 
100 million available for anti-corruption projects and to forego bidding on WB projects 
for two years.
192
  Except for its Russian subsidiary, Siemens was not debarred or 
otherwise sanctioned.   The obvious questions that this settlement raises are: First, on what 
basis was the amount of USD 100 million determined and, much more importantly, does 
the settlement suggest that those with “deep pockets” can buy their way out of sanctions?  
Interestingly, the Review of the World Bank Group Sanctions Regime 2011 – 2014 
expressed concern over the lack of transparency surrounding settlements.
193
   
 
Other examples of settlements that followed after the Siemens settlement include:  
 
 A settlement with Iberdrola Ingeniería y Construcción, S.A.U. (“Iberinco”), 
following acknowledgment of misconduct by Iberinco involving two power 
projects in Albania.  Under the terms of the settlement agreement, Iberinco was 
debarred for a period of twelve months to be followed by a six-month conditional 
non-debarment period.  In addition, the company had to make a restitution 
payment of USD 350,000 to the Albanian government.
194
  Here, again, the 
sanction appears to be conspicuously under the one-year threshold which would 
have triggered cross-debarment, described in more detail in section G(ii) below, 
raising questions as to whether a restitution payment has contributed to the 
imposition of more lenient terms.      
 
 A settlement with Sinclair Knight Merz Pty (SKM), following the company’s self-
reporting to the INT of corrupt misconduct relating to Bank-financed projects in 
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the East Asia and Pacific region.  The settlement resulted in a conditional non-
debarment, with the WB press release noting that “[a] combination of self-
reporting, corrective action against corruption, and engaging with the World 
Bank’s Integrity Vice Presidency with full transparency placed SKM in a strong 
and credible position with regard to the resolution of this matter.   As a result of 
the exceptional cooperation received from the company, which has enabled INT to 
take steps to safeguard World Bank funds and identify other potential targets for 
investigation, a conditional non-debarment for two and a half years is being 
imposed on SKM, under strict conditions.”195 
 
 A settlement with Alstom, resulting from the company’s improper payment to an 
entity controlled by a former senior government official for consultancy services in 
relation to the WB-financed Zambia Power Rehabilitation Project.  The settlement 
resulted in a debarment of Alstom Hydro France and Alstom Network Schweiz 
AG (Switzerland), as well as their affiliates, for a period of three years, which 
period may be reduced to 21 months if the companies comply with the conditions 





The number of settlements has seen a steady increase since 2014, with only six 
settlement agreements submitted to the SDO by the INT in 2014, and 23 settlement 
agreements submitted in 2018.
197
   
 
 Quite problematically from the due process perspective, it is unclear how multi-
million dollar settlements have been calculated by participating institutions and the 
respondent and whether the amount is intended to be restorative and/or related to 
reimbursement of investigation and proceedings costs, particularly as settlement 
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agreements terms are not widely disclosed and are subject to less public scrutiny.
198
  Of 
particular concern is whether, in view of the cross-debarment regime, a debarment against 
an entity by one MDB may allow another MDB with an open investigation into the same 
entity to gain leverage from the debarment to extract maximum payment amounts if there 





 With settlements becoming more common on MDBs’ sanctions landscape, further 
measures to increase transparency and checks and balances around settlement agreements 
are warranted, as discussed in greater detail in Chapter 3.   
 
 C.  Inter-American Development Bank’s sanctions regime 
 
(i) Early developments and the Thornburgh report 
  
The Inter-American Development Bank (“IADB”) was established in 1959 with 
the aim to contribute to the acceleration of the process of economic and social 
development of its member countries in Latin America and the Caribbean.
200
  Just like 
WB, IADB also started paying more attention to matters involving fraud and corruption in 
the 1990s.
201
  Thus, in 1996, IADB’s Board of Executive Directors approved the 
institution’s Policy on Modernization of the State and Strengthening of Civil Society, 
designed to consolidate democratic systems and strengthen governance processes in its 
borrowing member countries.
202
  A few years later, in 2001, IADB’s Board of Executive 
Directors adopted the strategy document titled “Strengthening the Systematic Framework 
Against Corruption”, which sets forth guidelines and policies for the IADB's actions to 
prevent corruption in three areas: ensuring integrity among IADB’s staff, 
ensuring activities financed by IADB are free of corruption and fraud, and 
supporting IADB's borrowing member countries to strengthen good governance and 
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  In the same year, IADB’s President announced the establishment of 
an independent Oversight Committee on Fraud and Corruption (“OCFC”), composed of 
senior staff members and tasked with coordinating responses to all allegations of fraud and 
corruption in connection with IADB’s activities and operations, overseeing any resulting 
investigations and assuring proper dispositions.
204
  The OCFC was receiving allegations of 
fraud and corruption and referring them for investigation to the Office of the Auditor 
General, the Procurement Committee, the Ethics Committee or the Legal Department, and 
then adjudicating the matter, including recommendation of any sanctions, which would 
then be sent to IADB’s President for his final decision.205   
 
Evidently, at this early stage of IADB’s sanctions proceedings, both investigation 
and adjudication were centred in a single body, comprised entirely of the institution’s staff 
members.  Very soon, however, the organisation adopted more sophisticated investigative 
procedures, together with the rules for the protection of whistleblowers and witnesses, an 
established the Office of Institutional Integrity (“OII”), an office within the Office of the 
President, tasked with investigating matters related to integrity,
206
 and an analogue to the 
WB’s INT.  In addition, the Sanctions Committee, comprised senior staff members, was 
created and took over much of OCFC’s adjudicatory and sanctioning functions.207 
 
The evolutionary path of IADB’s sanctions procedures is very similar to that of the 
WB, given that – just like at WB – the major reform of the IADB’s sanctions regime 
occurred following the review of the sanctions regime by a working group consisting of 
four experts, including Dick Thornburgh.
208
  The report prepared by the working group in 
2008 made several recommendations, reminiscent of the ones articulated in the above-




In 2011, important changes ensued: (i) the OII became an independent office 
reporting directly to the President of the Bank; (ii) the role of the Sanctions Officer, the 
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first-tier decision-maker, was created and (iii) the Sanctions Committee was reformed into 





(ii) Description of IADB’s current sanctions procedures 
 
(a) Two-step decision-making process 
 
Just like at WB, IADB’s sanctions cases begin with an OII investigation into 
possible misconduct under an IADB-financed activity.  The IADB’s sanctions system 
follows a two-step process: In step one, if an OII investigation concludes that a party has 
engaged in a sanctionable practice, OII presents the case to the Sanctions Officer.
211
  The 
Sanctions Officer is the first instance of IADB’s sanctions system’s adjudication phase.  In 
addition, OII may recommend that the Sanctions Officer impose a temporary 
suspension.
212
  In order to impose a temporary suspension, the Sanctions Officer must find, 
in consultation with the Chairperson of the Sanctions Committee (the second-tier decision-
maker) that the award of contracts to the concerned party or its participation in additional 
IADB-financed projects could result in significant harm to IADB and that OII has offered 
substantial evidence that supports an allegation of a sanctionable practice.
213
  The 





The Sanctions Officer reviews OII’s investigative findings and decides if it is more 
likely than not that the respondent committed a sanctionable practice. If that is the case, 
the Sanctions Officer issues a Notice of Administrative Action with a recommended 
sanction.
215
 This Notice is sent to the respondent, who can respond to the Notice, 
following which the Sanctions Officer determines whether a preponderance of the 
evidence supports a finding that the respondent engaged in a sanctionable practice and 
issues a determination to that effect.
216
  If the respondent does not respond to the Notice, 
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the respondent is deemed to have admitted the allegations in the Notice and to have 
waived the opportunity for appeal.
217
 Unless the respondent has so waived the opportunity 
to appeal, the respondent may appeal the Sanctions Officer’s determination, in which case 
the matter proceeds to the second step and moves before the IADB’s Sanctions 
Committee.
218
   
 
The Sanctions Committee is a seven-member body comprised four non-IADB 
employees and three IADB employees.
219
  The Sanctions Committee provides a full and 
independent review based on an adversarial process with exchanges of written 
submissions of arguments and evidence.  The Sanctions Committee may also convene a 
hearing, only upon its own discretion, and not upon a party’s request.220   
 
Sitting in a plenary or panel session, the Sanctions Committee considers de novo 
the allegations and evidence presented by the respondent in its appeal, the OII’s reply (if 
any), the parties’ presentations at any hearing, and any other materials in the record before 
taking a decision.
221
  The Sanctions Committee then issues a decision as to whether it is 
more likely than not that the respondent engaged in a sanctionable practice.
222
  Where the 
Sanctions Committee finds that a respondent is liable for a sanctionable practice, the 
Sanctions Procedures require that a sanction be imposed.
223
  Decisions of the Sanctions 
Board are final and non-appealable.
224
   
 
Any sanction imposed by the Sanctions Officer or the Sanctions Committee is 
published on IADB’s website,225 together with the name and nationality of the sanctioned 
party, country where the relevant project was located, the length of, and grounds for, the 
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    However, unlike WB, IADB does not publish texts of fully reasoned 
Sanctions Committee decisions.   
 
(b) Range of possible sanctions 
 
IADB’s Sanctions Procedures provide for six different types of sanctions that may 
be imposed: (1) reprimand, (2) debarment, (3) conditional non-debarment, (4) debarment 
with conditional release, (5) other sanctions and (6) sanctions of other institutions (which 
take into account the Cross-Debarment Agreement).   The first four are identical to the 
ones described in section B(v)(b) above relating to the sanctions prescribed by the WB’s 
Sanctions Procedures.  While IADB does not have (or make publicly available) its own 
sanctioning guidelines, all MDBs, including IADB, are signatories to the General 
Principles and Guidelines for Sanctions, which stipulate that “[t]he base sanction is three 
year debarment (with or without conditional release), which may be decreased or 
increased taking into account any mitigating and/or aggravating circumstances.”227 
 
 In addition, IADB’s Sanctions Procedures stipulate that “[o]ther sanctions may be 
imposed as deemed appropriate by the Sanctions Officer, or the Committee, as applicable, 
including, but not limited to, the restitution of funds, and the imposition of fines 
representing reimbursement of the costs associated with investigations and proceedings 
contemplated herein.” 228   The restitution of funds and the imposition of funds are 
analogous to the sanction of restitution under the WB’s Sanctions Procedures.  The “other 
sanctions” construct, on the other hand, raises concerns over this sanction’s potential 
violation of the basic nulla poena sine lege principle, which requires punishable conduct 
and penalties to be sufficiently precise, so that parties know what the expect if they are 
found guilty of a particular offence.  Finally, the IADB Sanctions Procedures specifically 
mention that IADB may impose a sanction in recognition of the sanctions of other 
institutions, referring primarily (although not expressly) to the cross-debarment regime 
described in section G(ii) below. 
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 Unlike WB, whose base sanction is debarment with conditional release, so far 
IADB has imposed almost exclusively simple debarments.  In 2014, IADB imposed 
debarment with conditional release for the first time.
229
  Arguably, unlike simple 
debarment, debarment with conditional release places greater emphasis on rehabilitation, 
encouraging sanctioned companies to adopt effective policies and measures that make it 
less likely that they will engage in misconduct in the future.  On the other hand, however, 
working with a firm on its meeting of the prescribed conditions and ultimately 
determining whether these conditions have been met is a resource-intensive process whose 
benefits have not been demonstrated.  Namely, as discussed in greater detail in Chapter 3, 
the 2013 Review of the World Bank Sanctions System raised concerns over “very limited 
engagement by Respondents, in particular SMEs, . . . raising the prospect that, contrary to 
intentions, debarment with conditional release will become, de facto, a road to indefinite 
debarment.”230 
 
(c) Settlements  
 
IADB’s Sanctions Procedures did not allow for settlements until 2015, when the 
organisation adopted revised Sanctions Procedures, which only briefly mention the 
possibility of settlements by stating that “[a]t any time prior to or during an investigation, 
but not after the receipt of a Statement of Charges by the Sanctions Officer, the Bank . . . 
may enter into negotiated resolution agreements related to Prohibited Practices.”231  The 
timeframe within which settlements are allowed is much more narrow than under the WB 
Sanctions Procedures, where settlements are permitted at any stage of the sanctions 
process until the issuance of the Sanctions Board decision.  In addition, unlike WB’s 
settlements, which are available to all respondents, the IADB’s procedures suggest that 
settlements are available only to those parties that provide evidence that assists in IADB’s 
investigations of sanctionable practices.   
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 IADB Sanctions Procedures, §15.4. 
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D.  European Bank for Reconstruction and Development’s sanctions regime 
 
(i) Early developments 
 
The European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (“EBRD”) was 
established in 1991 with the aim to help create a new post-Cold War era in central and 
eastern Europe, furthering progress towards market-oriented economies and the promotion 
of private and entrepreneurial initiatives.
232
  Initially focused on the countries of the 
former Eastern Bloc, it has since expanded to support development in central Asian and 
southern and eastern Mediterranean countries.  The main difference between EBRD and 
other MDBs is that EBRD is particularly focused on the development of the private sector 
within its countries of operations.   
 
EBRD adopted its sanctions procedures (called the Enforcement Policy and 
Procedures) in 2009.  Until that year, EBRD’s formal sanctions mechanism, which 
included debarment as a possible sanction, was limited to public sector procurement 




Just like WB did in 2006, in 2009, EBRD decided that the organisation should 
have a single sanctions mechanism for cases that are covered by the Procurement Policies 
and Rules (public procurement) and all other cases that fall outside it.  Consequently, 
EBRD adopted a single sanctions mechanism to address sanctionable practices by a party 
not only in relation to procurement opportunities in EBRD-financed contracts, but also 
with respect to EBRD’s financing(s), technical assistance contracts and corporate 
purchases.  Notably, because of EBRD’s focus on fostering private sector development, 
EBRD has a much lower level of public sector procurement as its percentage of its overall 
business and, as a consequence, has had a significantly lower number of cases related to 
sanctionable practices.
234
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Until November 2015, EBRD’s Enforcement Policy and Procedures resembled 
early sanctions procedures of other MDBs, with the decision-making centred in the 
Enforcement Committee comprising five senior staff members.
235
  This type of sanctions 
system did not provide the respondent with an opportunity to appeal the first-tier decision-
maker’s decision and, even more significantly, lacked independence because the 
Enforcement Committee was comprised entirely of internal staff members.  Because of 
these shortcomings, in 2015 EBRD reformed its sanctions system in order to provide 
greater due process protections to respondents and align its processes with those of other 
MDBs.   
 
(ii) Description of EBRD’s current sanctions procedures 
 
(a) Two-step decision-making process 
 
EBRD’s sanctions process begins with the investigation by the Office of the Chief 
Compliance Officer (“OCCO”) into whether there is sufficient evidence that (i) 
preponderance of the evidence supports a finding that the suspected Prohibited Practice 
was committed or (ii) a Third Party Finding may warrant a sanction.
236
  The imposition of 
a sanction on the basis of a Third Party Finding is unique to EBRD, as none of the other 
MDBs impose a sanction on that basis.  “Third Party Finding” is defined as a final 
judgment of a judicial process in EBRD’s member country or a finding by the 
enforcement (or similar) mechanism of another international organisation that is not an 
MDB that a party has engaged in a sanctionable practice or equivalent act of that member 
country or international organisation.
237
  The Third Party Finding mechanism allows the 
organisation to impose a sanction on the basis of a final judgment, without the need to 
conduct internal investigation and use internal resources.  Notably, a sanction imposed on 
the basis of a Third Party Finding is not subject to cross-debarment by other MDBs.
238
   
 
When OCCO’s investigation concludes that there is sufficient evidence that either 
(i) preponderance of the evidence supports a finding that the suspected sanctionable 
practice was committed or (ii) a Third Party Finding may warrant a sanction, the Chief 
Compliance Officer (the “CCO”) prepares a Notice that details, among other things, the 
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CCO’s evidence and findings (or a copy of the Third Party Finding), the sanction(s) 
proposed by the CCO and any exculpatory or mitigating evidence.
239
  A finding that “a 
Third Party Finding” may warrant a sanction is much more vague than the preponderance 
of the evidence standard.  This is probably deliberately so in order to give EBRD 
maximum discretion in deciding whether it wants to do business with a party found to 
have engaged in a sanctionable practice.  Yet, the respondent is restricted to the 
presentation of mitigating circumstances and/or other facts relevant to the proposed 
sanction and arguments as to the relevance of the Third Party Finding to EBRD,
240
 which 
is a difficult task, given that EBRD itself is best positioned to assess the relevance of the 
Third Party Finding to it. 
 
EBRD’s enforcement proceedings follow a two-stage decision-making process.  In 
the first stage, the CCO submits the above-described Notice to the Enforcement 
Commissioner, who determines whether, in the Enforcement Commissioner’s view, the 
CCO has presented evidence sufficient to support a finding that (i) more likely than not 
the party committed the alleged Prohibited Practice(s) or (ii) a Third Party Finding may 
warrant a sanction.  If the Enforcement Commissioner finds sufficient evidence, he/she 
will issue the Notice to the party (at this stage referred to as the respondent).
241
   If the 
respondent does not contest the allegations within the deadline prescribed in the Notice 
(which is never less than 30 days), the Enforcement Commissioner will issue a decision 
against the respondent imposing one or more sanctions.
242
    
 
If the respondent contests the case within the prescribed deadline, the CCO may 
then submit a reply presenting the arguments and evidence addressing the arguments and 
evidence presented in the respondent’s response.243  Based on these submissions and any 
additional submissions authorised by the Enforcement Commissioner or expressly 
requested by the Enforcement Commissioner, the Enforcement Commissioner will issue a 
decision.  EBRD is the only MDB whose sanctions procedures allow the investigators to 
appeal the first tier decision-maker’s decisions.  If, within the prescribed deadline, neither 
the respondent nor the CCO presents an appeal, the Enforcement Commissioner will 
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impose the sanction set forth in his/her decision, which will be publicly disclosed on 
EBRD’s website (if it involves a debarment).244 
 
If, however, either the respondent or the CCO submits an appeal, the matter 
proceeds to the second stage and moves to the Enforcement Committee.  The Enforcement 
Committee is a five-member body comprised three non-EBRD employees and two EBRD 
employees.
245
   The respondent may contest the Enforcement Commissioner’s decision on 
written pleadings and may also request to make oral representations to the Enforcement 
Committee.  In addition, the Enforcement Committee may also request oral 
representations of both parties on its own volition.
246
   
 
In response to the appellant’s notice of appeal, the appellee may submit an appeal 
response, following which the appellant may submit an appeal reply, in each case within 
the prescribed deadlines.
247
  The Enforcement Committee will then issue a decision, which 
is non-appealable.
248
  For cases initiated from November 2015, the Enforcement 




(b) Range of possible sanctions 
 
EBRD’s Enforcement Policy and Procedures provide for seven different types of 
sanctions that may be imposed: (1) rejection of a proposal for award of contract to a 
respondent in respect of a procurement of goods, works or services; (2) cancellation of a 
portion of EBRD’s finance allocated to a respondent, but not yet disbursed in respect of a 
contract for the procurement of goods, works or services; (3) reprimand; (4) debarment; 
(5) conditional non-debarment; (6) debarment with conditional release and (7) 
restitution.
250
   
 
The first one of these is always available to EBRD, even without the sanctions 
regime, as the organisation can always reject the respondent’s proposal a procurement of 
goods, works or services.  The second one is presumably dependent on EBRD’s ability to 
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cancel the portion of its finance under the provisions of the relevant contract.  Finally, the 
last five sanctions are the same as the ones described in section B(v)(b) above in the 




EBRD’s Enforcement Policy and Procedures allow for the settlement of cases at 
any stage of the sanctions process prior to the issuance of the Enforcement 
Commissioner’s decision.  Before commencing settlement negotiations, OCCO must be 
satisfied that the particular case warrants a negotiated resolution in lieu of pursuing a 
traditional sanctions proceeding.  
 
Additional measures are taken to ensure that all parties, both large and small, 
represented or unrepresented, who enter into a settlement agreement do so voluntarily and 
of their own free will. To this end, a settlement agreement contains an acknowledgement 
by all parties that are subject to it, including the CCO, that the accused party entered into it 




Once the accused party signs a settlement agreement, it must be submitted to the 
Enforcement Commissioner for his/her review.  The Enforcement Commissioner, in 
consultation with EBRD’s General Counsel, will review the terms of the settlement 
agreement to ensure that they do not violate any of EBRD’s policies.  Only after the 
Enforcement Commissioner has completed his/her review does the settlement agreement 
become binding and is the sanction imposed.
252
  Sanctions imposed through settlements 
are implemented identically to any sanction imposed by the Enforcement Commissioner 
through the regular enforcement proceedings, including the disclosure requirements on 
EBRD’s website.253 
E.  African Development Bank’s sanctions regime 
 
(i) Early developments 
 
The African Development Bank (“AfDB”) was founded in 1964 with the mission 
to fight poverty and improve living conditions on the African continent through promoting 
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the investment of public and private capital in projects and programs that are likely to 
contribute to the economic and social development of the region.
254
  AfDB adopted its 
sanctions procedures in 2012.  Until that year, AfDB’s processes governing sanctions 
were based on the following instruments: (i) the Uniform Framework, (ii) the 
organisation’s zero-tolerance policy against corruption and (iii) the organisation’s Rules 
and Procedures for Procurement of Goods and Works and the Rules and Procedures for 




In 2012, prompted by its signing of the Cross-Debarment Agreement in 2010, the 
organisation undertook a review of its sanctions process, which concluded that “[t]he 
Bank’s current sanctions process does not conform to the required standards that must be 
in place for the [Cross-Debarment] Agreement to be effective with respect to a 
Participating Institution”, particularly the standard that requires the Investigative Office to 
“perform its duties independently from those responsible for or involved in operational 
activities and from staff members liable to be subject of investigations.”256  This was 
because, at the time, AfDB’s Integrity and Anti-Corruption Division (“IACD”) played 
multiple roles: it both conducted investigations and made recommendations to AfDB’s 
President and, upon approval, implemented the sanctions.
257
  Thus, it exercised both 
investigative and adjudication functions.  The review of AfDB’s sanctions process 
concluded that, as a result of IACD’s multiple functions, “the transparency of the current 
process could be brought under scrutiny by both the sanctioned entities and the other 
IFIs...”258  Because of these shortcomings, in 2014 AfDB reformed its sanctions system in 
order to provide greater due process protections and align its processes with those of other 
MDBs. 
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 See Uniform Framework for Preventing and Combating Fraud and Corruption (2006), at 5. 
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(ii) Description of AfDB’s current sanctions procedures 
 
(a) Two-step decision-making process 
 
AfDB’s sanctions process begins with the investigation by IACD into whether 
there is sufficient evidence to support a finding of one or more sanctionable practices.
259
  
If, either before IACD concludes its investigation or after the end of its investigation, 
IACD believes that continuous eligibility of the subject of investigations would cause 
imminent financial or reputational harm to AfDB, IACD may seek a suspension of such 
party’s eligibility to participate in AfDB-financed programmes or projects and to be 
awarded new contracts and other support from AfDB.
260
  If, based on IACD’s request, the 
first-tier decision-maker (the Sanctions Commissioner) issues a Notice of Temporary 
Suspension, the party may then file an objection to such Notice, explaining why the 




AfDB’s sanctions proceedings follow a two-stage decision-making process.  In the 
first stage, when IACD’s investigation concludes that the evidence supports such finding, 
IACD presents Findings of Sanctionable Practices, together with any exculpatory or 
mitigating evidence to the Sanctions Commissioner.
262
  The Sanctions Commissioner then 
determines whether the Findings of Sanctionable Practice(s) support a prima facie finding 
that the respondent has engaged in a sanctionable practice.
263
  If so, the Sanctions 




If the respondent does not contest the allegations within the prescribed deadline, 
the Sanctions Commissioner will impose a sanction.
265
  If, however, the respondent 
contests the allegations, the Sanctions Commissioner will determine whether a 
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The respondent may appeal the Sanctions Commissioner’s decision within 25 days 
of its receipt.  In such case, the matter proceeds to the second stage and moves to the 
Appeals Board.  The Appeals Board is a three-member body comprised two non-AfDB 
employees and one AfDB employee.
267
  The respondent may contest the Sanctions 
Commissioner’s decision on written pleadings and may also request to make oral 
representations to the Appeals Board.   In addition, IACD and the Appeals Board itself 
may request an oral hearing.
268
  If the hearing has been requested by the respondent or 
IACD, the Appeals Board will hold it if it deems appropriate to do so and provided that 
the request for a hearing is supported by whatever the Appeals Board deems reasonable 




In response to the respondent’s notice of appeal, IACD may submit a reply, 
following which the respondent may submit a rebuttal.
270
  The Appeals Board will then 
consider whether a preponderance of the evidence supports a finding that the respondent 
engaged in a sanctionable practice.
271
  The Appeals Board’s decision will be delivered to 
IACD, the respondent and the Sanctions Commissioner, but will not be published on 
AfDB’s website.  What is published are the imposed sanction(s), the identity of the 
sanctioned party, the sanctionable practice the party is found to have committed and a 
summary of the decision.
272
  The Appeals Board’s decisions are non-appealable. 
 
(b) Range of possible sanctions 
 
AfDB’s Sanctions Procedures provide for six different types of sanctions that may 
be imposed: (1) letter of reprimand, (2) conditional non-debarment, (3) debarment for a 
fixed or indefinite term, (4) debarment with conditional release, (5) restitution and/or 
remedy and (6) other sanctions. 
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The first five sanctions are identical to the ones described in section B(v)(b) above 
relating to the sanctions prescribed by the WB’s Sanctions Procedures. 273   Just as in 
IADB’s case, the open-endedness of the “other sanctions”, however, raises concerns over 
this sanction’s potential violation of the nulla poena sine lege principle. 
  
(c) Settlements  
 
Just like WB’s Sanctions Procedures, AfDB’s Sanctions Procedures allow for the 
negotiated resolution of cases at any stage of the sanctions process up to the issuance of a 
decision by the Appeals Board.
274
  Settlements are subject to review by the AfDB General 
Counsel and the Sanctions Commissioner.
275
  Further, sanctions imposed through 
settlements are implemented identically to any sanction imposed through the traditional 




The way in which AfDB has been using settlements raises concerns.  Namely, in 
October 2015, AfDB reached a settlement with SNC-Lavalin International Inc. with 
respect to SNC’s uncontested illicit payments ordered by former SNC’s employees to 
public officials in order to secure contracts in relation to AfDB-financed projects in 
Uganda and Mozambique. Under the terms of the settlement agreement, AfDB imposed a 
conditional non-debarment on SNC for a period of two years and ten months, while SNC 
is required to make a settlement payment of CAD 1.5 million to flow into support of 
activities and programmes combating corruption on the African continent.
277
  Similarly, in 
December 2015, AfDB reached a settlement with Hitachi, Ltd. with respect to Hitachi’s 
engagement in sanctionable practices in order to be awarded the boiler works contract in 
the Republic of South Africa.  Under the terms of the settlement agreement, AfDB 
imposed a debarment of twelve months with conditional release, while “Hitachi has 
voluntarily agreed  . . . to make a substantial financial contribution to the AfDB, which 
will be used to fund worthy anti-corruption causes on the African continent.”278  
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In both instances, the sanctions appear quite lenient, do not trigger cross-
debarment and thus raise concerns over the perceived ability of those with financial 
resources to forego a sanction commensurate with sanctionable practices committed.  
Moreover, the funds that respondents in both cases have been asked to pay are not being 
made as a restitution to remedy harm done by the respondent, but directly to AfDB.   
F.  Asian Development Bank’s sanctions regime 
 
(i) Early developments  
 
The Asian Development Bank (“ADB”) was established in 1966 with the aim to 
foster economic growth and cooperation in the region of Asia and the Far East and to 
contribute to the acceleration of the process of economic development of the developing 
member countries in the region.
279
  ADB revised its sanctions regime in 2009, when it 
established an independent anticorruption office, the Office of Anticorruption and 
Integrity (“OAI”), which acts as an investigative body in cases involving sanctionable 
practices.
280
  Prior to that, ADB’s Integrity Division was part of the Office of the Auditor 
General.   
 
Previously, after a respondent was given an opportunity to contest OAI’s 
allegations, the OAI’s investigative findings and the respondent’s response, if any, were 
sent to ADB’s Integrity Oversight Committee (“IOC”), an independent body comprising 
of three ADB’s staff members.  In 2011, ADB took a further step forward towards 
increasing the independence of its sanctions system and revised the membership of its IOC 
to include one external member. 
 
(ii) Description of ADB’s current sanctions process 
 
(a) Two-step decision-making process 
 
ADB’s Sanctions Procedures (called Integrity Principles and Guidelines) differ 
markedly from those of the other MDBs, but nevertheless accommodate a two-tier 
decision-making process.  More specifically, at ADB, OAI is the initial point of contact 
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for allegations of integrity violations involving ADB-related activities.
281
 When OAI 
receives a complaint, its complaints assessment team considers whether the complaint is 
within OAI’s mandate, credible, verifiable and material. At the conclusion of the 
screening, the team will recommend closure of the complaint (when the complaint does 
not meet all the criteria) or further investigation (if all the screening criteria are met) to the 




At any time during the course of the investigation where OAI finds that there is 
sufficient evidence to support a finding of an integrity violation against a party, and that it 
is highly unlikely that the investigation will be concluded within a maximum of one year, 
OAI may present to the IOC a request for a temporary suspension. 
283
 OAI can also 
present to the IOC a request for a temporary suspension where a party has been 
temporarily suspended by another MDB, and if OAI determines that the party’s continued 
eligibility may constitute a reputational risk or a risk of further integrity violations until 
such time that the party is debarred.
284
  Unlike sanctions procedures of other MDBs, 





After investigation, and if OAI finds that a party has committed an integrity 
violation, OAI will provide that party an opportunity to respond.  OAI will send its 
findings to the party, which may or may not contain a proposed sanction. The party is 
given a reasonable period, which is generally not less than 30 days, within which to 
submit its response together with any evidence.
286
 If requested, OAI will also entertain 
oral representations.
287
  OAI will re-evaluate the case upon receipt of any response, and 
may conduct further enquiries and/or request additional information from the party.
288
  
Where a party accepts OAI’s findings and proposed sanction, such party will execute a 
confirmation of agreement to the proposed sanction. The sanction against the party will be 
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effective from the date OAI received the signed confirmation.
289
  This process is markedly 
different from that of other MDBs, where both the evaluation of the case upon receipt of 
any response from a respondent and a decision on the type of sanction to be imposed are 
within the purview of the first-tier decision-maker, rather than the investigators.    
 
Where, however, a party disputes OAI’s investigative findings or when there is no 
response to the findings, OAI will provide the IOC with a report of its investigation, 
together with the party’s response to the findings, if any.  As noted above, the IOC 
consists of three voting members, one of whom is selected from a list of external members.  
Unlike the other MDBs’ Sanctions Boards, IOC is majority internal.  The IOC determines, 
on a more probable than not basis, whether the party violated ADB’s Anticorruption 




Finally, a sanctioned party can appeal to the Sanction Appeals Committee 
(“SAC”) within 90 days from the date a sanction is imposed. The SAC will consider 
appeals that include new information that is relevant to the IOC’s decision and could not 
have been reasonably known to the appellant at the time OAI concluded its 
investigation.
291
  The SAC consists of two or three ADB’s Vice Presidents, appointed by 
the Executive Directors. 
 
ADB publishes only the names of entities and individuals that have been debarred 
more than once.
292
  Under this approach, first-time violators may be seen as having an 
opportunity to improve their ethical standards and controls without the added pressure of 
public sanctions or cross-debarment.  The list of parties that ADB debars for the first time, 
although not published, is made available to parties with a demonstrated need to know.
293
  
These parties are not subject to cross-debarment by other MDBs, given that, under the 
Cross-Debarment Agreement, cross-debarment applies only if the decision is made public 
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by the sanctioning institution.
294
  ADB also publishes synopses of the debarment decision 
on its website, although the information is not linked to the names of the debarred entities 
and individuals. 
Unlike sanctions procedures of other MDBs, sanctions procedures of ADB do not 
allow for the settlement of cases. 
 
(b) Range of possible sanctions 
 
ADB’s Integrity Principles and Guidelines provide for six different types of 
sanctions that may be imposed: (i) debarment, (ii) debarment with conditional 
reinstatement, (iii) conditional non-debarment, (iv) reprimand, (v) restitution and/or 




 The first five sanctions are identical to the ones described in section B(v)(b) above 
relating to the sanctions prescribed by the WB’s Sanctions Procedures.  Caution is given 





G.  Comparison of MDBs’ sanctions regimes and the cross-debarment regime 
 
(i) Comparison of MDBs’ sanctions regimes 
 
The following table provides a comparison of key elements of the sanctions procedures of 
each of the five MDBs:   
 








































which is theft, 
waste or 
improper use of 
assets related to 
ADB-related 
activity 
(vii) Conflict of 
interest 
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do so in cases 
where it finds a 
referral is 
warranted.   
 
Below are a few examples illustrating how these differences could lead to different 
outcomes:  
 
If an MDB’s client used the MDB’s funds for a purpose different from the one for 
which the MDB’s funds were intended (for example, if it spent money on unnecessary 
infrastructure, or improperly diverted travel expenses for personal purposes), or if it 
simply misappropriated the MDB’s funds, such conduct would probably result in a 
contractual breach.  However, unless such conduct also fell under the definition of 
“fraudulent practice” (which would require an act or omission, including 
74 
 
misrepresentation, that knowingly or recklessly misleads, or attempts to mislead, a party to 
obtain a financial or other benefit or to avoid an obligation), it would lead to an 
investigation under EBRD’s and ADB’s Sanctions Procedures, while it would not lead to 
an investigation under the Sanctions Procedures of WB, AfDB or IADB, given that these 
organisations have not included theft or misuse of resources or assets as one of their 
sanctionable practices.   
 
Further, a company found guilty of fraud or corruption in a national court would be 
eligible to participate in tenders for MDBs’ contracts, except in the case of EBRD, which 
is the only MDB that may enforce final judgments of a judicial process in EBRD’s 
member countries, if such judgment “has relevance and seriousness to the Bank.”297 
 
 Moreover, a respondent could try to negotiate a settlement at any stage of the 
sanctions proceedings with AfDB and WB.  EBRD’s and IADB’s regimes are a bit more 
restrictive, and allow respondents to negotiate a settlement only before the first-tier 
decision-maker has issued a decision (in the case of EBRD) or received a Statement of 
Charges from investigators (in the case of IADB).  By contrast, if a respondent found itself 
accused of a sanctionable practice under ADB’s Sanctions Procedures, settlement would 
not be an option, although the respondent could simply accept the investigators’ findings 
and proposed sanction by signing a confirmation to that effect. 
 
 Furthermore, while EBD, ADB, AfDB and WB would each grant the respondent’s 
request for an oral hearing, such option is not available under IADB’s sanctions 
proceedings, which permit oral hearing only at the discretion of the Sanctions Committee.  
The respondent would have even less certainty if it wanted to request live witness 
testimony, given that ADB’s, AfDB’s and IADB’s sanctions procedures are silent on 
whether this is permitted, while EBRD’s procedures expressly do not allow live witness 
testimony, and WB’s procedures allow only the Sanctions Board to call witnesses.    
 
 Finally, if a respondent were debarred, its name would be published on the relevant 
MDB’s website, except in the case of ADB, which publishes the names of debarred parties 
only if they have been debarred more than once.  Further, if the debarment were issued on 
                                                     
297
 EBRD’s Enforcement Policy and Procedures, § 11.59 (Third Party Finding). 
75 
 
the basis of a first-tier decision maker’s decision, only WB would publish the text of such 
decision.  If the debarment were issued on the basis of an appellate body’s decision, only 
EBRD and WB would publish the text of such decision, while ADB, AfDB and IADB 
would not. 
 
 The above-illustrated inconsistencies are problematic not only from the due 
process standpoint, but also on practical grounds.  With different global and regional 
sanctions regimes proliferating, in practice it is very difficult for companies to monitor 
various regimes they are subject to, let alone study procedural idiosyncrasies of each 
regime when mounting a defence.  Greater harmonisation on basic due process matters in 
MDBs’ sanctions procedures would therefore be beneficial not only from the human rights 
perspective, but also from the practical perspective of ensuring that compliance with these 
regimes is practically feasible.     
 
(ii) Cross-debarment regime 
 
On 9 April 2010, the heads of the five MDBs signed an agreement providing for 
mutual and reciprocal enforcement of debarment decisions made by any one of them 
against entities that engage in sanctionable practices (i.e., corrupt, fraudulent, collusive 
and coercive practices) in connection with MDB-financed projects.
298
  Under the 
Agreement for Mutual Enforcement of Debarment Decisions (the “Cross-Debarment 
Agreement”), sanctions covering the sanctionable practices that are imposed and made 
publicly available by any participating MDB may be enforced by other participating 
MDBs. 
 
The Cross-Debarment Agreement establishes the following six principles shared 
by the contracting MDBs for addressing sanctionable practices:  
(1) adoption of harmonised definitions of sanctionable practices for (i) fraudulent 
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(4) publishing of written procedures that require (a) notice to entities and/or 
individuals against whom the allegations are made and (b) an opportunity for 




(5) use of the “more probable than not” standard, or its equivalent, to assess 
allegations of sanctionable conduct;
303
 and  
 
(6) providing for a range of sanctions that are proportional and incorporate 




An MDB may decide not to enforce a debarment decision of another MDB where 
such enforcement would be inconsistent with its own legal or other institutional 
considerations.
305
 If an MDB decides not to enforce another MDB’s debarment decision, it 
must “promptly notify” all other MDBs of such decision.306  Finally, the Cross-Debarment 
Agreement does not preclude an MDB from instituting independent debarment 
proceedings, which could result in “concurrent, consecutive or subsequent periods of 
debarment” for entities and individuals engaging in sanctionable practices.307 
 
It has been suggested that the Cross-Debarment Agreement constitutes “an 
unprecedented step in the fight against corruption in the context of public procurement and 
of cooperation for development”, given that it allowed the MDBs to apply consistent 
standards to parties that would have otherwise posed a reputational risk to the same MDBs 
by being able to be awarded contracts funded by an MDB while being debarred by 
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  In addition, the Cross-Debarment Agreement increased the deterrence effect 
already created by the risk of being publicly debarred by one of the main MDBs through 
the extension of the debarment to all other MDBs.
309
  
H.  Conclusion    
 
While MDBs seek to support countries in their development efforts, corruption in 
recipient societies can undermine this support.  Consequently, MDBs attach to their 
financing a range of integrity measures aimed at ensuring the proper use of their proceeds, 
which range from professional procurement rules, external audits and sanctions rules that 
exclude from their projects those who have engaged in a set of actions found damaging to 
development initiatives, including fraud, corruption, collusion and coercion.  This Chapter 
has examined the origins and characteristics of MDBs’ sanctions regimes, as one of the 
tools for curbing corruption and mitigating its negative effects on MDBs’ development 
efforts.   
 
My analysis has demonstrated that, while many similarities exist between the five 
systems (for example, notice requirements, two-step decision-making processes, and 
consideration of mitigating and aggravating circumstances), the systems are also quite 
distinct from each other, particularly regarding the composition of appellate bodies, the 
range of possible sanctions, the use of hearings and witnesses in the discovery process, the 
publication of decisions, and the use of negotiated settlements.  This is problematic not 
only from the due process standpoint, but also on practical grounds of having to comply 
with five different regimes.   
 
Because of the far-reaching consequences of the MDBs’ sanctions proceedings, 
particularly in view of the Cross-Debarment Agreement, these proceedings are likely to 
evolve towards increasingly quasi-judicial models with the development of adjudicatory 
processes that are more elaborate than those that typify national administrative processes 
like FAR.  At the same time, however, sanctions processes remain essentially 
administrative in nature, given that MDBs do not have any law enforcement powers.  
Therefore, in developing their sanctions proceedings, MDBs will need to determine the 
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most appropriate benchmark(s) for establishing due process rights most appropriate for 
their sanctions systems, in view of the MDBs’ efforts to balance standards of efficiency 
and effectiveness, on the one hand, with the rule of law and due process considerations, on 
the other.  Finding the appropriate benchmark regime for MDBs’ sanctions procedures is 
far from easy, however.  The obvious starting point are judicial review regimes, 
particularly the US and UK ones, given that MDBs’ sanctions regimes are based on the 
common law principles and that three out of the five MDBs are based in these two 
jurisdictions.  The next Chapter therefore starts off with the analysis of due process rights 
under the US and UK judicial review regimes,  particularly in relation those issues where 
MDBs’ sanctions procedures differ, such as the right to a hearing and to live witness 
testimony, and the right to be given reasons for the decision.  Judicial review standards are 
not directly applicable to MDBs, however, because of MDBs’ jurisdictional immunity, 
which is also analysed in the next Chapter 2.  In search of the most appropriate legal 
principles applicable to MDBs’ sanctions regimes, the next Chapter proceeds to examine 
possible benchmark regimes: from customary law and legal principles, and Global 
Administrative Law, which it finds to be too high-level and therefore not particularly 
useful for determining appropriate due process standards, to Article 6(1) of the ECHR and 




CHAPTER 2: JUDICIAL REVIEW STANDARDS; IMMUNITY OF MDBs AND 
BENCHMARKS FOR MDBs’ SANCTIONS REGIMES 
Introduction 
 
 Arguably, MDBs fulfil a public function and the decisions of their sanctions bodies 
should therefore – just as those of national administrative agencies – be subject to judicial 
review.  As described in the first section of this Chapter, judicial review ensures that an 
essentially fair process is followed by an administrative agency and that an agency action 
is not arbitrary, capricious or an abuse of discretion.  Nonetheless, because of MDBs’ 
jurisdictional immunities, MDBs’ sanctions decisions are not subject to judicial review, 
which raises concerns over the existence of mechanisms to prevent MDBs from making 
sanctions decisions that are arbitrary, capricious or an abuse of discretion.  As 
demonstrated in the second section of this Chapter, domestic courts will not always 
uphold immunity of international organisations whose decisions fail to uphold appropriate 
due process standards.  The key question that this Chapter addresses therefore is: What 
legal standards should underpin MDBs’ sanctions regimes?  The third section of this 
Chapter tries to answer this question by proposing four possible sources of best practice 
standards for MDBs’ sanctions regimes.   
1.  Judicial review standards  
A.  Introduction 
 
The phrase ‘administrative law’ is used to refer to the law governing the 
organisation and activities of administrative agencies.  It defines the structural position of 
administrative agencies within the governmental system, specifies the decision-making 
procedures that they must follow and determines the availability and scope of review of 
their actions by an independent judiciary.
310
  Administrative agencies were established to 
do the government’s work in a simpler and more direct manner than the legislature could 
do by enacting a law, and than the courts could do by applying that law in various cases.  
Because they pursue their actions less formally, administrative agencies do not follow the 
civil procedure that is set up for courts.  Instead, the law of administrative procedure has 
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 Discussing the difference between the administrative and judicial process, US 
Justice Franfkurter said:  
 
“… unlike courts which are concerned primarily with the enforcement of private rights . . . 
administrative agencies are predominantly concerned with enforcing public rights although 
private interests may thereby be affected.  To no small degree administrative agencies for the 
enforcement of public rights were established by Congress because more flexible and less 
traditional procedures were called for than those evolved by the courts.  It is therefore essential 
to the vitality of the administrative process that the procedural powers given to these 
administrative agencies not be confined within the conventional modes by which business is 
done in courts.”312 
 
 This attitude reflects the view that the administrative branch of the government 
must be granted a large measure of autonomy in procedural matters.  However, the limits 
of this power have not been clearly drawn.
313
 In that context, judicial review of agency 
action provides an important set of controls on administrative behaviour by offering relief 
for a party that has been harmed by a particular agency decision.  As described in more 
detail below, judicial review has evolved over a period of years into a complex system of 
statutory, constitutional and judicial doctrines that define the proper boundaries of this 
system of oversight.  The sections that follow briefly describe the bases for judicial review 
of administrative decisions in the UK and the US, with the focus on due process violations.  
Both jurisdictions were selected because MDBs’ sanctions regimes emanated from FAR 
and are thus firmly grounded in the common law tradition.  Given these origins of MDBs’ 
sanctions regimes, the examination of judicial review standards in the Anglo-American 
jurisdictions is relevant and more suitable than a civil law system for determining 
appropriate due process standards for MDBs’ sanctions regimes.   
 
  




 FCC v National Broadcasting Co., 319 U.S. 239, 248 (1943), cited in St. John’s Law Review: Due 
Process and the Right to Counsel in Administrative Proceedings, St. John’s Law Review, Volume 32, Iss.1, 
Article 8, at 67-8. 
313
 St. John’s Law Review: Due Process and the Right to Counsel in Administrative Proceedings, St. John’s 
Law Review, Volume 32, Issue 1, Article 8, at 68. 
81 
 
B.  Judicial review standards in the UK and the US 
 
Judicial review is the procedure by which an individual can seek to challenge the policy, decision, 
action or failure to act of a public body.  Judicial review is available as a means of challenging the 
legality of decisions of government authorities, and is regarded as a procedure of last resort which 
should be used only where the aggrieved party has no alternative remedy such as a right to appeal.  
Moreover, where an appeal is available, it is usually preferable for an aggrieved party to pursue 
that option, because an appeal may well involve a reconsideration of the merits of the case, not 
merely its legality.
314
 Traditionally, the main focus of judicial review has been on the way in which 




(i) Judicial review in the UK 
 
(a) Bases for judicial review 
 
Judicial review in the UK is governed by section 54.1 of the Civil Procedure Rules, 
which says:  
 
 “(2) In this Part – 
 
(a) a ‘claim for judicial review’ means a claim to review the lawfulness of  
 
(i) an enactment; or 
(ii) a decision, action or failure to act in relation to the exercise of a 
public function.”  
 
Courts have been concerned to emphasise that, in judicial review proceedings, they 
are exercising supervisory, not an appellate, jurisdiction.  Thus, for example, in Chief 
Constable of the North Wales Police v Evans,
316
 Lord Hailsham described the difference 
between judicial review and appeal as follows: “The purpose of judicial review is to 
ensure that the individual receives fair treatment, and not to ensure that the authority, after 
according fair treatment, reaches on a matter which it is authorised by law to decide for 
itself a conclusion which is correct in they eyes of the court.”  Judicial review is therefore 
a process by which a court reviews a decision made by a public body in order to decide 
whether or not that decision was lawful, while an appeal is usually brought to challenge 
the outcome of a particular case.  
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Not all decision-making bodies will be subject to judicial review.  Many 
applications for judicial review concern such bodies as local authorities carrying out 
statutory duties, which are quite clearly subject to public law remedies.  The fact that a 
body derives its authority from statute will generally be conclusive, although not 
always.
317
  Difficulties, however, arise in the case of bodies that are created in some other 
way, such as self-regulatory bodies set up by persons with a common interest, or where a 
public authority contracts set out its services.  In the landmark case, R v City Panel on 
Takeovers and Mergers ex parte Datafin plc,
318
 the Court of Appeal found that, to be 
subject to judicial review, a body needs to have a “public element” or be under some 
“public duty”.   
 
In Regina (Beer (Trading as Hammer Trout Farm)) v Hampshire Farmer’s 
Markets Ltd,
319
 the Court of Appeal listed four crucial factors that warranted judicial 
review in the case which concerned a private company to which the local council had 
transferred certain powers: (1) first, the company was set up by the council using its 
statutory powers; (2) second, the markets took place on public land to which the public 
had access; (3) third, the company was set up by the Council with the specific aim of 
running the market and thus “stepped into the Council’s shoes”; and (4) fourth, the 
Council substantially assisted the company in carrying out its activities.  These were 
sufficient to render the running of the markets a public function despite the fact that in 
doing so the company was not carrying out any statutory function for the Council.   
 
Applying these tenets to MDBs, it could be argued that MDBs have a “public 
element”, given that they are created by a group of countries, in order to provide financing 
and advisory services for the purpose of development.  They are publicly funded and, 
arguably, if they did not exist, the individual governments would be likely to step in to 
fulfil MDBs’ function through their own development organisations.  Thus, it could be 
argued that judicial review standards should be applicable to MDBs’ administrative 
decisions, including sanctions decisions.  
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(b) Reasons for judicial review 
 
 The most common reasons for judicial review in the UK are: i) illegality/ultra 
vires doctrine, ii) improper purpose, iii) irrationality or unreasonableness, iv) procedural 
impropriety, v) bias, vi) flawed consultation process, vii) violation of a party’s legitimate 
expectations and viii) section 6(1) of the European Convention on Human Rights 
(ECHR).
320
  Below, the chapter examines judicial review on the grounds of procedural 
impropriety, which is most relevant to the analysis of appropriate due process standards 
under MDBs’ sanctions regimes. Section 6(1) of the ECHR is analysed in greater detail in 
section 3 of this Chapter. 
 
For much of the first half of the 1900s, courts drew a distinction between 
administrative decisions and ‘judicial’ type decisions, allowing the right to a hearing, or 
consultation, only in the latter type of case.
321
  This distinction was largely swept away by 
Ridge v Baldwin [1964] AC 40, often described as “the turning point of judicial policy”, 
which extended the doctrine of procedural fairness in judicial hearings into the realm of 
administrative decision making.  Namely, Ridge made it clear that it was not so much the 
type of decision being made, or the status of the person making it, that was important, so 
much as whether fairness demanded consultation.  In determining this issue, the primary 
matter to look at is the impact of the decision on the person affected and, in particular, 




If the decision affects a person’s legal rights, then the decision-maker will 
generally be required to follow a high standard of fairness – as in civil or criminal trials.323  
More difficult are those cases where the decision will affect an interest, for example a 
person’s business, but will not infringe his or her rights.  A classic example cited by 
Fenwick and Phillipson is a case where the decision in question was to revoke a licence 
allowing a person to run their business.  In general, the individual interest will have to be 
balanced against the cost and inconvenience to the decision-maker of holding hearings and 
following lengthy procedures.  But sometimes in cases of this sort, a person affected by a 
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decision may also be able to claim a right to a hearing or a consultation simply by virtue 
of the importance of the decision for his or her livelihood, reputation or some other vital 
interest.
324
  Thus, in R v Barnsley Metropolitan Borough Council ex parte Hook,
325
 which 
concerned a market trader, Hook, being banned for life following an incident, the court 
held that the hearing concerning his case had to be run in accordance with principles of 
procedural fairness. 
 
As Fenwick and Phillipson suggest, a crucial aspect of the Hook decision was the 
fact that it deprived Mr Hook of his livelihood.  By contrast, where someone complains of 
a decision not to grant him a licence in the first place, he is far less likely to be able to 
attack the procedure surrounding such a decision successfully.  This is because he/she is 
seen as not having been deprived of any benefit he previously had, but merely as not 
having had a benefit granted to him.
326
  If we compare this to MDBs’ sanctions processes, 
we can conclude that MDBs’ sanctions deprive respondents of the right they had 
beforehand – i.e., the right to act as borrowers, contractors, sub-contractors, supplier, sub-
suppliers, consultants and sub-consultants in MDB-financed projects.  Thus, one could 
possibly argue that an MDB sanction deprives such respondents of their livelihood, given 
the impact that such debarment has on their business not only with the five MDBs, but 
also with other entities which may be deterred by the respondents’ public listing on MDBs’ 
sanctions lists.   
 
(c)  Required procedures 
 
The question that arises in the context of the judicial review cases is the extent of 
due process required in administrative proceedings.  To that end, Fenwick and Phillipson 
argue that, in ascending order of seriousness, the different procedural safeguards that 
courts may find required are: (i) the notice of the charge against the person, (ii) the right to 
a hearing, (iii) the right to call witnesses and cross-examine the other party’s witnesses 
and (iv) the right to legal representation.  Each of these is described in more detail in 
continuation, together with the need to provide a reasoned decision which has emerged 
from case law. 
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        I. Notice 
 
Notice of the case against a person is the lowest level of procedural protection: if a 
person has no notice of the case against him, he cannot make any effective representation 
on his own behalf.  Because this right is so basic, it is only likely to be denied either for 
very pressing reasons of public policy (for example, national security) or where the 





          II. Oral hearing 
 
Oral hearing is a much more burdensome procedure, and in many cases, 
unlikely to be necessary.  Conversely, as with the right to notice, the situations in which a 
person is likely not to be granted a right to make written representations is in the bare 
application cases.
328
  In terms of deciding whether an oral hearing should be permitted, 
one school of thought that courts have used is to look at the purpose that any such hearing 
would serve.  In other words, if the court thinks that allowing a party to make oral 
representations or call witnesses would make no difference to the party, then he has 




 R (on the application of Smith) v Parole Board
330
 offers some guidance on when 
oral hearing may be required.  The case concerned two prisoners, released from prison on 
licence, who sought to resist subsequent revocation of their licences, because of the 
alleged breach of the licence by the claimants.  They brought judicial review proceedings, 
arguing that the refusal of the Parole Board to hold oral hearings before deciding to revoke 
their licences was a breach of their due process rights.  The relevant statutory rules 
permitted, but did not require oral hearings in these circumstances.  In his concurring 
opinion, Lord Slynn helpfully observed that even though: 
 
“there is no absolute rule that there must be an oral hearing automatically in every case, 
[w]here . . . there are issues of fact, or where explanations are put forward to justify 
actions said to be a breach of licence conditions, or where the officer’s assessment needs 
further probing, fairness may well require that there should be an oral hearing. If there is 
doubt as to whether the matter can fairly be dealt with on paper, then in my view the board 
should be predisposed in favour of an oral hearing. On any view the applicant should be 
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told that an oral hearing may be possible though it is not automatic; if having been told 
this the applicant clearly says he does not want an oral hearing then there need not be such 
a hearing unless the board itself feels exceptionally that fairness requires one.” 
 
III. Right to call and cross-examine witnesses 
 
It has been argued that it would make little point to conduct an oral hearing but 
refuse to allow for the presence of witnesses or their cross-examination.
331
  Arguably, then, 
the essential test here is the same as that for an oral hearing: is the calling of witnesses, 
and allowing their cross-examination necessary to ensure a fair hearing of the applicant’s 
case?  Thus, in a case which involves merely an interpretation of rules, or the law, or an 
examination of one person’s isolated conduct, a public authority will not generally be 
required to call witnesses.  Similarly, if it thought such request were in bad faith (e.g., in 
order to obstruct or subvert proceedings by calling large numbers of witnesses), it would 




The right to cross-examine witnesses was analysed in Bushell v Secretary of State 
for the Environment.
333
  In this case the court considered planning procedures adopted on 
the construction of two new stretches of motorway, and in particular whether the Secretary 
of State had acted unlawfully in refusing to allow objectors to the scheme to cross-
examine the Department’s witnesses.    The court held that it did not.  Lord Diplock stated:  
 
“Proceedings at a local inquiry at which many parties wish to make representations 
without incurring the expense of legal representation and cannot attend the inquiry 
throughout its length ought to be as informal as is consistent with achieving those 
objectives. To ‘over-judicialise’ the inquiry by insisting on observance of the procedures 
of a court of justice which professional lawyers alone are competent to operate effectively 
in the interests of their clients would not be fair. It would, in my view, be quite fallacious 
to suppose that at an inquiry of this kind the only fair way of ascertaining matters of fact 
and expert opinion is by the oral testimony of witnesses who are subjected to cross-
examination on behalf of parties who disagree with what they have said.” 
 
 Still, the decision leaves open the question of why calling of witnesses was 
allowed, but their cross-examination was not.   
 
IV. Right to legal representation 
 
  The approach here has been very much to deny any clear right to legal 
representation except in courts and in certain tribunals (in statutory tribunals, the position 
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is that legal representation should normally be permitted, in the absence of statutory 
provision to the contrary).
334
  In a prisoners’ rights case, R v Secretary of State for the 
Home Dept ex parte Tarrant
335
, the court held that, in considering whether to allow legal 
representation, every parole board should consider the following factors: “the seriousness 
of the charge; whether points of law are likely to arise; the capacity of the prisoner to 
present his own case; any procedural difficulties; the need for reasonable speed in making 
the adjudication; and the need for fairness between prisoners and between prisoners and 
prison officers.” 
 
V. Failure to give reasons for the final decision 
 
In R v Ministry of Defence ex parte Murray,
336
 the court provided a useful 
summary of the principles governing the right to be given reasons for the final decision:  
 
(a) The law does not at present recognise a general duty to give reasons.337 
(b) In the absence of a requirement to give reasons, the person seeking to argue 
that reasons should have been given must show that the procedure adopted of 
not giving reasons is unfair.
338
 
(c) There is a perceptible trend towards an insistence on greater openness . . . or in 
transparency in the making of administrative decisions.
339
 
(d) In deciding whether fairness requires a tribunal to give reasons, regard will be 
had not only to the first instance hearing but also to the availability and the 
nature of any appellate remedy or remedy by way of judicial review:  
 
(i) The absence of any right to appeal may be a factor in deciding that 
reasons should be given.
340
 
(ii) If it is important that there should be an effective means of detecting the 
kind of error [by way of judicial review] which would entitle the court 
to intervene, then the reasoning may have to be disclosed.
341
 
(e) If the giving of a decision without reasons is insufficient to achieve justice, 
then reasons should be required; the reasons need be no more than a concise 
statement of the way in which the decision-maker arrived at its decision.
342
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(f) In favour of giving reasons are the following factors: the giving of reasons may, 
among other things, concentrate the decision-maker’s mind on the right 
questions; demonstrate to the recipient that this is so; show the issues have 
been conscientiously addressed and how the result has been reached; or 
alternatively alert the recipient to a justiciable flaw in the process.
343
 
(g) In favour of not requiring reasons are the following factors: it may place an 
undue burden on decision-makers; demand an appearance of unanimity where 
there is diversity; call for articulation of sometimes inexpressible value 
judgments; and offer “an invitation to the captious to comb the reasons for 
previously unsuspected grounds of challenge.”344 
(h) Although fairness may favour a requirement for giving reasons, there may be 




(i) The giving of reasons will not be required if the procedures of the particular 
decision-maker would be frustrated by a requirement to give reasons.
346
   
 
(ii) Judicial review in the US 
 
(a) Bases for judicial review 
 
The so-called Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment of the US Constitution 
guarantees no deprivation of life, liberty or property without due process of law.  With the 
passage of the US Administrative Procedure Act (the “APA”), these procedural due 
process standards have been routinely applied to federal administrative agencies.
347
  The 
APA applies to all administrative agencies and provides that “final agency action for 
which there is no other adequate remedy in a court [is] subject to judicial review.”348   The 
APA provides several types of judicial review that apply unless otherwise specified by 
statute.  With respect to the standards of judicial review of agency action that a court will 
use to evaluate whether an agency’s action is valid, the APA states that “the reviewing 
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court shall . . . hold unlawful and set aside agency action, findings, and conclusions found 
to be:  
 
(A) arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance 
with law; 
(B) contrary to constitutional right, power, privilege, or immunity; 
(C) in excess of statutory jurisdiction, authority, or limitations, or short of statutory 
right; 
(D) without observance of procedure required by law; 
(E) unsupported by substantial evidence in a case subject to sections 556 and 557 
of this title or otherwise reviewed on the record of an agency hearing provided by statute; 
or 
(F) unwarranted by the facts to the extent that the facts are subject to trial de novo 
by the reviewing court. 
 
A party that has been adversely affected by an agency action or decision and that 
wants to avail itself of judicial review must demonstrate that: (a) the court has jurisdiction 
to hear the case, (b) the party has standing to challenge the administrative decision or 
action, (c) the case is ripe and not moot, (d) the agency’s action is reviewable, (e) the party 
has exhausted all administrative remedies available within the agency, and (f) primary 




Turning back to the Due Process Clause, in the administrative law context, the two 
important protected interests are property and liberty.   
 
“Property” in the due process sense has both a traditional and non-traditional 
usage.  In the traditional sense, property encompasses well-defined categories of wealth, 
such as money, tangible personal property, real estate, etc.  Thus, for example, if an 
agency is bringing an enforcement proceeding seeking monetary penalty, the private party 
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The non-traditional sense of the word “property”, however, requires closer 
examination.  For example, government employees, holders of government licenses, 
applicants for and current recipients of social welfare benefits all suffer from a loss of 
their relationship with the government, and the question is whether the loss of such 




In 1972, the US Supreme Court ruled in two cases – Board of Regents v Roth352 
and Perry v. Sindermann
353
, both of which required the Court to consider the due process 
requirements when employees were facing the non-renewal of their employment contracts.  
In Roth, the claimant (Roth) was a non-tenured professor, hired to teach for one year at a 
public university in Wisconsin.  During that year he made comments against the university 
officials. He was not rehired for the following year, and no reason was given.  Roth sued, 
claiming that the failure to provide him with a hearing before deciding to terminate his 
employment constituted a due process violation.  The Supreme Court, however, ruled that 
Roth’s employment did not fall under the nature of “liberty” or “property”, because Roth, 




Perry v. Sindermann also involved a claim brought by a university professor who 
had taught at a state university, under a series of one-year contracts.  When his contract 
ran out, the university did not renew it.  Although the university issued a press release 
setting forth allegations of Perry’s insubordination, it refused to provide him with a further 
statement of reasons for his non-renewal or a hearing to challenge it.  In this case, however, 
the Supreme Court held that the professor might have a property interest.   Unlike Roth, 
Perry had produced university handbooks and other official publications that arguably 
created an entitlement to continued employment during satisfactory performance.  The 
Court was therefore able to distinguish the claimant’s due process claim in Perry from 
Roth: As in Roth, the Court in Perry held that a simple refusal to rehire a non-tenured 
teacher did not amount to a deprivation of property.  However, the Court stressed that the 
absence of a contractual right of renewal was not controlling.  The employee in Perry had 
“alleged that the college had a de facto tenure program.”355   The existence of such a 
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programme, and the claimant’s participation in it, constituted a sufficient interest in 
property to entitle him to a hearing before dismissal.   
 
Roth and Perry thus show that the question of whether a private party has a 
property interest can turn on very narrow factual distinctions and, consequently, 
administrative law judges and other agency employees have been advised to assume that 




“Liberty” interests, like property interests, can be divided into fundamental and 
non-fundamental interests.  Fundamental liberty interests are those that are sufficiently 
well-recognised that they are protected regardless of how they are defined by state law.  
These types of interests include free speech, voting, privacy and other interests that are 





Non-fundamental liberty interests closely resemble property interests.  In order for 
a person to successfully assert that he has a non-fundamental liberty interest, he must be 
able to point to some statute, regulation, contract or other source of law that creates such 
entitlement.  Non-fundamental liberty interests differ from property interests only in that 





One context in which liberty interests are raised in administrative matters, which is 
quite relevant in the context of sanctions regimes of MDBs, is a reputational injury.   The 
US Supreme Court has held that a person does not have a liberty interest in his reputation 
as such.  However, an injury to reputation, coupled with some other significant negative 
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For example, in Miller v DeBuono,
360
 a nurse’s aide was accused of hitting one of 
her patients.  Under state law, her name was to be placed on a registry maintained by a 
state agency for the purpose of identifying abusers.  The New York Court of Appeals held 
that the aide had a liberty interest at stake.  Placement of her name in the registry called 
into question her reputation plus it had the effect of severely limiting her employment 
opportunities, as the registry was publicly available.
361
  Because she had a liberty interest 
at stake, her due process rights were triggered, and the court ruled that she should have 




This can be compared to the consequences of debarment of parties found to have 
engaged in sanctionable practices in relation to MDB-financed contracts, given that such 
debarments are made public on MDBs’ websites, which has a significant impact on the 
affected parties’ reputation.   
 
(b) Required procedures 
 
Assuming there is an administrative action in which a party has a property or 
liberty interest at stake, the party’s right to “due process of law” is triggered.  Of course, 
this is not a mechanical test, and notions of the appropriate amount of procedures required 




 One of the most famous administrative due process cases in the United States 
Supreme Court’s opinion is Goldberg v Kelly.364  In that case, John Kelly and others sued 
when State and local officials terminated their welfare benefits without having given them 
prior notice and an opportunity to be heard.  The Supreme Court ruled that the then-
existing procedures for determining eligibility under the Aid to Families with Dependent 
Children Programme were inadequate, because those procedures gave the recipient an 
insufficient opportunity to contest the reasons for being removed from the eligible list.  In 
ruling that the then-existing procedures were inadequate, the Court ruled that, at a 
minimum, due process requires:  
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- adequate, pre-deprivation notice of the basis for the welfare department’s proposed 
action, followed by  
- an opportunity to contest the action in an administrative hearing bearing most of 
the elements of a judicial proceeding, including:  
 
o an impartial adjudicator,  
o a proceeding on the record, and  
o the right to:  
 
 appear in person,  
 confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses,  
 adduce evidence through testimony and documents,  
 present written and oral arguments, and  
 be represented  by counsel.365   
 
The Court justified this holding, to a great extent, on its finding that the stakes for a 
welfare recipient facing loss of her means of survival, were “simply too high,” and the risk 
of erroneous deprivation too great to permit any less protective process. 
 
 As noted in Chapter 1, more recently, in Matthews v Eldridge
366
, the Supreme 
Court has articulated a more flexible test, which requires that due process rights be 
balanced against three factors:  (1) first, the value of the property or liberty interest, (2) 
second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedure used, 
and the probably value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards and (3) 
finally, the cost to the government in providing more procedure.  Thus, arguably, for 
smaller matters, very informal hearings can suffice.  For administrative matters in which 
much of the evidence is documentary or technical, written submissions can substitute for 
what otherwise might be lengthy oral hearings.  As long as the procedures give all parties 
concerned a reasonable opportunity to present their case, and the decision is made in a 
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reasoned, fair and impartial manner based upon what the decision-maker learns at the 
hearing, due process is generally satisfied.
367
 
C.  Conclusion 
 
 The examination of judicial review standards in the Anglo-American jurisdictions 
is relevant for determining appropriate due process standards for MDBs’ sanctions 
regimes, which are modelled on the US FAR.  While the UK and the US offer several 
grounds for judicial review of administrative decisions, the most relevant for purposes of 
determining appropriate due process standards of MDBs’ sanctions regimes are procedural 
improprieties.  In that context, several principles of fundamental due process rights emerge 
from the UK and the US judicial review case law, which could prove useful for MDBs:   
 
First, notice of the charges against the respondent (which all MDBs’ sanctions 
procedures provide for) and a decision by an impartial adjudicator are fundamental due 
process rights.  Oral hearing is not an absolute right and should be required only if there is 
doubt as to whether the matter can be fairly dealt with on the basis of written submissions 
only.  Similarly, the right to call and cross-examine witnesses should be allowed only if it 
is necessary to ensure a fair hearing of the respondent’s case.  Further, the right to legal 
representation depends on the seriousness of the charges, the likelihood of legal points 
arising, the capacity of the respondent to present its own case, any procedural difficulties, 
the need for reasonable speed in making the adjudication, and the need for fairness.  
Finally, the right to be given the reasons for the final decision depends on several factors, 
including whether the giving of reasons is required to achieve justice, but bearing in mind, 
on the other hand, considerations of public interest which would outweigh the advantages 
of requiring reasons.  Such reasons need be no more than a concise statement of the way in 
which the decision-maker reached the decision. 
 
Nevertheless, despite the fact that it can be argued that MDBs fulfil a public 
function and that their sanctions decisions are thus subject judicial review, as examined in 
the next section, because of MDBs’ special status, courts have usually recused themselves 
from exercising jurisdiction over MDBs’ administrative decisions, thus sheltering MDBs 
from the rigours of judicial review.  However, with the number and activities of 
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international organisations having multiplied in the recent decades, questions of 
accountability are taken more seriously than they were a few decades ago. Increasingly, 
domestic courts have been abandoning the traditional view of the immunity of 
international organisations whose decisions fail to consider due process rights, with an 
emerging consensus that international organisations must observe general principles of 
customary norms of international law, including certain due process norms. The chapter 




2.  Accountability of international organisations 
A.  Introduction 
 
Even though it could be argued that international organisations, including MDBs, 
perform a public function, decisions of international organisations do not benefit from 
judicial review in the same way that decisions of public bodies do.  Because of 
jurisdictional immunities of international organisations, the key question is how 
international organisations are held accountable and by whom.  The answer to this 
question requires the analysis of the immunities of international organisations.   This 
Chapter describes the basis of immunities of international organisations and how courts of 
different jurisdictions around the world have interpreted them.  Specifically, the Chapter 
looks at the treatment of immunities in the US, the UK, Italy, France and Belgium.  These 
five countries were chosen because they all host a significant number of international 
organisations and their courts have addressed the challenges to international organisations’ 
immunities.  The Chapter further describes the treatment of immunities before the 
European Court of Human Rights (the “ECtHR”) in view of several landmark cases, 
where international organisations’ immunity was challenged on human rights grounds.  
B.   Basis of international organisations’ immunities 
 
The immunities of international organisations have their own distinctive basis, 
derived primarily from treaty law.  The distinctive personality of international 
organisations is quite different from that of states.  A state represents political 
communities, the effective government of a population in a fixed area territory, enjoying 
sovereignty and equality with other states.  International organisations, by contrast, are 
essentially legal constructs.  They do not have the material attributes of states, and their 
actions always take place on the territory of a state, yet they are characterised, inter alia, 
by their independence from executive, administrative legislative and judicial interferences 
of their members.
368
   
 
Arguments justifying the immunity of international organisations generally fall 
into three categories:  
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The first and the most often cited argument is that the use of legal process by a 
state authority might be used for an illegitimate purpose, in order to exert political 
pressure on international organisations to act in certain ways or to desist from so acting.
369
  
For example, if WB does not grant a loan to country C, or does not make timely 
disbursement of funds pursuant to such a loan, then the next time a WB official travels to 
country C he/she may find him/herself subject to arrest or other arbitrary detention.  Thus, 
without the protection of immunities, individual member countries could impose a myriad 
national legal obligations on an organisation, impairing its ability to conduct business 
efficiently, chilling open and frank discussions between staff, management and member 
countries, and undermining the global, multilateral nature of the organisation.370 
 
Second, it has been suggested that for private contractual arrangements, including 
employment contracts, it would place an intolerable administrative burden upon 
international organisations were they obliged to subject themselves to the legal systems of 
every country in which they operate.
371
   
 
 Finally, international law is supposed to create a legal order higher than that of any 
national state.  Therefore, the position of international organisations would be subverted if 
they were rendered subject to the jurisdiction of national courts, just as it would place 
impossible fetters on the Federal Government’s position in the US if its actions were 
subject to the challenge in individual states’ courts.372 
 
Notably, the traditional grounds for state immunity are not valid for granting 
immunity to international organisations.  The (now historic) view that immunity against 
lawsuits is an inherent element of the sovereign quality of the state, was never a 
consideration with respect to international organisations because they do not possess 
sovereignty, but are created by states through international agreements defining their legal 
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  A state has a territory and a population that are subject to its 
legislative and executive authority and over which it exercises judicial jurisdiction – 
thereby providing a claimant with the opportunity to sue before domestic courts.  By 
contrast, an international organisation has neither citizens, a comprehensive body of law 
applicable to its activities, nor a territory.  Therefore, a complaint against an international 
organisation before a domestic court will always be directed against a foreign legal person, 
and an alternative forum analogous to the possibility of suing a foreign state before its 
own courts is not available.
374
  Thus, arguably, the immunity from judicial process before 
national courts reflects the determination of international organisations’ member states 
that a rational use of their resources requires that the international organisation not be 
subject to vexatious litigation which would impair the ability of that organisation to carry 
out its functions or fulfil its purpose; or alternatively in inconvenient fora, where the 
organisation does not have an office, staff, papers or settled operational ways of working 
with local authorities.  On the other hand, it might be argued that any person or 
organisation involved in cross-border activities is faced with similar problems, but few are 




Rules of the immunity of international organisations, including MDBs, are set out 
in their foundation documents, which contain a number of common characteristics:  
 
(1) Often, the foundation document of the organisation refers to the fact that these 
privileges and immunities are necessary for the fulfilment of the functions or the 
purpose of the organisation – in other words, the ‘functional necessity.’ 376  This 
standard is flexible enough to allow courts to balance the operational needs of 
international organisations against other important legal principles and public 
expectations, such as fairness to private litigants and accountability under the rule 
of law. But in practice, many international organisations –  including those whose 
foundational charters clearly contemplate that they will be sued in national courts –  
have insisted that only absolute or near-absolute immunity is sufficient to ensure 
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that judicial  scrutiny does not impede them from achieving their institutional 
objectives.
377
  On the other hand, however, functional necessity does not provide a 
specific yardstick by which it can be decided in each concrete case whether or not 




(2) Generally, the immunity of the organisation is absolute and unconditional.379 
 
(3) With respect to the denial of justice risk, waiver of immunity is possible. Thus, by 
way of example, the Agreement Establishing the European Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development says:  
 
“The Board of Directors may waive to such extent and upon such conditions as it may 
determine any of the immunities, privileges and exemptions . . .  in cases where such 
action would, in its opinion, be appropriate in the best interests of the Bank. The President 
shall have the right and the duty to waive any immunity, privilege or exemption in respect 




 Courts have generally recognised that the privileges and immunities afforded to 
international organisations are rooted in their independence, i.e., the need to protect 
international organisations from any member’s unilateral control over their activities 
within the member’s territory or purview, thus allowing organisations to fulfil their 




The principle of immunity of international organisations has become increasingly 
criticised, however.  If national courts cannot exercise jurisdiction over international 
organisations, who can?  As case law has progressively accepted that the sovereignty of a 
state is not jeopardised when the state is brought before domestic courts for a dispute 
arising from a jure gestionis act, it has also been argued that the independence of an 
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international organisation would not be endangered if it too had to submit to the 
jurisdiction of local courts in respect of comparable disputes.
382
   
 
Further, it has been suggested that one of the most important shortcomings in the 
public accountability of international organisations is the lack of opportunities for 
aggrieved individuals to obtain legal redress.  Arguably, broad assertions of immunity also 
contravene two widely accepted principles of international law: the notion that individuals 
are entitled to minimum standards of procedural fairness in resolving claims against public 
entities, and  that sovereigns should not use expansive grants of immunity as a way to 
avoid the rule of law or sidestep popular moral judgment.
383
 
C.   Case Law 
 
In applying a stricter functional immunity standard, national courts have 
sometimes denied immunity to international organisations where they considered a 
specific activity to fall outside the scope of functional necessity.
384
   For example, Italian 
courts have held that customary international law does not grant absolute immunity to 
international organisations and that international organisations established in Italy do not 
have immunity for transactions of a commercial nature, but only for acts related to their 
institutional purposes.
385
   
 
Generally, however, national courts tend to accept a rather broad scope of 
functional necessity covering, in particular, employment disputes,
386
 given that the 
protection of the independent functioning of the organisation should be balanced against 
the equally compelling demand of protecting the interests of potential litigants in having 
the opportunity to pursue their claims against an international organisation before an 
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independent judicial or quasi-judicial body.
387
  What follows is an overview of the ways in 
which different courts in the aforementioned selected jurisdictions have interpreted the 
jurisdictional immunities of international organisations. 
 
(i) US courts 
 
Under US law, international organisations possess privileges and immunities set 
forth in ratified treaties, as well as the privileges and immunities set forth in the 
International Organizations Immunities Act (“IOIA”), which was adopted in 1945.  IOIA 
provides that “[i]nternational organizations, their property, and their assets, wherever 
located and by whomsoever held, shall enjoy the same immunity from suit and every form 
of judicial process as enjoyed by foreign governments, except to the extent that such 
organizations may expressly waive their immunity for the purpose of any proceeding or by 
the terms of any contract.” (emphasis added)388 “International organisation” is, in turn 
defined as “a public international organization in which the United States participates 
pursuant to any treaty or under the authority of any Act of Congress authorizing such 
participation or making an appropriation for such participation, and which shall have been 
designated by the President through appropriate Executive order as being entitled to enjoy 
the privileges, exemptions, and immunities herein provided.”389  Therefore, the immunity 
conferred by IOIA is subject to two sources of limitation:  First, the organisation itself 
may expressly waive its immunity. Second, the President may specifically limit the 
organisation's immunities when he selects the organisation as one entitled to enjoy IOIA’s 
privileges and immunities. 
 
The question of whether international organisations and their employees enjoy 
absolute or limited immunity under US law has long been the subject of a split among US 
federal courts.  In terms of case law, the DC Circuit has played a central role in the 
interpretation of IOIA.  Due to its location, the DC Circuit has jurisdiction over all suits 
filed against international organisations headquartered in DC.  As a result, it has heard 
almost all of the cases involving IOIA immunity claims.
390
  Broadly speaking, the DC 
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Circuit follows a two-step analysis when determining whether an international 
organisation is entitled to judicial immunity under IOIA:  
 
(1) First, it establishes the baseline standard of immunity authorised by IOIA, 
which requires the court to determine whether IOIA permanently adopts “the 
same” foreign sovereign immunity rules that the Foreign Sovereign Immunities 
Act (“FSIA”) conferred to foreign states in 1945, when IOIA was enacted, or 
whether it incorporates subsequent changes, which limited foreign sovereign 
immunity in the context of commercial activities,
391
 so that the two immunities 
remain “the same” over time.  As described in more detail below, the court has 
traditionally opted for the former interpretation. 
 
(2)  Second, the court must determine whether an international organisation has 
waived any immunity to which it may be entitled under IOIA.  This includes 
specific waivers that may be made in the context of a given case or contract, 





One of the first cases heard by the DC Circuit on the immunity of international 
organisations from a lawsuit brought by former employees was Broadbent v Organization 
of American States.
393
  The former employees of the Organization of American States (the 
“OAS”) sued the employer for damages alleging that their terminations were a breach of 
contract. OAS moved to dismiss the suit on the immunity grounds.  The employees argued 
that IOIA conferred on international organisations the same immunity enjoyed by foreign 
governments under FSIA; FSIA, in turn, indicates that foreign governments enjoy only 
restrictive immunity; therefore, the employees reasoned that international organisations 
enjoyed only restrictive immunity as well.   
 
The court found that it did not need to decide whether FSIA had the effect on 
limiting the scope of immunities under IOIA because, even under the restrictive view, the 
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employment of civil servants does not represent a commercial activity.
394
  It then 
concluded that the OAS was insulated from the employees’ lawsuits by finding that: 
 
“An attempt by the courts of one nation to adjudicate the personnel claims of international 
civil servants would entangle those courts in the internal administration of those 
organizations. Denial of immunity opens the door to divided decisions of the courts of 
different member states passing judgment on the rules, regulations, and decisions of the 
international bodies. Undercutting uniformity in the application of staff rules or 
regulations would undermine the ability of the organization to function effectively.”395 
 
 Three years later, the DC Circuit was faced with a similar situation in Mendaro v 
World Bank,
396
 which also concerned a former employee bringing a lawsuit against WB, 
which claimed immunity.  In its decision, the DC Circuit avoided the FSIA altogether.  
Instead, it analysed the WB’s immunity under IOIA and stated that “the members of the 
World Bank effectively curtailed much of the Bank’s immunity from judicial process in 
Article VII, section 3 [of the Articles of Association of the International Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development] by stipulating the conditions under which actions may 
be brought against the Bank.  Thus, even though the extensive immunity conferred by 
section 2(b) [of IOIA] would normally insulate the Bank from jurisdiction over this type 
of action brought by employees, this court must accept jurisdiction over Mendaro's claim 
unless the Articles of Agreement preserve the World Bank's immunity to suits by 
employees.”397  The court, however, did not find any evidence that WB intended to waive 
its immunity, finding that the waiver of immunity to suits arising out of the WB’s internal 
operations, such as in relations with its own employees, “would lay the Bank open to 
disruptive interference with its employment policies in each of the thirty-six countries in 
which it has resident missions, and the more than 140 nations in which it could be 
involved in its lending and financing activities.”398 
  
Nearly 15 years since Mendaro, in Atkinson v Inter-American Development 
Bank,
399
 the DC Circuit reached a conclusive determination of the relationship between 
IOIA and FSIA.  In this case, the claimant sought to garnish the wages of her former 
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husband, the IADB staff member who had fallen behind on alimony and child-support 
payments.  In particular, the claimant argued that: 
 
(a) IOIA conferred on international organisations only “the same immunity from 
suit and every form of judicial process as is enjoyed by foreign governments”;  
(b) FSIA subsequently eliminated the immunity of foreign governments for claims 
based on their commercial activities; 
400
 and  
(c) the IADB therefore had no entitlement to immunity for commercial activities, 
such as the payment of wages.
401
   
 
According to the court’s analysis, the issue turned on whether “the 1945 Congress mean[t] 
to refer to the law governing the immunity of foreign governments as it existed in 1945, or 
to incorporate as well . . . subsequent . . . changes to that body of law.”402 The court found 
that   “despite the lack of a clear instruction as to whether Congress meant to incorporate 
in IOIA subsequent changes to the law of immunity of foreign sovereigns, Congress' 
intent was to adopt that body of law only as it existed in 1945 when immunity of foreign 
sovereigns was absolute. . . [Notably, however,] absolute immunity under IOIA is merely 
a baseline that is subject to modification by executive order.”403  The Court found that 
“[s]ince the purpose of the immunities accorded to international organizations is to enable 
the organizations to fulfil their functions, applying the same rationale in reverse, it is likely 
that most organizations would be unwilling to relinquish their immunity without receiving 
a corresponding benefit which would further the organization’s goals.”404  
 
Thus, according to the DC Circuit, the judiciary is the one vested with the 
authority to conduct the cost-benefit analysis to determine when a constructive waiver of 
immunity is appropriate.  More specifically, the court hypothesised that the cost-benefit 
test would apply when international organisations engaged in commercial transactions, 
because otherwise private parties would be reluctant to trade without legal remedy.  
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Therefore, international organisations must have intended to include a commercial waiver 




This test has been criticised on the grounds that IOIA only allows express waiver 
of immunity.
406
  When the judiciary engages in a balancing test to determine whether an 
organisation intended to waive its immunity in a particular situation, such waiver runs 
counter to the international organisations’ raison d’etre and, arguably, may severely 
impair the ability of international organisations to carry out their mandate.
407
   
 
In addition, it could also be argued that the “to enable the [MDB] to fulfil the 
functions with which it is entrusted” construct is merely a descriptive, purposive clause, 
which states the reason for according the relevant international organisation the 
immunities set out in its foundation documents and is not intended to require international 
organisations to justify the application of the asserted immunity – an argument recently 
upheld by the Supreme Court of Canada in its ruling on the WB immunity.
408
  At the other 
end of spectrum, it has been suggested that the functional necessity doctrine has been 
interpreted much too broadly and should, instead, provide a framework to balance the 
operational requirements of international organisations against other important social 
values, such as fairness to private litigants, equal access to justice, and accountability 
under the rule of law.409  
 
 Finally, the Atkinson decision has been criticised because of the court’s 
determination that, although IOIA says that international organisations enjoy the same 
immunity from judicial process as is enjoyed by foreign governments, the reference to the 
“same immunity” was to be interpreted as the immunity conferred to foreign states under 
the FSIA in force when IOIA was enacted in 1945 (which was a “virtually absolute 
immunity”). 410  Instead, critics argue, the court should have recognised that a natural 
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reading of the “same immunity” language in IOIA dictates that the immunity of 




In 2009, the court reaffirmed Mendaro and Atkinson in Osseiran v International 
Finance Corporation,
412
 in which the claimant investor sued the IFC when its investment 
deal soured on the grounds of promissory estoppel and breach of confidentiality in a 
commercial transaction.  The IFC claimed immunity under IOIA.  Building on Mendaro 
and Atkinson, in which the court determined that it was for the federal judiciary to decide 
whether an international organisation’s invocation of immunity for certain actions would 
interfere with its mission, and found that in those particular cases, the relevant 
international organisation had not waived immunity because the waiver of immunity 
would not yield the organisation any conceivable benefit, the court in Osseiran reasoned 
that immunity from lawsuits based on commercial transactions would actually harm an 
organisation’s ability to fulfil its fundamental goals by hindering its capacity to operate in 
the marketplace.
413
  In this case, the court found that the IFC did not identify any 
countervailing costs to suggest that immunity should not be waived.  Therefore, the court 




 However, in its most recent decision on the immunities of international 
organisations – Budha Ismail Jam, et al. v International Finance Corporation,415 the US 
Supreme Court overturned the DC Circuit’s decision (which had relied on Atkinson) and 
held that international organisations do not have absolute immunity that foreign 
governments enjoyed when IOIA, but rather limited immunity that foreign governments 
enjoy today.  In reaching its conclusion, the Supreme Court noted that IOIA defines 
immunities by reference to comparable privileges and immunities enjoyed by foreign 
governments. Thus, the IOIA should be understood to link the law of international 
organisation immunity to the law of foreign state immunity, as defined by FSIA.  As a 
consequence, international organisations are now exposed to potential liability if their 
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actions fall within one of the exceptions to the FSIA, including the exception for 
“commercial activities.” 
 
Outside the DC Circuit, the Third Circuit rejected the Atkinson interpretation in 
OSS Nokalva, Inc. v European Space Agency.
416
 In this case, the claimant software 
provider from New Jersey sued the European Space Agency (the “ESA”) for claims 
including breach of contract, conversion, negligence, and tortious interference.  The ESA 
argued that it enjoyed absolute immunity under IOIA.  Although the District Court agreed, 
it found that the ESA had waived immunity, due in part to the fact that the ESA had 





 On appeal, the Third Circuit held that IOIA does not confer absolute immunity on 
international organisations and that it only provides international organisations with “the 
same immunity from suit and every form of judicial process as is enjoyed by foreign 
governments”,418 where “the same” was interpreted to include the restrictions to sovereign 
immunity adopted under the FSIA subsequent to IOIA enactment.   
 
As a result, the Third Circuit deemed IOIA to incorporate the standards set forth in 
the FSIA, including the exception to immunity for commercial activities having close 
connections to the territory of the United States.
419
  In conclusion, the Third Circuit stated 
that the recognition of absolute immunity enjoyed by international organisations would 
produce “anomalous result.”  Because foreign governments enjoyed no immunity from 
claims based on their commercial activities, the Court found no reason “why a group of 
states acting through an international organization is entitled to broader immunity than its 
member states when acting alone.”420 
 
Finally, it is important to note that, unlike its European counterparts, the US 
judiciary does not have to reconcile the obligations set forth in the relevant immunity and 
those included in or developed on the basis of the European Convention on Human Rights.  
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Therefore, US courts have not developed case law similar to Waite and Kennedy v 
Germany, described in more detail in section (vi) below, which conditions the granting of 
immunity on the availability of “alternative remedies” to claimants.    
 
(ii) UK courts 
 
The UK view appears to be that the basis of the privileges and immunities of 
international organisations is premised on the principle of functional necessity, as set out 
in the policy document from 1969.
421
  The standard way in which international 
organisations and their officials enjoy privileges and immunities in the UK is when the 
UK government adopts an “Order of Council” pursuant to sections 1(2)(b)-(d) of the 
International Organisations Act, which state that an international organisation, its officials, 
employees and experts shall have the privileges and immunities set out in Parts I, II and III 
of Schedule 1 of the International Organisations Act.  
 
UK courts have generally shown considerable consciousness of the fact that, for 
the most part of their activities, international organisations operate at the level of 
international law, and have been careful to observe the proper role of national courts when 
faced with cases concerning international organisations.
422
  In two cases relating in broad 
terms to labour disputes with EBRD (specifically, race and sex discrimination), the 
Employment Appeal Tribunal found that the respective disputes concerned the official 
employment-related functions of EBRD which were immune from the jurisdiction by 
virtue of the Headquarters Agreement that had been given effect in the relevant Order of 
Council under the International Organisations Act of 1968.
423
  Specifically, in Mukoro v 
European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, the claimant argued that his 
application for employment at EBRD was unlawfully rejected on the grounds of race.  
More particularly, he put forward two arguments in an attempt to defeat EBRD’s claim of 
immunity: first, he argued that an act of racial discrimination could not be construed as an 
“official activity” of EBRD, as this was inconsistent with EBRD’s commitment to the 
respect for human rights as expressed in its founding document.  Second, he argued that 
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the 1991 Order of Council, which granted privileges and immunities to EBRD was ultra 
vires insofar as it granted EBRD broader immunities than those required under its 
constituent treaty, which provided only for the immunity of EBRD’s employees and 
officers and not for the immunity of EBRD itself.
424
   
 
The Employment Appeal Tribunal rejected both arguments, finding that, with 
respect to the claimant’s first argument, under the terms of the 1991 Order, “official 
activity” included “administrative activity”, and the selection of staff fell within such 
administrative activity for which the Order provided immunity from suit.  The claimant’s 
second argument was rejected based on the court’s interpretation of the UK-EBRD 




Entico Ltd. v UNESCO
426
 is another mention-worthy case.  It concerned a dispute 
between an English publishing company which contracted with UNESCO to produce a 
calendar.  Entico alleged wrongful repudiation of contract by UNESCO, whereas 
UNESCO argued that no contract had been formed to begin with.  The claimant argued 
that UNESCO’s immunity was qualified by the requirement to provide an alternative 
remedy under section 31 of UNESCO’s Specialised Agencies Convention.  The court, 
however, interpreted section 31 quite narrowly and stated:  
 
“Section 31 itself offers no criteria pursuant to which the appropriateness of a mode of 
settlement is to be judged. . . It would be wholly inimical to the international scheme 
envisaged if individual States party arrogated to themselves the power to determine 
whether the provision made by each specialised agency for the settlement of disputes is 
adequate, whether considered generally or by reference to the facts of a particular case.” 
 
It is perhaps the specific facts of the case that offer a reason why the court was quick to 
reject any challenge to UNESCO’s immunity: Entico had the option, under its purported 
contract with UNESCO, to take the dispute to arbitration under UNCITRAL rules, which 




(iii)  Italian courts 
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 Unlike their UK counterparts, Italian courts have gradually restricted international 
organisation immunity by interpreting the functional necessity principle in an increasingly 
rigorous manner.  Functional immunity is confined to activities having a “public” or 
“sovereign” nature.428  However, like US courts, Italian courts have become increasingly 
more demanding in this regard and have retained the power to decide which activities are 
the essential purposes and “public” activities of the international organisation.  Therefore, 
they retained the power to deny immunity where, in their opinion, the activity was not 





 It has been suggested that Italian courts have been forerunners in recognising that 
international organisation immunity should be subordinated to the availability of effective 
alternative remedies.
430
  Namely, in the Italian legal order, international organisation 
immunity is provided under treaty law and treaties are subordinated to the Italian 
Constitution, which says that “[e]veryone can take judicial action for the protection of 
individual rights and legitimate interests.”431 
 
 The constant concern of Italian courts has been the balancing of two competing 
interests: the fundamental right to judicial protection, on the one hand, and the immunity 
of international organisations, on the other hand.
432
  This has been evident primarily in the 
context of disputes with international organisations’ employees.  Therefore, where 
alternative internal remedies are available, courts will typically find no breach of the right 
of access to court provided under the Italian Constitution.
433
   By contrast, where no 
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internal remedies were available to an international organisation’s employees, immunity 




 Notably, Italian courts no longer appear to be satisfied with the formal existence of 
alternative remedies: recent decisions suggest that Italian courts will not shy away from 
ensuring that, before they grant immunity to an international organisation, the judicial 
protection of employees is entrusted to a body that is independent and impartial.  Italian 
courts will therefore look into the composition of the adjudicating body established inside 
the international organisation to ensure that it is truly independent and impartial.  For 
example, in Drago A. v International Plant Genetic Resources Institute (IPGRI), the 
Supreme Court did not uphold the immunity from jurisdiction of IPGRI as a consequence 
of its failure to provide an independent and impartial judicial remedy alternative to court 
proceedings in the host state for the resolution of employment disputes.  Mr Drago was a 
former IPGRI employee with a temporary employment contract. After the termination of 
the working relationship, he launched a court action invoking unfair dismissal and asked 
to be reinstated in service.  The court found that the IPGRI Appeals Committee was a 
mere internal remedy, unsuited to provide appropriate judicial protection to an employee 
contesting his dismissal.
435
  It further held that the jurisdictional immunity conferred upon 
IPGRI in its headquarters agreement with Italy was incompatible with the fundamental 
right to commence proceedings to protect one’s rights contained in Article 24 of the Italian 
Constitution, because the organisation had not fulfilled its obligation pursuant to the 
headquarters agreement to provide an independent and impartial judicial remedy for the 
resolution of employment-related dispute.
436
  Specifically, the Court held that IPGRI’s 
“internal rules (known as the Personnel Policy Manual) state that disciplinary measures 
are to be re-examined by a body known as the Appeals Committee, which may also 
consider appeals of a non-disciplinary nature. This merely constitutes an internal remedy, 
which does not provide jurisdictional protection in the aforesaid sense.”437 
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This preclusion of any form of judicial protection of the organisation’s employees 
led the Court to conclude that IPGRI could not rely on its immunity and that the dispute 
fell within the jurisdiction of Italian courts.
438
   
  
(iv)   French courts 
 As in Italy, French courts have sometimes followed a restrictive approach towards 
the immunity of international organisations, particularly in relation to labour disputes.  
Unlike in the US and the UK, no specific domestic legislation has been enacted in France 
concerning international organisations.  Consequently, sources of rules applicable to 
international organisations are typically found in international treaties introduced in the 
French legal order; specifically: the constituent treaties of international organisations; 
multilateral conventions and protocols on privileges and immunities, such as the 
Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the UN; and bilateral agreements, such as 
headquarters agreements.
439





 In recent years, French courts have been visibly influenced by the case law of the 
ECtHR and the necessity to preserve the right of any claimant to free access to a judge.  
Thus, for example, in UNESCO v Boulois, a French appellate court rejected UNESCO’s 
claim of immunity by directly invoking ECHR.  The court held that granting immunity 
“would inevitably lead to preventing [the claimant] from bringing his case to a court.  This 
situation would be contrary to public policy as it constitutes a denial of justice and a 
violation of the provisions of Article 6(1) of the [ECHR] and fundamental liberties.”441   
 
More recently, in Banque africaine de développement v M.A. Degboe, Cour de 
Cassation decided that AfDB could not benefit from immunity because there was no 
internal tribunal that could decide a dispute between the Bank and a former employee.
442
  
In its decision, the court did not refer to the ECHR; rather, the decision was grounded on 
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the notion of “international public order” which forbids the denial of justice.443  This 
approach suggests that the idea of a “forfeiture” of immunity in cases in which no 
alternative remedy is provided is not limited to those situations where the right of access 
to justice is derived from the ECHR.  Rather, it indicates that this concept may be 
“transferable” to other jurisdictions, where it may be based on due process or the 
prohibition of denial of justice understood as elements of an “international public order” 




 The Court of Cassation confirmed its position in other decisions, and went further 
in its oversight, which is not limited to ensuring that there exists a tribunal within an 
organisation, but also extends to the characteristics of this tribunal and to the rights offered 
to claimants.  Thus, in Illemassene v OECD,
445
 the French Court of Cassation stressed the 
fact that the organisation was not bound by the ECHR, but carefully verified that staff 
members enjoyed the rights provided by the ECHR concerning access to justice.  
Specifically, the court examined the set-up of OECD’s administrative tribunal and found 
that it did not violate the French concept of ordre publique and that, therefore, OECD was 
entitled to benefit from immunity to jurisdiction.  In particular, the Court noted that the 
administrative tribunal judges were three highly qualified jurists from outside the OECD 
and were to exercise their functions with impartiality and complete independence.  Further, 
the administrative tribunal sessions were open to public, unless otherwise requested by the 
parties in the proceedings; the dates of sessions were published on a list available to agents, 





 Finally, French court was recently faced with a challenge to jurisdictional 
immunity of an international organisation (ADB) in the context of a debarment decision 
that ADB imposed on Eurotrends, a French company, under its sanctions procedures.  
More particularly, in July 2014, Eurotrends filed suit in the Paris Court of first instance, 
requesting the court to set aside ADB’s debarment decision and to order ADB to pay 
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Eurotrends €1.5 million in damages, plus interest and fees.447  Eurotrends argued that 
ADB’s debarment process deprived Eurotrends and its two directors (who joined the 
proceedings) of the right to access to a judge or to a fair legal process under the ECHR, as 
incorporated into international public policy or community law.  Specifically, Eurotrends 
challenged ADB’s debarment process and argued that ADB’s sanctions procedures denied 
Eurotrends due process human rights.  Further, Eurotrends also argued that ADB’s 
sanctions regime was not sufficiently independent or impartial, partly because internal 
ADB personnel comprised its Sanctions Board, which according to Eurotrends, provided 
inadequate due process.  ADB, on the other hand, requested the court to dismiss 
Eurotrends’ claims on the basis of ADB’s jurisdictional immunity as set out in Article 50 
of the Agreement Establishing the Asian Development Bank.    
 
In a judgment rendered in April 2015, the Paris Court of first instance held that 
Eurotrends’ claims were not admissible, thereby dismissing Eurotrends’ case.  The court 
based its decision on the jurisdictional immunities clause of the Charter holding that 
“Article 50 [of the Charter] first establishes the absolute nature of ADB’s jurisdictional 
immunity” from legal process and that the exceptions to such immunity are limited to acts 
in relation with the exercise of its power to borrow money, guarantee obligations, or to 
buy, sell or underwrite the sale of securities.  The Court noted that ADB had not waived 
its immunity in the present case (Eurotrends had not argued that ADB had waived its 
immunities).   The Court also ruled that while the “right to a judge” is recognised under 
international public law, this right is not absolute but rather subject to restrictions if the 
limitations are imposed for a legitimate purpose and are not disproportionate.   
 
Most critically, the Court held that: 
 
“The jurisdictional immunity of the ADB . . . has a legitimate purpose.  And the 
ineligibility of Eurotrends to take part in any calls for tender for three years [the length of 
debarment] is drawn from the very international public service missions that sixty-seven 
States, including France, have conferred on the ADB . . .  
 
. . . [The debarment process] was governed by the principles and rules and, correlatively, 
the procedures, corrective measures and sanctions that the ADB has adopted in relation to 
its duty of integrity, in order to carry out its international public service missions . . .” 
 
The Court “for the sake of fair debate” also ruled that, in ADB’s debarment 
process, Eurotrends received notice of the allegations against it, was able to present 
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arguments in its defense, and was heard by the appropriate bodies of ADB on its appeal 
against the debarment decision of ADB. The Court also noted that ADB’s debarment 
process included an opportunity to appeal, albeit one that was denied Eurotrends on the 
basis that Eurotrends offered no new evidence required by ADB process to sustain an 
appeal. The Court also noted that the ADB debarment panels were comprised of ADB 
personnel, which did not appear to offend the Court’s views on required due process. 
Without directly ruling on the matter, the Court seems to have indicated that ADB’s 
debarment process comprised sufficient due process. 
 
(v)  Belgian courts 
The most noteworthy Belgian case regarding the challenge of an international 
organisation’s immunity before a national court is Siedler v Western European Union, in 
which Ms. Siedler challenged the termination of her employment, and in which the Court 
of Appeals refused to uphold the Western European Union’s (WEU) immunity on the 
grounds that its internal tribunal failed to provide adequate due process rights to the 
respondent.  In its analysis, the court first recognised the guarantees of a fair trial under 
Article 6(1) of the ECHR,
448
 and noted that, in line with Waite v Kennedy (described in 
section (vi) below), the right to court was not absolute.  The court proceeded to point out 
that in Waite v Kennedy, the ECtHR did not examine whether the available means offered 
by the ESA satisfied all the guarantees involved in the notion of a fair trial under Article 
6(1) of the ECHR.
449
  By contrast, the court decided to examine the proceedings before the 
WEU’s Appeals Tribunal and found several elements in which they were deficient in 
meeting due process requirements under Article 6(1) of the ECHR.   
 
Specifically, the Court held that the public character of the proceedings and of the 
decisions was not guaranteed because the hearings of the Board were held in private and 
the decisions were not published.
450
  Moreover, it noted that the members of the tribunal 
were appointed by the Intergovernmental Committee for a two-year term.  In the opinion 
of the Court, the short term of the WEU Appeals Board members’ mandate and their mode 
of appointment did not provide sufficient guarantees for their independence (more 
particularly, the Court noted that the “irremovability” of judges was a necessary element 
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  Finally, the Court found that no provisions existed to permit 
challenges concerning the impartiality of individual Tribunal members.
452
  Thus, the Court 
concluded that the procedure provided by the WEU did not offer all the guarantees 
inherent in the notion of fair trial, with some of the most important conditions being 
flawed and, consequently, that the “limitation on access to the normal courts by virtue of 
the jurisdictional immunity of the WEU was incompatible with Article 6(1) of the 
ECHR.”453 
 
Several years later, the Supreme Court (Cour de Cassation) upheld the Court of 
Appeals’ judgment. 454   Evidently, therefore, Belgian courts did not shy away from 
evaluating the quality of an international organisation’s dispute resolution mechanism, and 
confirmed that the mere existence of such mechanism did not suffice for the organisation 
to invoke its immunity successfully before a domestic court.  In the courts’ view, such 
mechanism should also meet various qualitative due process criteria before an 
organisation could rely on it to justify invoking its immunity.  
 
(vi)  Human rights dimension and the ECHR 
Although most human rights instruments do not expressly provide for a right of 
access to court, it is clear from the interpretations of the texts that the fair trial guarantees 
contained in such documents as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights
455
, the 







include a right of access to court.   
 
 The human rights argument for providing access to court is equally persuasive in 
the context of the immunity of international organisations: the relevant human rights 
instruments clearly phrase the underlying fair trial rights as rights of individuals entitling 
them to have a fair third-party adjudication of their claims against anyone else, regardless 
of whether the opposing party might be another private party, a foreign state or an 
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  Nonetheless, the right of access to court is not unlimited and, 
provided that immunity is accompanied by appropriate safeguards – for example, the 
availability of appropriate alternative remedies for the claimant, immunity may be justified.   
 
The reason international organisations have to provide appropriate alternative 
remedies for those parties whose interests have been or may have been affected by their 
acts, actions or omissions emanates from the imperative of the protection of human rights.  
The creation of comprehensive body of primary and secondary rules on human rights 
protection has taken place in parallel, although at a different pace, to the proliferation and 
expansion of international organisations.   After all, “it would be quite ironic to negate the 
rights of individuals on the assumption that they might be incompatible with the functions 
of international organisations.”460  Thus, arguably, the functional needs of an international 
organisation should always be subordinated to basic international human rights standards, 
such as the right to adequate means of redress in the case of violations of one’s rights.461 
 
In two landmark cases, Waite and Kennedy v Germany and Beer and Regan v 
Germany
462
, the ECtHR had to address the question of whether Germany had violated 
Article 6(1) of the ECHR by declaring complaints against the ESA brought by ESA’s 
temporary workers, who pursued the approval of employment contracts, inadmissible on 
the grounds of the ESA’s immunity.  The ECtHR noted that: 
 
“[t]he right of access to the courts secured by Article 6 §1 of the [ECHR] is not absolute, 
but may be subject to limitations; these are permitted by implication since the right of 
access by its very nature calls for regulation by the State. . . . [The Court] must be satisfied 
that the limitations applied do not restrict or reduce the access left to the individual in such 
a way or to such an extent that the very essence of the right is impaired.  Furthermore, a 
limitation will not be compatible with Article 6 §1 if it does not pursue a legitimate aim 
and if there is not a reasonable relationship of proportionality between the means 
employed and the aim sought to be achieved.
463
 (emphasis added) 
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The Court proceeded to note that “a material factor in determining whether 
granting the ESA immunity from German jurisdiction is permissible under the ECHR is 
whether the applicants had available to them reasonable alternative means to protect 
effectively their rights under the Convention.”464  It then concluded that the requirement of 
the availability of these alternative means was fulfilled because the ESA had established 
an internal appeals board, which is “independent of the Agency.”465  The Court therefore 
found that the claimants were provided with “equivalent protection” to Article 6(1) of the 
ECHR, even in the absence of access to the German labour courts.   
 
In denying the violation of Article 6(1) of the ECHR, the ECtHR did not address 
the concern expressed by the European Commission on Human Rights that the claimants 
were probably unable to resort to this internal remedial mechanism of the ESA, given that 
they did not fall within the ESA’s definition of “staff members.”  The ECtHR therefore 
failed to clarify the general question of whether the EU Member States, by having signed 
the ESA founding statute, which is an act of an EU institution, might be liable for 
infringement of the ECHR.   
 
The ECtHR’s decision has been criticised on the grounds that there was hardly a 
risk that the functioning of a well-established organisation would be disrupted by the 
recognition of the right of staff members, who have not been given the status of agents, to 
refer any claims they might have to the jurisdiction of the state courts.
466
  Arguably, a 
bolder approach would have recognised that it is necessary to limit the immunities that 
international organisations enjoy, in the same way that this was judged to be essential for 





The obligation of international organisations to make available to claimants 
“reasonable alternative means to protect effectively their rights” 468  is not limited to 
providing a forum.  It is also necessary that such alternative forum meets certain criteria as 
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to its effectiveness.  The question, however, remains as to what criteria permit the 
upholding of an international organisation’s immunity and what type of alternative means 
of dispute resolution need to be in place in order to justify the maintaining of an expansive 
approach to the immunity of international organisations.  In that context, it has been 
suggested that if judges do not strictly examine the actual existence of “reasonable 
alternative means” which provide “effectively” the right to an independent and impartial 




The issue was not clarified in a more recent ECtHR decision involving 
employment dispute with the UNDP – Perez v Germany, 470  in which a former staff 
member of the UNDP complained that there had been manifest deficiencies in the UNDP 
internal appeal proceedings surrounding her dismissal.  Germany was to be held 
responsible for these deficient procedures as it had failed to ensure that there was a UN 
internal dispute settlement procedure protecting her fundamental rights in a manner 
equivalent to the ECHR standards.  The claimant brought suit directly before the ECtHR, 
arguing that she had implicitly fulfilled the requirement of exhausting domestic remedies, 
because German courts would grant immunity to the UNDP and dismiss her case.  The 
ECtHR disagreed, holding that German courts would have jurisdiction to review her 
claims.   
 
Notably, the ECtHR held that the internal resolution mechanism that the UNDP 
had made available to the claimant was structurally deficient and would likely fail to meet 
the human rights protection required by the German Constitution and the ECHR.  
However, the Court left open the question of whether Germany was to be held responsible 
for the alleged deficiencies in Ms Perez’s case, as it came to the conclusion that she had 
failed to exhaust the national remedies. In reaching that conclusion, the Court took note of 
the German Government’s submission that a constitutional complaint would have been an 
effective remedy in respect of those complaints. It followed from several relevant 
decisions of the German Constitutional Court that – despite the immunity of international 
organisations from the jurisdiction of the German courts – the Constitutional Court had 
jurisdiction to examine whether the level of fundamental rights protection in employment 
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disputes in international organisations complied with the Constitution. A complaint to the 
German Constitutional Court would therefore have been an effective remedy, which Ms 
Perez had failed to exhaust. 
 
Another recent noteworthy ECtHR case is Stichting Mothers of Srebrenica et al. v 
The Netherland,
471
 which upheld an international organisation’s immunity despite 
complete lack of alternative remedies to claimants.  The case concerned the conduct of a 
Dutch military force operating within the peacekeeping mission established in the former 
Yugoslavia by the UN Security Council. Surviving relatives sought to hold the UN 
accountable through Dutch courts for the abandonment of the peacekeeping force’s duty to 
protect a group of Bosnian Muslims.  The case before the ECtHR was a complaint by 
relatives of victims of the 1995 Srebrenica massacre, and by an NGO representing victims’ 
relatives, of the Netherlands courts’ decision to declare their case against the United 
Nations (UN) inadmissible on the ground that the UN enjoyed immunity from national 
courts’ jurisdiction.  In particular, the claimants alleged that their right of access to court 
had been violated by that decision.   
 
The ECtHR, like the Dutch Supreme Court and all of Dutch lower courts, 
concluded that the UN’s immunity prevailed over the claimants’ right to access to justice 
even though there was no alternative remedy for the claimants.  Referring extensively to 
Waite and Kennedy, the ECtHR interpreted this case to mean that the availability of an 
alternative remedy is not a conditio sine qua non for immunity.   
 
In this particular case, the ECtHR concluded that “in the present case the grant of 
immunity to the United Nations served a legitimate purpose and was not 
disproportionate.”472  The ECtHR was careful to distinguish the Mothers of Srebrenica 
case from earlier cases in which it decided upon the immunity of several international 
organisations. It held that at the root of the case was “a dispute between the applicants and 
the United Nations based on the use by the Security Council of its powers under Chapter 
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VII of the [UN Charter to act to preserve international peace and security].”473 The ECtHR 
rationalised its decision as follows:  
 
“The Court finds that since operations established by United Nations Security Council 
resolutions under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter are fundamental to the 
mission of the United Nations to secure international peace and security, the Convention 
cannot be interpreted in a manner which would subject the acts and omissions of the 
Security Council to domestic jurisdiction without the accord of the United Nations. To 
bring such operations within the scope of domestic jurisdiction would be to allow 
individual States, through their courts, to interfere with the fulfilment of the key mission 




Accordingly, the Court considered the absence of an alternative remedy not to 
carry sufficient weight to outweigh the interest of the UN to retain immunity for the UN 
peacekeeping forces’ failure to prevent the Srebrenica massacre.  This ruling may be 
justified by the understanding that any review of such conduct would immediately 
implicate the operational decisions taken by the UN Security Council and would entail 
judicial scrutiny of the UN Security Council’s use of its special powers under Chapter 
VII.
475
  Arguably, the UN immunity was grounded in a political interest, as the claimants 
challenged the discharge of the UN’s core functions of protecting international peace and 
security.  On the other hand, it has been argued that the Srebrenica decision implies that 
an organisation exercising its functions and violating human rights – without this being the 
main objective of the action or inaction, but a side-effect – remains protected by its 
immunity from jurisdiction even if there is no recourse to international courts.
476
  Still, as 
noted above, where an international organisation’s conduct entails no element of public 
authority, and does not touch upon the core of the exercise of its functions, there is no 
reason to protect it from judicial scrutiny.  It remains to be seen whether the ECtHR will 
use the same reasoning in cases concerning the immunity of other international 
organisations. 
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D.  Conclusion 
 
 As evidenced from the case law on immunities of international organisations, the 
regime of immunities continues to be the cornerstone of the law of international 
organisations, essential for their independent functioning and is generally accepted and 
upheld by courts.  Nonetheless, there seems to be a clear development in the case law of 
domestic courts towards abandoning the traditional view of the immunity of international 
organisations whose decisions fail to consider the human rights-based notion of access to 
justice and due process.  Case law suggests, however, that the court’s decision on whether 
to uphold immunity will also depend on both the type of dispute and the type of 
international organisation concerned.  Thus, for example, an employment case against 
IPGRI in the Drago case before the Italian Supreme Court is very different from the 
ECtHR case about the prevention of genocide in Srebrenica concerning the UN.    
 
 As described in the above analysis, national courts have struggled to define the 
scope of international organisations’ immunities, with individual national courts having 
each found their own way to deal with the issue, and without common or coordinated 
approach having developed.  To some extent, different approaches by national judges may 
be explained by differences in the applicable immunity provisions. While many 
international organisations enjoy immunity “from every form of legal process” (such as 
the UN and the IMF
477
), other organisations (such as all five MDBs) have a more 
restrictive immunity regime.
478
   
 
Thus, in cases in which the relevant immunity rules of an international 
organisation provide for absolute immunity (such as those of the UN), there is indeed little 
room for national courts to exercise jurisdiction.
479
  By contrast, if the organisation does 
not have absolute immunity (such as the MDBs), there is more room for national courts to 
exercise jurisdiction over certain cases that are not covered by immunities, with the 
national courts of different members possibly coming to different conclusions in cases that 
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are similar.  In particular, Italian, French and Belgian courts have followed a restrictive 
approach towards immunity in comparison to their UK and US counterparts, especially in 
relation to employment disputes.
480
   
 
The obvious criticism to the immunities regime is that parties suffering from the 
activities of international organisations cannot bring claims against them.  Scholars have 
argued that international organisations must ensure that their actions are consistent with 
more than just their charters and internal governance procedures, and there is an emerging 
consensus that, as subjects of international law, international organisations must observe 
general principles of customary norms of international law, including certain human rights 
norms.
481
  Namely, as with any other legal model, international organisations’ sanctions 
regimes should be legitimate.  Standard features legitimising legal systems include public 
accountability for the legislative process, public consultations, and media debates that 
shape national laws in democratic countries, and international organisations’ systems do 




Moreover, the WB itself has acknowledged that economic development and human 
rights are intertwined.
483
  It therefore seems clear that there is a human rights-driven need 
to close accountability gaps, irrespective of whether they result from immunity or other 
grounds leading to the lack of jurisdiction of national courts.
484
  As to the determination of 
whether courts should be the ones to fill the accountability gap, the following 
considerations are relevant: (a) whether courts are suited to perform this task, (b) what law 
should be applied and (c) whether such exercise of jurisdiction will disproportionally 
hinder the independent functioning of international organisations.
485
  The follow-on 
question is who should engage in this balancing exercise – international organisations 
themselves, national courts or international courts. 
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Possibly, the answer to close the accountability gap does not lie in questioning the 
existing regime of immunity rules of international organisations, but in reducing any 
“accountability gaps” by, among other things, providing alternative remedies for private 
law disputes.
486
  If international organisations do not take this requirement seriously, 
courts may increasingly reject immunity claims by international organisations and, 
moreover, international organisations may lose the support of public opinion.
487
   
 
Specifically, in the context of MDBs’ sanctions regimes, coupled with the MDBs’ 
immunity from judicial review, the question arises as to what measures exist to prevent 
MDBs from introducing such arbitrary decisions to, by way of example, debar not only 
the party found to have engaged in a sanctionable practice, but also all of its affiliates, 
including its parent companies, without even considering the extent of the parent 
companies’ supervision.  Or, to go as far as debarring a party for an indefinite period of 
time, without even taking into account any mitigating factors.  Arguably, despite their 
immunity from jurisdiction, MDBs cannot inexplicably debar parties because this would 
be “anathema both to the [MDBs’] development missions and to [their] associated work to 
improve transparency and reasoned decision-making in governance worldwide.”488   In 
fact, the WB has committed to provide due process as part of the sanctions regime
489
, but 
the question remains what that due process entails and what the appropriate benchmark for 
it would be. 
 
In other words, given that the debarred parties are unlikely to get any redress 
against such onerous decisions in courts, what features should characterise MDBs’ 
sanctions regimes in order to ensure that the aggrieved parties are provided with adequate 
protections against unreasonable and arbitrary decisions by the MDBs’ sanctions decision-
makers?   The next section attempts to answer this question by trying to identify the 
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appropriate benchmarks for MDBs’ sanctions regimes.  Chapter 3 then compares the 
principles of these benchmark systems with the MDBs’ sanctions regimes and makes 




3.  What legal principles should form the basis of MDBs’ sanctions regimes? 
A.  Introduction 
 
As noted in section 2 above, one of the most important shortcomings in the public 
accountability of international organisations is arguably the lack of opportunities for 
aggrieved parties to obtain legal redress.  In addition to being inconsistent with 
contemporary notions of international organisations’ accountability and legitimacy, the 
sweeping assertions of immunity by international organisations also contravene other 
well-settled and widely accepted international legal principles, including the principle that 
parties are entitled to minimum standards of procedural fairness in resolving claims 
against public entities.
490
  In that context, scholars have recognised that “[t]he crux of the 
problem lies in the occasionally inadequate procedures – if not their complete absence – 
for victims of the acts of international organizations to seek justice.”491  In view of the 
increase of both the numbers and the activities of international organisations, the 
expectation of the international community is that international organisations should 
deliver justice not only in words but also in practice and, therefore, international 
organisations need to ensure that the alternative dispute resolution systems they provide 
are robust.  The question, of course, is what such a robust dispute resolution system looks 
like and what benchmarks it should be measured against. 
 
MDBs’ sanctions processes are administrative adjudication processes, which 
incorporate aspects of at least three other legal disciplines: criminal, tort and contract 
law.
492
  For example, the debates at WB echo those that legislators face when deciding 
whether strict liability, negligence or recklessness standards should govern tortious 
conduct.
493
  This section examines what the appropriate benchmark for MDBs’ sanctions 
regimes should be by looking at four possible sources of information: (i) customary law 
and general principles, (ii) Global Administrative Law, (iii) Article 6(1) of the ECHR, and 
(iv) MDBs’ administrative tribunal jurisprudence, each of which is analysed in 
continuation.   While there is a broad consensus that international organisations must 
adhere to general principles and customary norms of international law, including certain 
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human rights norms that can be viewed as customary law or general principles of law,
494
  
as described in continuation, both customary law and general principles and GAL are too 
broad and high-level, while the ECHR and MDBs’ administrative tribunal jurisprudence 
can indeed prove useful to fill the gaps in MDBs’ sanctions procedures.  In addition, 
international arbitration rules (such as the IBA Rules on the Taking of Evidence in 
International Arbitration, the SCC Rules and the LCIA Rules) may prove useful in filling 
very specific, procedural gaps in MDBs’ sanctions procedures, given there is no basis for 
MDBs’ sanctions decision-making bodies to choose, for example, one national law’s 
approach towards the collection and assessment of evidence over another national law’s 
approach.  Therefore, any national law rules on such procedural matters would be 
inapplicable to the MDBs’ sanctions procedures.  
 
Arguably, another possible benchmark could be the practice of the European Anti-
Fraud Office (commonly known as OLAF), which investigates fraud against the EU 
budget, corruption and serious misconduct within the European institutions, and develops 
anti-fraud policy for the European Commission.
495
 However, unlike MDBs, OLAF is not a 
sanctioning body.  Rather, it investigates and then refers cases to national authorities to 
take forward under their rules.
496
  Also, unlike MDBs, OLAF does not maintain a 
debarment list separate from that of the European Union.  While this may change with the 
establishment of the European Public Prosecutor’s Office (EPPO), the EPPO is expected 
to take up its functions only in 2020.
497
  Finally, the vast majority of the OLAF case law 
focuses on challenging OLAF’s statutory and/or jurisdictional role to investigate, and 
doesn’t go into the respondents’ rights to due process in relation to a debarment decision, 
which is the focus of this thesis.
498
  This is why OLAF’s practices are not considered as 
appropriate benchmark for MDBs’ sanctions regimes. 
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B.  Customary law and general principles 
 
“The most difficult thing about international law,” Professor Watson of Columbus 
School of Law once wrote, “is finding it.”499  While there is no formal document in the 
legal frameworks of MDBs’ sanctions regimes that expressly recognises general principles 
as a source of law for MDBs’ sanctions regimes, it is common in international and 
administrative law to resort to customary law and general principles to resolve legal issues 
not clearly addressed within the applicable legal framework of the relevant international 
organisation (e.g., its sanctions procedures and related guidelines, as well as any precedent 
cases).
500
  Specifically, the International Court of Justice (“ICJ”) has observed that 
“international organizations are subjects of international law and, as such, are bound by 
any obligations incumbent upon them under general rules of international law, under their 
constitutions or under international agreements to which they are a party.” 501   The 
determination of what constitutes customary law and general principles is far from simple, 
however.   
 
First, customary law is not a written source, and the criteria for the identification of 
customary law are not clear: Article 38(1)(b) of the ICJ Statute says that international law 
disputes will be decided on the basis of “international custom, as evidence of a general 
practice accepted as law”, and the ICJ has stated that “[n]ot only must the acts concerned 
be a settled practice, but they must also be such, or be carried out in such a way, as to be 
evidence of a belief that this practice is rendered obligatory by the existence of a rule 
requiring it . . . The states concerned must feel that they are conforming to what amounts 
to a legal obligation.”502 Thus, for a new rule of customary international law to be created, 
two elements must be present: (i) state practice and (ii) opinio juris.   
 
In particular, the element of state practice is subject to controversy.  Scholars have 
debated what kind of activity constitutes state practice and disagree on the duration and 
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frequency of the activity that is necessary to satisfy the definition.
503
   Further, it is 
practically impossible to determine the customs of the nearly 200 states in the 
international community, nor do we know how many states have to act in a certain way for 
it to become customary.  Consequently, a determination of “customary law” will 
inevitably take into account only major powers and the most affected states.
504
   
 
In 2018, the International Law Commission (“ILC”) adopted a set of 16 “draft 
conclusions on customary international law,”505 which concern the ways in which the 
existence and content of rules of customary international law are to be determined.  
According to the ILC, the requirement, as a constituent element of customary international 
law, of a general practice means that it is primarily the practice of states that contributes to 
the formation of rules of customary international law.
506
  While the ILC does not elaborate 
on the type of activity that constitutes state practice, it says that “[i]n certain cases, the 
practice of international organizations also contributes to the formation, or expression, of 
rules of customary international law.”507  The ILC further clarifies that such practice refers 
to the acts of international organisations that are functionally equivalent to the powers 
exercised by states, such as the practice of secretariats of international organisations when 
serving as treaty depositaries, in deploying military forces, or in taking positions on the 
scope of privileges and immunities for the organisation and its officials, while the acts of 
international organisations that are not functionally equivalent to the acts of states are 
unlikely to constitute relevant practice.
508
  It is unlikely that MDBs’ sanctions regimes 
would fall under the category of acts functionally equivalent to the powers exercised by 
states.  Even if they did, the ILC’s conclusion would make the determination of legal 
practices that should form the basis of MDBs’ sanctions regimes circular, as it would 
suggest that MDBs’ sanctions practices themselves form the basis of the formation of 
customary international law. 
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Admittedly, in the field of international human rights, certain obligations are 
widely accepted to form part of customary law, such as the prohibition of genocide, 
slavery, torture and other cruel, inhumane or degrading treatment of punishment, 
prolonged arbitrary detention, and systematic racial discrimination.
509
  This is so although 
a number of states have not signed international treaties devoted to these obligations.
510
  
However, sanctions regimes of MDBs are not concerned with such broad principles, but 
rather with due process rights that should be accorded to those accused of sanctionable 
practices, where one has to consider what rules of customary law apply to these types of 
proceedings.  When faced with this type of question in international law disputes, courts 
have often resorted to determining whether a customary rule exists in the opinio juris of 
states, which is a rather subjective element.  For example, in Nicaragua v U.S.A., the ICJ 
held that:  
 
“The opinio juris may be deduced from, inter alia, the attitude of the Parties and of States 
towards certain General Assembly resolutions . . . Consent to such resolutions is one of the 
forms of expression of an opinio juris with regard to the principle of non-use of force, 
regarded as a principle of customary international law, independently of the provisions, 





In view of this difficulty of determining what constitutes “international custom” 
within the meaning of Article 38(1)(b), some authors have proposed that one ought to look 
for a different – and arguably less demanding –  way to explain the legal force of 
universally recognised rights.  This could be the third source mentioned in Article 
381(1)(c) of the ICJ Statute, namely “the general principles of law recognised by civilised 
nations.”512  These general principles become effective through general acceptance or 
recognition by states.
513
  While this approach would dispense with the requirement to 
ascertain what state practice is, it is not free of problems.  As Petersen aptly put it:  
 
“If general principles can be established solely by their acceptance, the only significant 
distinction that they would have from customary rules would be the absence of a 
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requirement of state practice.  Human rights would thus be privileged because fewer 
conditions would have to be met to establish unwritten human rights norms.”514 
 
Nonetheless,  although due process rights are accepted by all common law systems 
and receive recognition in many others, this does not make these principles “universal”, 
given that they do not have the same scope in every legal system.  The European Court of 
Justice, for example, once surveyed national procedures in competition decisions, where 
due process rights are widely recognised: they were, however, shown to differ greatly 
even within the EU.
515
  For example, while the generally accepted principles of due 
process rights focus on impartiality, the opportunity to be heard and a reasoned decision, 
English law protects the right to a hearing relatively strongly, but it does not recognise a 
general administrative duty to give reasons, although most administrative lawyers believe 
that it should.  Similarly, in French administrative law, the main concern is legality and 
the focus on the “rights of the defence”; thus, in administrative proceedings, where 




Finally, in the report commissioned by the UN on basic due process rights, 
Fassbender notes differences among jurisdictions related, inter alia, to the extent of the 
right of access to courts, the types of disputes subject to fair trial rights, the application of 
fair trial rights to administrative procedures, the independence and impartiality of a 
tribunal and legitimate restrictions of fair trial rights in the “public interest.” 517  
Nevertheless, Fassbender concludes that certain minimum standards exist:  
 
“Notwithstanding the … differences in the definition of due process rights, it can be 
concluded that today international law provides for a universal minimum standard of due 
process which includes, firstly, the right of every person to be heard before an individual 
governmental or administrative measure which would affect him or her adversely is taken, 
and secondly the right of a person claiming a violation of his or her rights and freedoms by 
a State organ to an effective remedy before an impartial tribunal or authority.  These 
rights . . .  can be considered as part of the corpus of customary international law, and are 
also protected by general principles of law in the meaning of . . .  the ICJ Statute.”518 
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Recognising the difficulties of defining customary law and general principles, in 
her Advisory Opinion, the then General Counsel of the WB suggested that “[n]ational law 
concepts are more likely to be reference points for the prospective amendments to the 
Bank’s legal framework, and, in fact, many of the proposals in the [WB sanctions regime] 
are grounded in a survey of ‘benchmark’ national legal systems”,519 where “benchmark 
jurisdictions” would be the US, UK, France, Germany and possibly China. 520  
Undoubtedly, not everyone will agree with the choice of these five benchmark 
jurisdictions.    
 
One attempt to synthesise general principles of law has been in the form of the 
Global Administrative Law (“GAL”) described below.   
C.  Global Administrative Law 
 
Just as is the case with the general principles described in section B above, the 
legitimacy of GAL’s principles as a source of law depends on whether they are “so widely 
accepted and well-established in different legal systems that they are regarded as generally 
applicable to all decisions taken by international organisations.”521   This difficulty of 
convergence of legal norms is not endemic to GAL.  Scholars have argued that one of the 
key obstacles to the convergence is that “everyone accepts unification provided this means 
the others failing into line with [his] national law.”  Moreover, the diversity of nations 
with their different economic, social and political structures and divergent ideas of justice, 
not to mention the diversity of methods used by lawyers of various countries in the 
elaboration and development of the law all contribute to the difficulties of achieving 
convergence of legal norms.
522
  Arguably, however, a GAL-based approach would not 
dispense with the need to synthesise national laws, but it would allow MDBs to develop 
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GAL has been described as “comprising of the mechanisms, principles, practices 
and supporting social understandings that promote or otherwise affect the accountability 
of global administrative bodies, in particular by ensuring they meet adequate standards of 
transparency, participation, reasoned decision and legality, and by providing effective 
review of the rules and decisions they make.”524  Global administrative bodies, in turn, 
include “formal intergovernmental regulatory bodies, informal intergovernmental 
regulatory networks and coordination arrangements, national regulatory bodies operating 
with reference to an international intergovernmental regime, hybrid public-private 
regulatory bodies, and some private regulatory bodies exercising transnational governance 
functions of particular public significance.”525   
 
The formal sources of GAL include the classical sources of public international 
law – treaties, custom and general principles.526  However, it is highly unlikely that these 
sources will address all areas to be encountered in MDBs’ sanctions proceedings.  
Moreover, it is equally unlikely that a definitive and detailed body of rules and principles 
governing global administrative law could be formulated, as disagreements are inevitable 
about whose practices to count and whose not to count for the emergence of a rule and as 
to how much consistent practice might be necessary to generate a strong pull for 
adhesion.
527
  GAL has, however, developed some basic legal standards as its normative 
conception, which are as follows:   
 
(1) Procedural participation and transparency: Decisional transparency and 
access to information promote accountability directly by exposing 
administrative decisions and relevant documents to public and peer scrutiny.
528
  
As a consequence of criticism of the decision-making secrecy of international 
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organisations, international organisations have started providing wider public 
access to internal documents on internal decision-making and considerations 
on which decisions are based.
529
  To that end, MDBs are publishing on their 
websites quite extensive information about their sanctions regimes
530
 and some 
are also publishing full texts of reasoned decisions (EBRD and WB, in 
particular).  
 
(2) Reasoned decisions: The requirement to provide reasons for administrative 
decisions, including responses to the major arguments made by the parties, has 
been transposed from domestic law into some global and regional 
institutions.
531
  It is impossible to know how well-reasoned the decisions of 
MDBs’ appeals bodies are if these decisions are not published and, thus far, 
only EBRD and WB are publishing full texts of the decisions of their appeals 
bodies, and WB is also publishing full texts of the first-tier decision-maker’s 
decisions.  As of the date of this writing, EBRD has not had any appeals body 
decisions published.  Notably, it was only in November 2015 that EBRD 
introduced the requirement for all of its appeals body decisions to be published 
and, since then, the appeals body has not heard s single case. 
 
(3) Review: An entitlement to have a decision of domestic administrative body 
affecting one’s rights reviewed by a court or another independent tribunal is 
among the most widely accepted features of domestic administrative law and, 
as such, is to some extent reflected in GAL.
532
  In fact, some international 
human rights conventions consider the right to have a detrimental decision 
reviewed by a court as a human right: for example, Article 14 of the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
533
 and Articles 6 and 13 of 
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  However, as described in section 2, the regime of international 
organisations’ immunities continues to be the cornerstone of the law of 
international organisations and is generally accepted and upheld by courts, 
although there is an emerging trend of domestic courts abandoning the 
traditional view of the immunity of international organisations whose decisions 
fail to consider the human rights-based notion of access to justice and due 
process.  Arguably, if international organisations fail to provide effective 
accountability for seriously erroneous, arbitrary or abusive decisions, domestic 




(4) Substantive standards: proportionality, means-ends rationality and 
avoidance of unnecessary restrictive means:
536
 Proportionality is a 
cornerstone of the jurisprudence of some international human rights covenants: 
for example, under Article 8 of the ECHR, interference with certain individual 
rights is justifiable only if such interference is proportionate to the legitimate 
public objective pursued.
537
  Similarly, measures should be allowed only if 
they meet certain requirements designed to ensure a rational fit between means 
and ends, and employ means that are not more restrictive than reasonably 
necessary to accomplish the objective.
538
  This echoes the test that the US 
Supreme Court articulated in Matthews v Eldrige, described in Chapters 1 and 
2, which requires that due process rights be balanced against several factors. 
 
The question remains as to how the GAL norms will develop and evolve.  In that 
context, two different approaches have been put forward, each of which faces important 
limitations:  
 
(1) The “bottom up” approach would have GAL develop through the application 
of domestic administrative law tools to the decisions of global regulatory 
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  The main constraint of this approach is that although domestic 
administrative law systems provide some valuable ideas, they are not generally 
applicable as direct models for understanding and problem solving in the quite 
different conditions presented by the global administrative space.
 540
  Most 
domestic systems of administrative law address the issue of executive branch 
officers or administrative agencies exercising authority delegated to them by a 
parliamentary statute.  In exercising this authority, agencies are required to 
follow particular procedures involving the participation of affected parties or 
broader public.
541
  This model does not fit easily with the structures of 
international law and global governance, which lacks a democratic anchor 
through a central plenary law-making authority or a delegation of powers from 
national democratic organs.
542
   Therefore, while deriving some concepts from 
domestic administrative law, GAL must start from different structural premises 




(2) The “top down” approach would create new sui generis administrative law 
mechanism directly at the level of global regulatory regime.  Under this 
mechanism, individuals, groups and states would participate in global 
administrative procedures, the review of decisions would be performed by 
independent international bodies and this would include the review of domestic 
decisions forming part of distributed global administration.
544
  The challenge 
with this approach, however, is that it would require legalisation and 
institutionalisation of administrative regimes that are currently informal, which 
is difficult to achieve without losing the benefits of informal modes of 
cooperation and powerful states will generally be suspicious of strongly 
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 In conclusion, GAL does not answer all of the challenges of appropriate due 
process rights under sanctions regimes, and national law will therefore likely remain a 
valuable source in MDBs’ development of substantive legal norms.   Still, in view of the 
differences in national laws and notions of justice from which MDBs would have to 
choose in developing their sanctions processes if they tried to base them on customary law, 
general principles or GAL, it has been suggested that the best way to cement due process 
values or present them as “universal” is in the guise of human rights.546   
 
By contrast, the ECHR, the oldest and probably most influential regional treaty,
547
 
addresses the right to fair trial in Article 6 – it has generated extensive jurisprudence and 
has been cascaded in the national systems of administrative law.  Thus, the standards 
articulated in the ECHR could be compared to MDBs’ sanctions proceedings, given that 
rules on fair trial occupy functionally analogous positions under both the ECHR and 
MDBs’ sanctions regimes, operating as procedural guarantees for the fair administration 
of justice.  Although international organisations are not parties to the ECHR, because their 
member states or the forum state may be bound by the ECHR, it is reasonable to require 
that these organisations’ dispute resolution mechanisms, including sanctions proceedings, 
offer rights protection that is at least equivalent (although not necessarily identical) to the 
protection  offered by Article 6(1), described in continuation. 
D.  Article 6(1) of the ECHR 
 
Article 6(1) of the ECHR says that:  
 
“[i]n the determination of his civil rights and obligations or of any criminal charge against 
him, everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an 
independent and impartial tribunal established by law.  Judgment shall be pronounced 
publicly but the press and public may be excluded from all or part of the trial in the 
interests of morals, public order or national security in a democratic society, where the 
interests of juveniles or the protection of the private life of the parties so require, or to the 
extent strictly necessary in the opinion of the court in special circumstances where 
publicity would prejudice the interests of justice.” (emphasis added) 
 
As was noted in section 2, the constituent rights within Article 6 are not absolute 
and the aim is to ensure the fairness of the proceedings, while at the same time balancing it 
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with the need to adopt different procedures.
548
  The following sections describe the way in 
which the ECtHR has interpreted the key principles of Article 6(1). 
 
(i) Civil rights 
 
In its analysis of what constitutes “civil rights”, the ECtHR ascribed this concept 
broad meaning.  Thus, the ability to carry on a business by entering into contractual 
relations with others in the future was held to be a “civil right”.549  By analogy, depriving 
a party of its business by denying it the right not only to get funding from, but also to 
become a contractor, supplier or consultant in relation to a project financed by, any of the 





As a general principle, the ECtHR has held that parties to a dispute have a right to 
a public hearing unless one of the exceptional circumstances applies.  This principle was 
articulated in Miller v Sweden, in which the ECtHR said that:  
 
“[t]he exceptional character of the circumstances that may justify dispensing with an oral 
hearing essentially comes down to the nature of the issues to be decided by the competent 
national court. . . For example, the Court has recognised that disputes concerning benefits 
under social-security schemes are generally rather technical, often involving numerous 
figures, and their outcome usually depends on the written opinions given by medical 
doctors. Many such disputes may accordingly be better dealt with in writing than in oral 
argument. Moreover, it is understandable that in this sphere the national authorities should 
have regard to the demands of efficiency and economy. Systematically holding hearings 
could be an obstacle to the particular diligence required in social-security cases.”550 
 
 Accordingly, unless there exist exceptional circumstances that justify dispensing 
with a hearing, the right to a public hearing under Article 6(1) implies a right to an oral 
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hearing at least before one instance.
551
  Nonetheless, a hearing may not be required where 
there exist no issues of credibility or contested facts which require a hearing and the courts 
may fairly and reasonably decide the case on the basis of the parties’ submissions and 
other written materials;
552
 a case raises merely legal issues of a limited nature
553
 or 
presents no particular complexity;
554
 or  a case involves highly technical questions.
555
 
 On the other hand, however, an oral hearing will be considered necessary when the 
court needs to decide on issues of law and important factual questions,
556
 the court needs 
to determine whether the facts were correctly established by the authorities,
557
 
circumstances require the court to get a personal impression of the applicants in order to 
give the applicants the right to explain their personal situation,
558
 or the court would like 




  (iii) Independent and impartial tribunal 
 
The right to a fair hearing under Article 6(1) requires that a case be heard by an 
“independent and impartial tribunal.”  There is a close relationship between the guarantees 
of an “independent” and an “impartial” trial, and the Court therefore commonly considers 
the two requirements together.
560
  The term “independent” refers to independence vis-à-vis 
the other powers (the executive and the Parliament)
561
, as well as vis-à-vis the parties 
involved in the proceedings.
562
  In determining whether a body can be considered 
“independent”, the Court has considered, inter alia, the following criteria: (1) the manner 
of appointment of the members, (2) the duration of their term of office, (3) the existence of 
guarantees against outside pressures, and (4) whether the body presents an appearance of 
independence.
563
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The fact that judges are appointed by one of the parties in the proceedings and are 
removable by it does not automatically amount to a violation of Article 6(1).  Thus, in 
Clarke v The United Kingdom, the ECtHR held that “in order to establish whether a 
tribunal can be considered as ‘independent’, regard must be had, inter alia, to the manner 
of appointment of its members and their term of office, the existence of guarantees against 
outside pressures and the question whether the body presents an appearance of 
independence. What is at stake is the confidence which such tribunals must inspire in the 
public.”564 
 
The Court then proceeded to examine the manner of appointment of judges ruling 
on the case in question, noting that they were appointed after a competitive procedure, that 
they took the judicial oath which included an undertaking to administer justice impartially, 
that their salaries were fixed by statute, and that they could be removed only on grounds of 
misbehaviour or incapacity.  The Court thus concluded that the manner of appointment of 
the judges was compatible with the requirements of Article 6(1).  In addition, as to 
guarantees against outside pressures, the Court noted that there was no hierarchical or 
organisational connection between the judges and the Lord Chancellor (the defendant in 
the proceedings). Further, there was no suggestion that pressure was actually put on 
district or circuit judges to decide cases one way rather than another. Given the judicial 
oath that both judges had taken and the absence of any indication or risk of any outside 




Similarly, the appointment of judges by the executive is allowed, provided that the 
appointees are free from influence or pressure when exercising their duties.
566
  In 
determining whether a decision-making body can be considered “independent”, the 
ECtHR has considered the following criteria:
567
 the manner of appointment of the 
decision-making body’s members, the duration of the judges’ term of office, the existence 
of guarantees against outside pressures, and whether the tribunal presents an appearance of 
independence. 
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As to the length of term, the ECtHR has not specified any particular term of office 
for the members of the decision-making body, but it has held that “whilst the 
irremovability of judges during their term of office must in general be considered as a 
corollary of their independence, the absence of a formal recognition of this irremovability 
in the law does not in itself imply lack of independence provided that it is recognised in 
fact and that the other necessary guarantees are present.” 568   This independence is, 
however, questionable when, as part of its mandate, the executive can remove lay judges 




As to the guarantees against outside pressure, individual judges must be free from 
undue influence – not only from outside the judiciary, but also from within. This internal 
judicial independence requires that judges be free from directives or pressures from fellow 
judges or those who have administrative responsibilities in a court such as, for example, 
the president of the court.
570
 The absence of sufficient safeguards ensuring the 
independence of judges within the judiciary and, in particular, vis-à-vis their judicial 
superiors, may lead the ECtHR to conclude that there are justifiable doubts as to the 




 Finally, with respect to the “appearance of independence”, what appears to be 
determinative is whether an “objective observer” would see cause for concern about the 
tribunals’ independence in the circumstance of the case at hand.572 
 
As for the impartiality of the tribunal, the ECtHR has repeatedly drawn a 
distinction between (i) a subjective test, whereby it sought to establish the personal 
conviction and behaviour of a given judge in a given case, i.e., whether the judge held any 
personal prejudice or bias in a given case; and (ii) an objective test, aimed at ascertaining 
whether the tribunal itself and, among other aspects, its composition, offered sufficient 
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With respect to the subjective test, the ECtHR has consistently held that “the 
personal impartiality of a judge must be presumed until there is proof to the contrary.”574  
As to the type of evidence required, the ECtHR has, for example, found evidence of the 
judge using expressions “which implied that he had already formed an unfavourable view 
of the applicant’s case” before the commencement of the proceedings, as “incompatible 
with the impartiality required of any court, as laid down in Article 6 § 1 of the 
Convention.”575 
 
With respect to the objective test, it must be determined whether, quite apart from 
the judge’s conduct, there are ascertainable facts which may cast doubt as to his 
impartiality.
576
  The objective test mostly concerns hierarchical or other links between the 
judge and other actors in the proceedings, which objectively justify doubts as to the 
impartiality of the tribunal and thus fail to meet the Convention standard under the 
objective test.
577
  For example, in a case where the judge represented the applicant's 
opponents at an earlier stage in the proceedings and that, later on, his daughter continued 
to do so, the ECtHR found that such “dual role” of the judge in a single set of proceedings 
“raised legitimate doubts as to [the judge’s] impartiality.”578  Similarly, in a case where the 
applicant was faced with a panel of three judges, one of whom was the uncle of the 
opposing party’s advocate and the brother of the advocate acting for the opposing party 
during the first-instance proceedings, the ECtHR held that “the close family ties between 
the opposing party’s advocate and the Chief Justice sufficed to objectively justify fears 
that the presiding judge lacked impartiality.”579 Further, in a case where one of the judges 
involved in the proceedings concerning an appeal on points of law had prior involvement 
in the case as a presiding judge of the Higher Court, the ECtHR held that “the impartiality 
of the ‘tribunal’ was open to doubt, not only in the eyes of the applicant but also 
objectively.”580 
 
                                                     
574
 See, e.g., Le Compte, Van Leuven and De Meyere v Belgium, no. 6878/75; 7238/75 (1981), ¶ 58; and 
Micallef v Malta, no. 17056/06 (2009), ¶ 94. 
575
 Buscemi v Italy, no. 29569/95 (1999), ¶ 68. 
576
 European Court of Human Rights: Guide on Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights, 




 Meznaric v Croatia, no. 71615/01 (2005), ¶¶ 34-36. 
579
 Micallef v Malta, no. 17056/06 (2009), ¶ 102. 
580
 Perus v Slovenia, no. 35016/05 (2012), ¶ 38. 
143 
 
Also, the ECtHR has held that any direct involvement in the passage of legislation, 
or of executive rules, is likely to be sufficient to cast doubt on the judicial impartiality of a 
person subsequently called on to determine a dispute over “whether reasons exist to permit 
a variation from the wording of the legislation or rules at issue.”581  This is quite relevant 
in the context of internal members serving on MDBs’ appeals bodies or the first-tier 
decision-makers, who are typically employees of the relevant MDB.  None of these 
individuals should be involved in the drafting of the relevant organisation’s Sanctions 
Procedures in order to ensure that the Sanctions Procedures are free from their influence 
and interests.   
 
Ultimately, it must be decided in each individual case whether the relationship in 





(iv) Public judgment / reasoning of judicial decisions 
 
 The ECtHR has held that reasons provided by the court in its decision must be 
such as to enable parties to make effective use of any existing right of appeal.
583
  Although 
Article 6(1) requires courts to give reasons for their decisions, it does not require that such 




 The degree to which the duty to give reasons applies may vary according to the 
nature of the decision and can only be determined based on the circumstances of the case: 
it is thus necessary to consider, among other things, the variety of the submissions that a 
party may bring before the court and the differences among statutory provisions, 





 Article 6(1) does not require a court of appeals to provide detailed reasoning when 
it merely applies a specific legal provision to dismiss an appeal on points of law as having 
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no prospects of success, without any further explanation.
586
  Moreover, in dismissing an 
appeal, a court of appeals may simply uphold the reasons for the lower court’s decision.587  
Nevertheless, the ECtHR has also held that:  
 
“the notion of a fair procedure requires that a national court which has given sparse 
reasons for its decisions, whether by incorporating the reasons of a lower court or 
otherwise, did in fact address the essential issues which were submitted to its jurisdiction 
and did not merely endorse without further ado the findings reached by a lower court. This 
requirement is all the more important where a litigant has not been able to present his case 
orally in the domestic proceedings.”588 
 
Further, judgments failing to mention very important arguments,
589
 making a clear error 
regarding established facts,
590
 or deciding a case for a legal reason that is not good reason 




(v)   Fair trial 
 
 The ECtHR has held that the right to a fair trial “is one of the fundamental 
principles of any democratic society, within the meaning of the Convention.”592  Moreover, 
the principle of “equality of arms” is inherent in the broader concept of a fair trial.593  This 
concept implies that each party must be afforded a reasonable opportunity to present its 
case – including its evidence – under conditions that do not place it at a substantial 
disadvantage vis-à-vis the other party.
594
  Although this principle, as well as the 
adversarial principle, applies equally to both parties in the process, usually equality of 
arms means that the defendant must not be deprived in their fundamental procedural rights 
in relation to the prosecutor.
595
  This principle was found to have been breached in a 
number of cases, because the ECtHR found that the defendant had been placed at a 
disadvantage vis-à-vis the prosecutor.  For example, in Menchinskaya v Russia, the 
prosecutor intervened in support of the arguments of the applicant’s opponent, noting that, 
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given that “only the prosecutor, but not the parties, had submitted his arguments orally 
before the . . . Court, [and] the Court concludes that the prosecutor's intervention in the 
appeal proceedings on the applicant's claim undermined the appearances of a fair trial and 
the principle of equality of arms”596 
  
          Nonetheless, small procedural omissions do not seem to be tantamount to the 
violation of the “equality of arms” tenet.  Thus, for example, in Ankerl v Switzerland, the 
ECtHR found compatible with Article 6(1) a difference of treatment in respect of the 
hearing of the parties’ witnesses, where one party’s witness gave evidence under oath, 
whereas the other party’s witness did not.  The Court noted that this had not, in practice, 
influenced the outcome of the proceedings.
597
  In Wierzbicki v Poland, the ECtHR 
articulated general principles of the “equality of arms” by stating that:   
 
“Article 6 of the Convention does not explicitly guarantee the right to have witnesses 
called or other evidence admitted by a court in civil proceedings. Nevertheless, any 
restriction imposed on the right of a party to civil proceedings to call witnesses and to 
adduce other evidence in support of his case must be consistent with the requirements of a 
fair trial within the meaning of paragraph 1 of that Article, including the principle of 
equality of arms. As regards litigation involving opposing private interests, equality of 
arms implies that each party must be afforded a reasonable opportunity to present his case 
- including his evidence - under conditions that do not place him at a substantial 
disadvantage vis-à-vis his opponent”598   
 
Applying these principles to the facts of the case, in Olujic v Croatia, the ECtHR found 
that   “the national authorities’ refusal to examine any of the defence witnesses led to a 
limitation of the applicant’s ability to present his case in a manner incompatible with the 
guarantees of a fair trial enshrined in Article 6.”599 Similarly, in Hentrich v France, the 
ECtHR held that the applicant did not get a reasonable opportunity to present his case 
under conditions that would not place him at a substantial disadvantage vis-à-vis his 
opponent in administrative proceedings: on the one hand, the tribunals of fact allowed the 
defendant (the revenue authority) to confine the reason given for its decision in a way that 
was too short and general to enable the applicant to mount a reasoned challenge; and, on 
the other hand, the tribunals of fact declined to allow the applicant to establish a reasoned 
challenge to the authority’s assessment.600 
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Further, in Dagtekin v Turkey, the ECtHR found violation of Article 6(1), because 
the defendants were not given access to an important document, which led to the 
annulment of their lease contracts.  The government argued that such denial of access was 
justified on the security grounds, to which the ECtHR contended that “national authorities 
can[not] be free from effective control by the domestic courts whenever they choose to 
assert that national security and terrorism are involved.”601 
 In conclusion, the ECHR jurisprudence offers several principles of fundamental 
due process rights, which could prove useful for MDBs: 
 
First, in principle, parties have a right to a hearing unless there exists an 
exceptional circumstance that justifies dispensing with a hearing.  Such circumstances 
depend on the nature of the issues to be decided (e.g., questions of law, as opposed to 
questions of fact, no contested facts, technical nature of disputes, which are better 
addressed in writing than by means of an oral argument, etc.).  Moreover, where courts 
refuse to have witnesses called, they must give sufficient reasons and the refusal must not 
be tainted by arbitrariness: it must not amount to a disproportionate restriction of the 
parties’ ability to present arguments in support of their case. 
 
Further, parties have the right to have their case heard by an independent and 
impartial tribunal.  The following criteria are considered in determining whether a body 
can be considered “independent”: (1) the manner of appointment of the members, (2) the 
duration of their term of office, (3) the existence of guarantees against outside pressures, 
and (4) whether the body presents an appearance of independence.  As for the impartiality 
of the tribunal, the examination of both subjective and objective criteria is required.  
Subjective criteria examine whether the judge holds any personal prejudice or bias in a 
given case, whereas objective criteria examine whether the tribunal itself and, among other 
aspects, its composition, offers sufficient guarantees to exclude any legitimate doubt in 
respect of its impartiality. 
 
Additionally, courts have to provide sufficient reasoning for their decision to 
enable parties to make effective use of any right to appeal.  Such decisions need not 
provide a detailed answer to every argument, however. 
                                                     
601




Finally, the principle of “equality of arms” is inherent in the broader concept of a 
fair trail, and implies that each party must be afforded a reasonable opportunity to present 
its case – including evidence – under conditions that do not place it at a substantial 
disadvantage vis-à-vis the other party.   
E.  MDBs’ administrative tribunal jurisprudence  
 
Yet another useful source for MDBs’ sanctions regimes may be the jurisprudence 
developed by MDBs in disputes with their staff members.  The jurisprudence concerning 
MDBs’ disputes with their staff members is abundant and points to a number of principles 
that can be compared to disputes with the parties found to have engaged in sanctionable 
practices.  Namely, under the dispute resolution process between MDBs and their staff, a 
staff member who has been disciplined for misconduct may bring an action before the 
relevant MDB’s administrative tribunal or an analogous body challenging the legality of 
the decision to impose disciplinary sanctions.  Such challenge could be based on the 
argument that the decision was unlawful and should be invalidated because it was based 
on a process, including the underlying investigation of misconduct, that did not afford 
adequate procedural protection to the accused.  Thus, the WB administrative tribunal 
(“WBAT”) has long held that, although WB “conducts administrative investigations 
which are not adjudicatory in nature. . . certain minimum guarantees must be observed, 
including that the accused staff member is informed of the allegation against him, given a 
fair opportunity to defend himself, to rebut accusations and to give his version of the 
pertinent events as to facts, arguments and conclusions.”602  Moreover, the WB’s sanctions 
process has been informed by the WBAT’s efforts to distil “national law principles from 
legal systems with which the Tribunal judges are familiar, both civil law and common 
law.” 603 
 
While MDBs’ sanctions regimes can and should borrow some of the key tenets of 
fairness in dispute resolution procedures from international organisations’ administrative 
tribunals, which have decided a significantly larger number of cases than the appeals 
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bodies have, it is important to keep in mind that the principles of employment relations 
between international civil servants and international organisations are fundamentally 
different from those between international organisations and third parties, as in the case of 
sanctions proceedings.  Below is a description of some of the key due process tenets that 
emerge from the administrative tribunals’ decisions and that could be relevant to the 
MDBs’ sanctions regimes.   
 
(i) Discovery rights  
 
 In many national court proceedings, claimants have quite extensive discovery 
rights in disputes against employers, and can seek a range of relevant documents, 
including even those that would not be admissible in court, as long as they “are reasonably 
calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.”604  Parties may also depose 
witnesses and take their testimony under oath.
605
  For example, in the US, it is the parties 
that are expected to work out their own discovery disputes, and discovery requests and 
their responses are not filed with the court or agency.  If a party faces a non-responsive 
counterpart, or seeks protection from some request that the party considers improper, 





 By contrast, discovery in the proceedings before MDBs’ administrative tribunals 
usually takes place through a request made to the tribunal itself, and it is then up to the 
tribunal to decide whether or not to honour such request.
607
  In that context, it has been 
suggested that MDBs’ administrative tribunals tend to be far more sympathetic to MDBs 
when considering whether a document request is “unduly burdensome” than would a US 
court in a similar situation.
608
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Still, although respondents have no power to force MDBs’ investigators to produce 
information, investigators are required to produce both exculpatory and mitigating 
evidence, and administrative tribunals have, in the past, faulted internal investigators for 
not giving “proper weight to the exculpatory testimony.” 609   Further, the WBAT has 
emphasised that, as neutral fact-finders, the investigators’ duty is “to find facts and not to 
interpret the rules in a manner that would justify charging applicants with misconduct.”610   
 
In addition, if the document requested to be produced is deemed to be important 
enough, the party refusing to produce it runs the risk of having judgment delivered against 
it.  Such judgment was rendered in a recent UN Dispute Tribunal case, Bertucci v 
Secretary-General of the United Nations, in which the Tribunal explained its default 
judgment against the UN, which refused to produce evidence:  
 
“The applicable principle is not only clear but rests upon sound notions of procedural 
justice: the respondent cannot put an applicant to proof when material that is or may 
reasonably be thought to be a part of that proof is withheld from disclosure by the 
respondent despite an order for it to be produced. This would enable the respondent to 
profit from its own illegal actions in breach of its contractual obligation towards the 
applicant and its instrumental obligations to the Tribunal.”611 
 
(ii) Oral hearings and witnesses 
 
Because MDBs do not have judicial powers of subpoenaing witnesses, grieving 
employees cannot oblige a person to appear as a witness.  However, administrative 
tribunals generally have discretion to allow oral hearing of both the parties and their 
witnesses and experts.  Thus, for example, the EBRD Administrative Tribunal Rules state 
that:  
 
“The Tribunal may put any question to the witnesses and the experts. Should a party wish 
to ask any witness or expert (other than its own) any questions, it should provide the 
Tribunal and the other party with a list of such questions in advance of the relevant 
hearing. These may only be asked by the chair serving on the Appeal in the form that he 
deems most suitable. A party who believes that the answers provided invite further 
questions, may propose to the Tribunal that such further questions be put by the chair 
serving on the Appeal to the person providing the answer.”612 
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Other administrative tribunals have analogous provisions and therefore retain control over 
questions posed to witnesses.
613
  Some Tribunals, however, allow parties to cross-examine 
witnesses,
614
 which arguably provides greater due process rights to the respondent than the 
examination by the Tribunal.   
 
 
(iii) Publication of decisions 
 
Most administrative tribunals publish their decisions,
615
 which has resulted in the 
compilation of a rich database of cases, most of which are searchable by key terms.  
Arguably, the fact that these decisions are published and fully reasoned has contributed to 
the Tribunals’ professionalisation and perception of transparency.  If the Tribunal makes a 
questionable decision, either because its reasoning or its assessment of the evidence is 
flawed, that will be a matter of public record and judged in the court of public opinion.
616
  
Finally, parties may request anonymity, which the Tribunal will grant where good cause 








Created in 1980, the WBAT has served as a model for the administrative tribunals 
at other international organisations – namely, the IMF, ADB, AfDB and EBRD.618  Article 
1 of the WBAT Statute expressly states that the WBAT is a judicial body which functions 
independently of the WB’s management and that the independence of the Tribunal will be 
guaranteed and respected by the WB at all times.
619
  In addition to this fundamental 
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principle, there are two other features of the WBAT that are particularly important for 
safeguarding its independence:  
 
(1) First, the Statute emphasises high qualifications required of judges and requires 
them to be “persons of high moral character [that] must possess the qualifications 
required for appointment to high judicial office or be jurisconsults of recognized 
competence.”620   
 
Further, the Statute states that the WB’s current or former staff members are not 
eligible for appointment and that judges may not be employed by WB after their 
service on the Tribunal.
621
  Arguably, these provisions of the Statute have 
depoliticised the appointment of the WBAT judges.  Admittedly, the judges are 
appointed by the WB’s Executive Directors (a body representing all of the WB’s 
member countries), upon the recommendation of the WB’s President, who consults 
with both the Executive Directors and the Staff Association before compiling a list 
of proposed candidates.
622
  This approach towards the selection criteria and 
appointment of judges has been followed by a number of other tribunals, including 
the IMF Administrative Tribunal,
623
 the UN Dispute Tribunal
624





Finally, the WBAT judges are appointed for a five-year term, renewable once. 
 
(2) Second, the WBAT Statute recognises the independence of the WBAT Secretariat, 
expressly stating that the Secretary is responsible in the performance of duties 
solely to the Tribunal.
626
  While this arrangement has been lauded as insulating the 
Secretariat and the Tribunal from any undue influence that might otherwise have 
been applied by WB, it is difficult to imagine how the Secretary, who is a WB 
employee,  can be completely insulated from the politics of the organisation which 
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“hosts” his/her office and decides on the Secretariat’s budget and the Secretary’s 
salary.   
 
(b)  UN Appeals Tribunal 
 
 The UN Appeals Tribunal (the “UNAT”) is an appellate court established by the 
UN General Assembly to review appeals against judgments rendered by the UN Dispute 
Tribunal. Similarly to the WBAT Statute, the UNAT Statute also seeks to create a 
nomination process that instils independence, accountability and professionalism.  To that 
end, the UNAT judges are appointed by the General Assembly on the recommendation of 
the Internal Justice Council
627
, which is in turn composed of five members: one UN staff 
representative, one management representative, two external jurists nominated by staff and 
management respectively , and a third external jurist chosen by a consensus of other 
members to be the Chairperson.
628
  The UNAT Statute further prescribes strict 
qualifications for judicial appointment: the candidate must possess at least 15 years of 
judicial experience.
629
   
 
 The UNAT judges are appointed for one non-renewable term of seven years and 
may only be removed by the General Assembly for misconduct or incapacity.
630
  This 
approach of longer and non-renewable terms has been lauded as “enhancing structural 
independence to a significant extent.”631  Further, in order to remove any perception of 
bias based on consideration of future employment, the UNAT Statute renders judges 
ineligible for any UN appointment other than a judicial post for five years after the 
expiration of their term of office.
632
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(c)  IMF Administrative Tribunal 
 
The IMF Administrative Tribunal is an appellate court established by the IMF for 
the resolution of employment disputes arising between the IMF and its staff members.  It 
is composed of five members, appointed by the IMF’s Managing Director, after 
consultation with the Staff Association and with the approval of the Executive Board.
633
  
The appointment term is four years, which can be renewed twice.  This is somewhat 
surprising, given the increasing recognition that relatively lengthy tenures with limited to 
no possibilities for renewal are key to judicial independence.  For example, the Institut de 
Droit International suggests that “[i]n order to strengthen the independence of judges, it 
would be desirable that they should be appointed for long terms of office, ranging from 
nine to twelve years.  Such terms of office should not be renewable.”634 
 
 The Tribunal members may not have any prior or present employment relationship 
with the IMF and must possess the qualifications required for the appointment of high 
judicial office or be jurisconsults of recognised competence.
635
 The members of the 
Tribunal must be completely independent in the exercise of their duties, may not receive 
any instructions or be subject to any constraint.  They are not eligible for staff employment 




 In conclusion, the MDBs’ administrative tribunal jurisprudence offers several 
principles, which could prove useful for MDBs’s sanctions proceedings: 
 
First, with respect to discovery rights, if a document requested to be produced is 
deemed to be important enough, the party refusing to produce it runs the risk of having 
judgment delivered against it.  Further, parties are allowed to inform the tribunal of the 
names and identity of any witnesses whom they wish to be heard, and some tribunals 
allow cross-examination of such witnesses.  Moreover, most tribunals publish reasoned 
decisions.   
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As for the composition of tribunals, they are composed of non-staff members, who 
meet very high professional criteria.  The length of members’ appointment varies from 
non-renewable seven-year terms to four-year terms renewable twice.  
F.  Conclusion 
 
The preceding sections have put forward four different sources of best practice 
standards for MDBs’ sanctions regimes, none of which is perfect.  Specifically, as the 
preceding sections have demonstrated, both Global Administrative Law and customary 
law and legal principles are too high-level and therefore not particularly useful for 
determining appropriate due process standards for MDBs’ sanctions proceedings.  Instead, 
the relevant standards could be identified through case law of the ECtHR and, to some 
degree (particularly with respect to the composition of tribunals), of MDBs’ 
administrative tribunals.  Cases by the ECtHR or the relevant administrative tribunal could 
be used to fill the gaps in sanctions proceedings by appropriate reliance on analogies.  In 
particular, the ECtHR case law deals with issues from different kinds of legal systems in 
an integrated way,
637
 while MDBs’ administrative tribunals, by their administrative set-up, 
are the closest analogue of MDBs’ appeals bodies.   
 
In addition, other sources could also prove useful and be examined by analogy to 
MDBs’ sanctions procedures, including FAR and the principles of procedural propriety 
articulated in judicial review cases described in section 1.  Moreover, in view of the 
differences in national laws and notions of justice from which MDBs would have to 
choose in developing their sanctions processes if they tried to base them on customary law 
and the fact that such procedural issues as admissibility and assessment of evidence are 
indeed primarily matters for regulation by national law and national courts, rather than the 
likes of the ECHR,
638
 international arbitration rules could provide guidance for filling 
procedural gaps in MDBs’ sanctions procedures – for example, the arbitration rules like 
the IBA Rules, the UNCITRAL Rules, the SCC Rules, the LCIA Rules, etc.   
 
 Of course, such approach of comparing procedural rules of other systems would 
have inherent practical limitations, and the comparative reasoning may fail for many 
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reasons, such as the incomplete transposition of the original reasoning that led to these 
particular rules.
 639
   After all, these rules are a product of historical and social 
development of the relevant system and a direct transplant of a rule or body of law may 
not have the same measure of success as it did in its home jurisdiction.
640
  What is 
important, then, is to understand that these sources are in no way determinative in and of 
themselves or to be applied verbatim.
641
  Instead, one should identify the similarities and 
differences and address the key question of comparative analysis in international law: To 
what extent is it appropriate to employ these considerations for the analysis of sanctions 
proceedings?   If this perspective is not properly identified, then the comparative argument 




 Moreover, none of these sources prescribes specific detailed procedures applicable 
across the endless variety of cases: one set length of the hearing day, one set number of 
disclosure requests and other similar issues that one encounters in practice.  The laws and 
rules certainly cannot capture what due process requires in any individual case.  But, they 





The next Chapter attempts to apply these sources to MDBs’ sanctions regimes with 
the aim of proposing best practices for these regimes.   
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CHAPTER 3: DUE PROCESS STANDARDS AND TREATMENT OF 
CORPORATE GROUPS UNDER MDBs’ SANCTIONS REGIMES 
Introduction 
 
The previous two Chapters have highlighted some of the key differences between 
MDBs’ sanctions regimes and have proposed different sources of best practice standards 
for these regimes, most notably the case law of the ECtHR and MDBs’ administrative 
tribunals, as well as FAR and principles of procedural propriety articulated in the US and 
UK judicial review cases.  Applying these standards to MDBs’ sanctions regimes, this 
Chapter proposes enhancements to MDBs’ sanctions regimes in the areas of discovery 
rights, publication of decisions, referral to national authorities, optimal composition of 
Sanctions Boards,
644
 range of sanctions and settlements.  The analysis of procedural 
matters, such as the optimal discovery rights, experts’ reports, witnesses, assessment of 
evidence and oral hearings, introduces the possibility of looking at international 
arbitrations rules for filling very specific, procedural gaps in MDBs’ sanctions procedures.  
The proposals for improvements to MDBs’ sanctioning guidelines and settlement regimes 
are based on the analysis of the US and UK sanctioning guidelines and settlement regimes, 
respectively.  The first part of the Chapter concludes by providing a table-form summary 
of proposals for the enhancement of MDBs’ sanctions regimes. 
 
The second part of this Chapter analyses the treatment of corporate groups, 
particularly the application of sanctions on a sanctioned party’s employer, subsidiary, 
parent company or successor, and proposes further guidelines based on US and the UK 
jurisprudence. 
1.  Key due process principles to be followed in sanctions proceedings 
 A.  Introduction 
 
As noted in Chapter 1, sanctions regimes of all five MDBs contain many of the 
fundamental principles of due process rights, including giving notice of allegations and of 
final decisions, an opportunity for the respondent to defend itself through a two-step 
decision-making process.  While many similarities exist between the five systems, 
however, differences remain on numerous procedural issues which are relevant to 
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respondents’ due process rights.  In particular, the MDBs differ in the composition of their 
appellate bodies, which may affect respondents’ right to a decision being rendered by an 
independent and impartial tribunal.  They also follow different practices with respect to 
discovery rights, in particular the use of hearings and witnesses in the discovery process, 
the range of sanctions that can be imposed, and the issuance of reasoned decisions and 
their publication.  Finally, MDBs also take different approaches towards referral of cases 
to national authorities and on the availability of settlements.  The sections that follow 
analyse and propose best practices for each of these areas on the basis of the principles 
identified in the preceding two Chapters. 
 
Moreover, while great strides have been made towards harmonisation of sanctions 
regimes among MDBs, starting from the Cross-Debarment Agreement to the Sanctioning 
Guidelines and the Harmonised Principles on Treatment of Corporate Groups, the 
harmonisation process is still far from complete.  Commentators have recommended 
higher level of cooperation and exchange of information among the MDBs’ investigative 
arms, mutual enforcement by other actors, such as national governments and other 
development agencies, and even creation of a joint Sanctions Board.
645
 In that context, 
best practices proposed in this Chapter would also contribute to greater harmonisation of 
MDBs’ sanctions regimes. 
 
Notably, however, while harmonisation in core respects is essential for cross-
debarment and due process, MDBs should retain discretion to adapt to regional needs and 
their own institutional priorities, given each institution’s specific mandate and operational 
context.  A certain degree of variation is inevitable among the MDBs as it is among 
national courts and arbitral institutions. 
B.  Discovery rights 
 
  (i) Permissive approach and production of documents 
 
Consistent with the administrative nature of proceedings, MDBs’ sanctions 
procedures provide for an extremely permissive approach to evidentiary issues, leaving it 
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to the decision-maker to determine the relevance and materiality of the presented 
evidence.
646
   
 
Consequently, both the investigators and the respondent may present any kind of 
evidence, and where “best evidence” is not available, parties are permitted to present 
whatever circumstantial evidence they can present to support an allegation or factual 
assertion.  At the same time, however, it is entirely up to the decision-makers
647
 to 
evaluate and weigh the evidence, so they may freely decide that circumstantial evidence 
proffered by the party is insufficient to support the relevant allegation or assertion. 
 
Yet, the flexible and vague evidentiary rules pose the danger of leaving gaps, 
which can cause problems if parties have conflicting views on how the case should 
proceed.  This is especially the case when parties come from different legal backgrounds 
and cultures.  The IBA Rules could potentially serve as a reference for filling these gaps.   
 
Notably, some of the IBA Rules provisions are at odds with the underlying 
principles of MDBs’ sanctions procedures: For example, the IBA Rules allow each party 
to submit a request to produce documents to the arbitral tribunal and the other parties.
648
   
Similarly, the IBA Rules also permit parties to ask an arbitral tribunal “to take whatever 
steps are legally available to obtain the requested documents, or seek leave from the 
arbitral tribunal to take such steps itself”, as long as the arbitral tribunal determines that 
such documents would be “relevant to the case and material to its outcome.”649  Likewise, 
the SCC Rules allow parties to request the Arbitral Tribunal to order a party to produce 
any documents or other evidence that may be relevant to the case and material to its 
outcome.
650
 MDBs’ sanctions procedures, on the other hand, rely on each party producing 
its own evidence to support its case, and require investigators to produce the evidence in 
support of their investigations, including all exculpatory and mitigating evidence.  Namely, 
MDBs’ investigators do not possess the traditional powers of investigators in a national 
police agency – including, at least after court approval, the power to compel testimony and 
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the production of documentary evidence.
651
  Even their ability to access the records of a 
respondent company depends on the MDB having included such clause (often referred to 
as the “third party audit right”) in the initial contract, which naturally limits the MDBs’ 
ability to gather sufficient evidence of sanctionable practices.  Alternatively, MDBs could 
seek information from law enforcement authorities in order to obtain information, but the 
authorities’ willingness and ability to provide assistance to the MDBs will depend on that 
jurisdiction’s legal framework and the authority’s willingness to cooperate.  Yet, even 
with these limitations on MDBs’ ability to gather evidence and despite the fact that 
investigators are required to produce both exculpatory and mitigating evidence (which, as 
discussed in Chapter 2, is in line with the practices of MDBs’ administrative tribunals652 
and the ECtHR
653
), respondents have no power to force MDBs’ investigators to produce 
information.  Discovery is thus one area where sanctions procedures do not come close to 
the rights that respondents would have if they were able to appeal to the courts of a 
national judicial system.
654
    
 
As a possible solution to the discovery conundrum, MDBs’ sanctions procedures 
could specify that respondents have the right to request documents from investigators and 
that investigators are expected to respond to those requests.  Only if the investigators 
claim that the discovery requested is irrelevant, privileged, or unduly burdensome, would 
the decision-maker be brought in to decide.  In most cases, the presumption would be that 
the requesting party is making legitimate requests and the burden would be on the 
investigators to persuade the decision-maker otherwise.
655
   Further, in line with the 
current version of the WB’s Sanctions Procedures, investigators should have the right to 
redact particular parts of evidence by removing references to staff members and other 
third parties in case where the identity of such parties is either not relevant or not germane 
to the case.
656
  The respondent may, however, challenge a redaction, in which case the 
decision-maker would review the unredacted version of such evidence to determine 
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whether the redacted information is necessary to enable the respondent to mount a 




(ii) Experts’ reports and assessment of evidence 
 
There are several other procedural provisions in various international arbitration 
rules that could prove useful for MDBs’ sanctions regimes, given that the jurisprudence of 
MDBs’ administrative tribunals and the ECtHR is sparse in this area: For example, MDBs’ 
sanctions procedures are silent on the use of expert reports, and would benefit from the 
IBA Rules provisions on the content of expert reports, which say that the expert report 
must describe, among other things, “the methods, evidence and information used in 
arriving at the conclusions.”658  The IBA Rules further require disclosure with respect to 
any and all relationships the expert may have with the parties, their legal advisors and the 
arbitral tribunal,
659
 as well as a statement of the expert’s independence (for example, in the 
sense that the expert has no financial interest in the outcome or otherwise has relationships 
that would prevent him/her from providing his/her opinion).
660
  The UNCITRAL Rules go 
even further and allow parties to inform the Tribunal if they have any objections to the 
expert’s qualifications, impartiality or independence, and the Tribunal may decide whether 




Similarly, the SCC Rules, the LCIA Rules and the UNCITRAL Rules require the 
Arbitration Tribunal to send a copy of the expert’s report to the parties and to give them an 
opportunity to submit written comments on the report and examine any expert appointed 
by the Arbitral Tribunal at a hearing.
662
   
 
Further, just like MDBs’ sanctions procedures, the IBA Rules, the SCC Rules, the 
LCIA Rules and the UNCITRAL Rules all contain the general principle that the arbitral 
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tribunal shall determine the admissibility, relevance, materiality and weight of evidence.
663
  
The IBA Rules go further and lay out how an arbitral tribunal will determine what 
evidence it will consider and how evidence will be assessed: Thus, for example, the IBA 
Rules allow the arbitral tribunal, at the request of a party or on its own motion, to exclude 
from evidence any document, statement, oral testimony for, among others, the following 
reasons: (i) legal impediment or privilege under the legal or ethical rules determined by 
the arbitral tribunal to be applicable;
664
 (ii) grounds of commercial or technical 
confidentiality that the arbitral tribunal determines to be compelling;
665
 (iii) grounds of 
special political or institutional sensitivity that the arbitral tribunal determines to be 
compelling;
666
 or (iv) considerations of procedural economy, proportionality, fairness or 
equality of the parties that the arbitral tribunal determines to be compelling.
667
   
 
In order to provide some predictability to the proceedings, the IBA Rules further 
lay out a number of different considerations for the tribunal to take into account when 
deciding on privilege-related issues (e.g., the need to protect the confidentiality of a piece 
created for the purpose of providing or obtaining legal advice or for the purpose of 
settlement negotiations, the need to maintain fairness and equality as between the Parties, 
particularly if they are subject to different legal or ethical rules, etc.).
668
  While the 
exceptions described in (i)-(iii) above are understandable in that some documents may be 
subject to such commercial and technical confidentiality concerns that they should not be 
required to be introduced into evidence, these kinds of exclusions could be used to delay 
the process: “procedural economy” in (iv) is far from a clearly defined concept, which 
means that parties cannot be sure if there indeed exist grounds to object to a request to 
produce for economic reason, and different tribunals are bound to interpret this provision 
in different ways.   
 
Moreover, although the IBA Rules provide tribunals with express authority to take 
into account the lack of good faith at the cost stage of the proceedings,
669
 it seems unlikely 
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that tribunals would condemn on bad-faith grounds an objection to the document 
production because of procedural economy.  Consequently, parties may be encouraged to 
submit objections on economic grounds without fearing breaching the duty to act in good 
faith (except for the most blatant attempts to stall the process).  Still, the threshold for 
excluding evidence on these grounds appears quite high, given that the arbitral tribunal 
must find the concerns to be “compelling” and, furthermore, under Article 9(4)  may make 
certain arrangements (such as entering into a confidentiality agreement or order) in order 
to permit evidence to be considered subject to suitable confidentiality protection.
670
  All of 
these principles could also be used by MDBs in filling the gaps in the application of their 
rules of evidence. 
 
(iii) Witnesses and oral hearings 
 
As noted in Chapter 1, WB is the only MDB that allows live witness testimony 
during sanctions proceedings.  Witnesses may be called and questioned only by the 
Sanctions Board, and no cross-examination is allowed.
671
  Further, as noted in Chapter 2, 
MDBs’ administrative tribunal rules are more flexible, and typically give tribunals 
discretion to allow oral hearing of both the parties and their witnesses and experts, with 
some even allowing cross-examinations.  The IBA Rules also allow each party to request 
the presence of a witness whose appearance it requests,
672
 and grant the Arbitral Tribunal 
the power to limit or exclude a question, answer, or the appearance of a witness if it 
considers the question or presence of the witness irrelevant or immaterial.
673
 If a witness 
whose testimony is requested by a party refuses to cooperate, that party may ask the 
arbitral tribunal to take whatever steps are available to obtain that testimony, or seek leave 




Notably, however, under most arbitration rules, either the arbitral tribunal or a 
party with the approval of the arbitral tribunal may ask state courts to compel the witness 
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to appear or to examine the witness itself.
675
  This is in stark contrast to the powers of 
Sanctions Boards, which cannot avail themselves of courts’ witness subpoena powers.  
Consequently, parties in sanctions proceedings cannot request Sanctions Boards to compel 
witnesses to appear.  Inevitably, the decision of whether or not to allow live witness 
testimony and cross-examination will turn to the balancing act of whether, in the opinion 
of the Sanctions Board, this is necessary to ensure a fair hearing of the respondent’s case.  
Similarly, as discussed in the context of judicial review standards in Chapter 2, if the 
Sanctions Board thought that a request to call a witness were in bad faith (e.g., in order to 
obstruct or subvert proceedings by calling larger numbers of witnesses), it should not be 




Still, following the example of MDBs’ administrative tribunals, which as described 
in Chapter 2, allow each party to inform the tribunal of the names and description of any 
witnesses and experts whom the party wishes to be heard, as a starting point, parties in 
sanctions proceedings should be allowed to provide the Sanctions Board with the names of 
witnesses whom they wish to appear before the Board, bearing in mind that the Board 
does not have judicial powers of subpoenaing witnesses.  Just as in the case of 
administrative tribunals, if a witness is not able to appear before the Board, the Board may 
decide that the witness will reply in writing to the questions of the parties.
677
   
 
Sanctions Boards could also take guidance from the LCIA Rules, which try to 
accommodate for the non-cooperation of a witness by stating that “[i]f the Arbitral 
Tribunal orders [the] party to secure the attendance of [the] witness and the witness 
refuses or fails to attend the hearing without good cause, the arbitral tribunal may place 
such weight on the written testimony or exclude all or any part thereof altogether as it 
considers appropriate in the circumstances.”678 
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Finally, while cross-examination of witnesses certainly increases parties’ due 
process rights, whether or not Sanctions Boards want to follow suit in this respect will 
depend on the extent to which they want to “judicialise” their proceedings, at the expense 
of efficiency and accessibility to those without legal representation.  Sanctions Boards 
may also consider limiting the maximum number of witnesses that each party may offer 




With respect to oral hearings, given that Article 8.1 of the IBA Rules requires each 
party to inform the arbitral tribunal and the other parties of the witnesses whose 
appearance at the hearing it requests, the assumption is that an oral hearing is the default.  
Similarly, the SCC Rules, the LCIA Rules and the UNCITRAL Rules each allow parties 
to request a hearing.
680
  As described in Chapter 1, MDBs’ practices vary in this respect: 
all MDBs, except for ADB, allow Sanctions Boards to request a hearing; moreover, AfDB 
and WB also allow hearings at both parties’ request, and ADB and EBRD only at 
respondents’ request.   
 
Looking at the practice of MDBs’ administrative tribunals, it is evident that some 
courts, such as the UN Dispute Tribunal, AfDB’s and IADB’s Administrative Tribunals 
have oral hearings as a matter of routine, while many others, such as the WBAT and the 
Administrative Tribunals of the ADB and the IMF rarely have them.
681
  As noted in 
Chapters 1 and 2, judicial review of FAR and other administrative decisions in the US, 
judicial review of administrative decision in the UK and the ECtHR case law all suggest 
that oral hearings are not always necessary.  In fact, there are no grounds for concluding 
that mandatory oral hearings result in fairer and better judgments, while they certainly 
have financial implications for both parties.
682
 The operative reason for not calling for oral 
hearings when a court has discretion to do so is if the court concludes that it has sufficient 
evidence based on the written proceedings to decide the case fairly.  By analogy, the 
Sanctions Boards should retain a discretion to have or not have oral hearings based on 
their determination of whether they have insufficient evidence on the basis of the written 
                                                     
679
 See, e.g., Rules of Procedure of the Inter-American Development Bank Administrative Tribunal, Article 
20(2)(B).  
680
 UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules (2010), Article 17(3); Arbitration Rules of the Arbitration Institute of the 
Stockholm Chamber of Commerce (2017), Article 32(1); and LCIA Arbitration Rules (2014), Article 19.1. 
681
 C.F. Amerasinghe: Reflections on the International Judicial Systems of International Organizations, in 
The Development and Effectiveness of International Administrative Law, Nijhoff Publishers (2012), at 51. 
682
 Ibid., at 52. 
165 
 
proceedings to decide a case fairly.  In particular, as articulated by the ECtHR’s reasoning 
described in Chapter 2 above, the hearing may be necessary when the Sanctions Board 
would like to obtain clarification on certain points, which it is unable to do through written 
submissions or where circumstances require the Sanctions Board to get a personal 
impression of the respondents in order to give the respondents the right to explain their 
situation.   
 
 C.  Publication of decisions 
 
In general, the MDBs have responded to increasing calls for accountability and 
transparency in their operations by shifting from a presumption of confidentiality to a 
presumption in favor of access to information.  The following table provides an overview 
of the various MDBs’ approaches to the publication of sanctions information:683 
 















AfDB Always Announces the fact 
of settlement with 
limited details. 
Summaries only Summaries only  
ADB No, unless (i) a 
repeat offence, 
(ii) respondent 
cannot be served 
notice or does not 
respond, or (iii) 
exceptional 
circumstances such 
as “very serious 
integrity 
violations.” 
N/A Summaries only Summaries only 
EBRD Always No No Fully reasoned 




IADB Always No Summaries only Summaries only 
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WB Always Usually announces 












As shown above, nearly all MDBs publish the names of currently debarred 
respondents on the debarment lists maintained on their public websites.  The main 
exception to this approach is the ADB’s use of two separate debarment lists: one public 
and one private.  First-time offenders are included only on ADB’s private debarment list, 
which is available to a limited audience of MDB staff and member governments.  Only the 
published ADB debarments are eligible for mutual enforcement under the Cross-
Debarment Agreement.
684
   
 
While MDBs generally publicise who has been debarred, as noted in the above 
table, only some publish more detailed information to explain why they are debarred.  The 
publication of fully reasoned decisions serves multiple purposes: If a decision-maker 
makes a questionable decision, either because its reasoning or its assessment of the 
evidence is flawed, that will be a matter of public record and judged in the court of public 
opinion.  Similarly, the strength or weakness of the cases brought by the investigators will 
come to light.  Consequently, publication would also provide a powerful incentive for all 




Other benchmark regimes also suggest that publication of reasoned decisions 
would be desirable.  Specifically, as noted in Chapter 2, Article 6(1) of the ECHR requires 
courts to give reasons for their decisions, although it does not require that such decisions 
provide a detailed answer to every argument, and the degree to which the duty to give 
reasons applies may vary according to the nature of the decision and can only be 
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Similarly, as noted in Chapter 2, most administrative tribunals publish their 
decisions,
687
 which has resulted in the compilation of a rich database of cases, most of 
which are searchable by key terms.  Further, as noted in Chapter 2, in the context of a 
judicial review of an administrative decision, in R v Ministry of Defence ex parte 
Murray,
688
 a UK court articulated the principles governing the right to be given reasons 
for the final decision, noting that, while there is no general duty to give reasons, this may 
be required if necessary to achieve justice, in which case the reasons need be no more than 
a concise statement of the way in which the decision-maker arrived at its decision.  The 
court in this case also summarised a number of arguments for and against providing 
reasons, which could also apply to the MDB decision-making bodies’ determination of 
whether to provide reasons for their decisions in sanctions cases:  In particular, the most 
persuasive argument in favour of providing reasons is that this would demonstrate that the 
issues have been conscientiously addressed and how the result has been reached.  
Moreover, in view of the increasing trend towards openness and given that sanctions 
processes have moved closer to a judicial model, issuance of reasoned decisions enhances 
credibility of the decision-making process and contributes to the development of a more 
accessible body of jurisprudence.   
 
 In addition, the requirement to provide reasoned decisions for administrative action, 
including responses to arguments raised by interested parties is often a crucial factor in 
rendering meaningful any accountability mechanism.  For example, as described in 
Chapter 2, in Siedler v Western European Union, in finding that the Western European 
Union’s internal procedures fell short of adequate due process requirements under Article 
6(1) of the ECHR, the Belgian Court of Appeals cited the fact that the organisation’s 
administrative tribunal did not publish its decisions.
689
  Such quest for greater 
transparency is prevalent in many other areas, including in investment treaty arbitration, 
where the seeming lack of transparency surrounding arbitrations is perceived by some to 
be an egregious failing, given that many known cases are challenging a broad spectrum of 
significant public policy measures in relation to environmental protection and regulation 
of essential public services.  This has led some nations to require that future investment 
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rules should expressly provide for full transparency both in the launching of claims and in 
their resolution.
690
   
 
 For all its advantages, publication of reasoned decisions is not free of risks, 
however.  For example, there is a risk that the Sanctions Board might rely on defamatory 
material, which then is placed in the record. While Sanctions Boards can be expected to 
avoid making assertions not justified by the evidence, the accuracy of the Sanctions 
Boards’ determinations is greatly dependent on the quality of the evidence presented to 
them.
691
 This highlights the significance of the quality of the evidence and of a careful 
evaluation of the evidence.
692
  In this context, comfort can be derived from the fact that 
evidence gathered by the Investigations Unit is vetted by the first-tier decision maker, and 
the opportunity is given the opportunity to contest the evidence.  Moreover, additional 
safeguards can be put in place by allowing Sanctions Boards to redact their decisions in 
order to preserve a party’s anonymity and/or protect its reputation.693  EBRD’s procedures 
offer a good example by stating that the Sanctions Board “may, in its discretion, publish 
its . . . [d]ecision in such a way so as to preserve the essential anonymity of any person or 
entity whose reputation might be adversely affected by such publication.” 
 
Finally, if Sanctions Board decisions are published, then by the same logic, the 
first-tier decision maker’s decisions in contested cases should also be published once the 
deadline for appeal has passed without the appeal having been lodged.  The first-tier 
decision-maker should put in place the same safeguards as the Sanctions Board with 
respect to the redaction of decisions.  
 
In the context of settlements, it might be useful for the MDBs to establish clear 
guidelines on the publication of settlements.  This would not only ensure greater 
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D.  Referral to national authorities 
 
 As described in Chapter 1, MDBs’ sanctions procedures follow slightly different 
practices in terms of referrals to national authorities.  Specifically, EBRD’s procedures say 
that, if the Chief Compliance Officer (CCO) makes a determination on a prima facie basis 
that criminal or regulatory laws of any country may have been violated by any party, 
he/she may at any time, recommend to the President of the Bank that the matter be 
referred to appropriate governmental authorities (including agencies of a Bank’s member 
country). The recommendation must contain the General Counsel’s opinion on the legal 
implications and ramifications on the Bank’s privileges and immunities of the referral.  
The President then makes the decision on the recommended referral.
695
   
 
IADB’s procedures allow the Sanctions Commissioner or the Chairperson of the 
Sanctions Committee to recommend to the President at any time, if they believe that the 





ADB’s procedures state that the Office of Anticorruption and Integrity (OAI) “may 
consider whether it is appropriate to refer information relating to the complaint to the 
appropriate national authorities, and the [OAI] will seek the necessary internal 
authorisation to do so in cases where it finds a referral is warranted.”697  In practice, such 
authorisation entails speaking or writing to the Bank’s President, who decides on the 
referral of the matter to appropriate authorities.  Further, the OAI only refers to, and advise 
national authorities of, the OAI’s findings where there was clearly a violation of local 
law.
698
     
 
AfDB’s and WB’s procedures simply state that the Bank may make disclosure to 
any governmental authorities as deemed necessary.
699
  WB has had extensive experience 
with referrals to national authorities.  In the past, the INT would refer the findings of its 
investigations to the relevant national authorities, if it believed there had been a violation 
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of national law.  Such information would be sent to the relevant authorities at the end of 
the INT’s investigation, and with a caveat that the investigation was conducted pursuant to 
the WB’s anti-corruption framework and that the relevant authority could not rely on it in 
developing its case (with such caveat included to assist in protecting the WB’s privileges 
and immunities).  National authorities were required to develop their own evidence 
pursuant to their own laws, regulations and procedures.  The recipients found such 
information of a limited use.  As a consequence, the INT moved towards closer 
cooperation with national authorities including the sharing of information at the earlier 
stages of its investigation, with the expectation in certain cases that the authorities would 
equally share their information and thereby assist with the development of the INT’s cases, 
especially if the INT did not have sufficient evidence to prove a sanctionable practice and 
believed that law enforcement authorities could be instrumental in obtaining it.  In each 
case, such information was provided with an express statement that such disclosure did 
not constitute a waiver of WB’s privileges and immunities.700 
 
The benefits of such referrals were illustrated in the following case, which resulted 
in a wide-ranging investigation involving multiple national authorities and the debarment 
of nine companies.  It started in 2011, when the INT received allegations that a Dutch 
medical supply company had obtained confidential information about a WB-financed 
procurement.  INT identified a WB consultant as the potential source of the disclosure.  
After launching its own investigation, INT referred the matter to Dutch authorities, who 
initiated a parallel investigation.  INT’s investigation revealed that the consultant had 
colluded with the company to help it win WB-financed contracts. INT subsequently made 
additional referrals to the UK and Switzerland. While the Dutch and UK authorities 
conducted simultaneous searches in the Netherlands and the UK, the Swiss authorities 
opened a money laundering investigation and froze several Swiss accounts. In order to 
uncover the full scope of the consultant’s corrupt activities, INT launched investigations 
covering ten WB-financed projects in nine countries. These investigations have, to date, 
led to the WBG imposing sanctions on nine companies. They ranged from a one-year 
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However, in a recent case before a Canadian court, Kevin Wallace v HMQ, the 
WB’s immunities were challenged as a result of the INT’s referral to the authorities.  
Specifically, the information provided by the INT was quite pivotal to the prosecution’s 
case and the defence counsel filed a motion seeking to compel WB to produce additional 
documents.  Given that WB believed that such disclosure would jeopardise WB’s 
immunities, it refused to comply with the motion.  Namely, WB’s investigators often 
recognise a need to keep certain information they collect confidential for the following 
reasons: (a) to preserve the integrity of an investigation and prevent interference with the 
investigation or destruction of evidence, (b) to protect those who assist the investigators in 
their investigations and who might otherwise face retaliation, and (c) to reassure potential 
witnesses, complainants and whistle-blowers that they can come forward confident in the 
knowledge that their identities will be kept confidential.  The judge in the case, however, 
found that, by having shared the information with the prosecution in the first place, WB 
had implicitly waived its immunity and ordered WB to produce the documents.  Part of 
the reason for such decision was the judge’s perception that, in having shared the 
information with the prosecution only, WB had put the defence in a disadvantageous 
position.
702
  WB appealed this interlocutory decision before the Supreme Court of Canada, 
which reversed the trial court’s decision, finding that the trial judge erred in his finding 




In view of the above, MDBs’ sanctions procedures should contain explicit 
authority to refer cases involving possible violation of national laws to the appropriate law 
enforcement authorities.  Given that a referral to national authorities is not a decision to be 
taken lightly, any such recommendation should require the identification of the 
information that may be disclosed to such authorities and possibly also the General 
Counsel’s opinion regarding the legal aspects of the recommended referral.  Given the 
graveness of the decision, it seems appropriate for the MDB’s President (in consultation 
with the senior management) to have a final decision as to whether the matter should be so 
referred. 
 
Further, in view of the trial court’s findings in Kevin Wallace v HMQ, MDBs 
should refer matters and share information with national authorities only in cases where 
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they are (a) appraised of the subsequent criminal procedures in the relevant country, and 
(b) fully prepared to share additional information (in the case of follow-on requests for 
information), cooperate with the relevant authorities in their investigation and have its 
staff testify, if necessary.  Additionally, a case should be referred to national authorities if 
there exists credible evidence suggesting that a party had violated national laws.  The 
credibility of such evidence should be corroborated by a local counsel, experienced with 
the relevant country’s criminal law system.   Finally, MDBs should also take into account 
that proper measures are put in place in order to ensure the chain of custody of the 
evidence. 
 
Another issue is whether the respondent should be informed of such referral.  In C 
v IBRD, the WBAT considered a situation in which WB had referred an internal 
disciplinary matter to the domestic law enforcement authorities, but did not inform the 
staff member of the nature of the precise files and investigative material turned over to the 
authorities.  The WBAT held that, while it was entirely proper to refer the matter for 
criminal prosecution, “[h]ad the Bank decided not to disclose any part of the investigation 
file, it might have had an argument that there was no reason to release it to anyone, 
including the Applicant. But once the Bank decided to refer this file to an outside party for 
possible prosecution, the Applicant became entitled to examine such documents since they 
contained specific accusations against him, particularly those that purport to summarize 
conversations with him.”704 Thus, the WBAT made clear that the organisation should, 
unless the law enforcement authorities direct otherwise, inform an accused staff member 
of any information provided by WB to the authorities for purposes of criminal prosecution.  
The same reasoning could be applied to MDBs’ sanctions procedures: it would be 
incumbent on the relevant MDB to inform the respondent of any materials made available 
to the authorities, and to provide copies of any such materials that are not already in the 
respondent’s possession.  As under the WB rule adopted in response to the ruling in C v 
IBRD, such notification should be provided within 30 days of disclosure, unless the law 
enforcement authorities request that it be delayed.
705
 
E.  Composition of Sanctions Boards 
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 (i) Sanctions Board members’ independence and impartiality 
 
All MDBs’ Sanctions Board members are expected to act impartially in their 
review of sanctions cases.
706
  However, the Boards vary in their formal independence and 
appointment or removal provisions, as well as reporting policies and practices.  These 
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 six years 
 
As evidenced in a limited number of national cases where courts considered the 
immunity of international organisations in the context of mostly employment disputes, as 
described in Chapters 1 and 2, the criteria of “independence” and “impartiality” are central 
when it comes to assessing due process rights in administrative trials.   
 
 As described in Chapter 2, in assessing the independence of tribunals, the ECtHR 
considers the manner of appointment of the decision-making body’s members, the 
duration of the judges’ term of office, the existence of guarantees against outside pressure, 
and whether the tribunal presents an appearance of independence.   While no court has 
established the optimum term of an administrative tribunal member, in practice, courts 
balance various factors in order to determine whether the relevant decision-making body is 
effectively “independent” and guarantees a fair trial.  In assessing the impartiality of 
tribunal members, the ECtHR examines whether the member holds any personal prejudice 
or bias in a given case and whether the tribunal itself and, among other aspects, its 
composition, offers sufficient guarantees to exclude any legitimate doubt in respect of its 
impartiality. 
 
The existence of possible pressure from the relevant MDB is particularly acute in 
MDBs’ Sanctions Boards.  Namely, even with the majority of Sanctions Board members 
being non-MDB employees, the system is still vulnerable to real or perceived conflicts of 
interest, because several members of the Board (albeit the minority) are still the 
organisation’s staffers with managerial and professional positions that may cause conflicts 
of interest.
708
   In addition, MDBs maintain close relationships with several multinational 
corporations.  For example, Corner House reported that staff members of Lahmeyer 
International, a company that was debarred by the WB for bribery and fraud in relation to 
its contracts on the WB-financed Lesotho Highlands Water Project, had previously 
participated in the WB’s staff exchange programme, which “allow[ed] them an insider’s 
view of how the Bank works, as well as allowing them to get to know Bank staff 
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personally…” 709   These relationships may call into question the neutrality of any 
investigations into these companies.    
 
 Another analogy that could be drawn is between the Sanctions Board members and 
panels of arbitrators in commercial arbitration.  In a recent UK case, Jivraj v Hashwani, 
the Supreme Court considered whether arbitrators should be considered employees for 
purposes of the employment equality regulations, and concluded that they should not.  
Had the Supreme Court found otherwise (as did the Court of Appeals), the independence 
of arbitrators and, by analogy, of the Sanctions Board members, could have been 
compromised.  In that context, the Supreme Court’s reasoning in  Jivraj v Hashwani is 
worth examining:  The Court first accepted that it was “common ground . . . that there is a 
contract between the parties and the arbitrator or arbitrators appointed under a contract and 
that his or their services are rendered pursuant to that contract.”710  The Court cited a 
number of provisions of the Arbitration Act 1996 which are inconsistent with a 
relationship of subordination to the parties, including the fact that an arbitrator can only be 
removed in exceptional circumstances.
711
  Thus, the Court held that the role of an 
arbitrator “is not naturally described as employment under a contract personally to do 
work.  That is because his role is not naturally described as one of employment at all.”712  
The court did, however, recognise that there were several elements in the arbitrator’s work 
that might have suggested an employment relationship: the arbitrator receives fees for his 
work and renders personal services that he cannot delegate.
713
  Importantly, however, the 
Court held that “he does not perform those services or earn his fees for and under the 
direction of the parties.”714  Instead, the Court considered the arbitrator as being “in the 
category of an independent provider of services who is not in a relationship of 
subordination with the parties who receive his services. . . His functions and duties require 
him to rise above the partisan interests of the parties and not to act in, or so as to further, 
the particular interests of either party.”715   
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 Ibid., ¶ 41. 
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 Commentators have suggested that the application of the “anti-subordination 
principle” calls for the exercise of considerable judgment as to who is “subordinate” and 
to whom and, that in the future, there might be considerable debate as to what 
“subordination” involves, such as how far it extends beyond the “control” test, applied by 
the Supreme Court to also include economic dependency.
716
  The European Court of 
Justice provided useful guidance in Allonby v Accrington and Rossendale College, by 
stating that “there must be considered as a worker a person who, for a certain period of 
time, performs services for and under the direction of another person in return for which 
he receives remuneration.”717 
 
 Applying these principles to the Sanctions Board members, although they are paid 
by the relevant MDB, external members of MDBs’ Sanctions Boards cannot be said to 
perform services “under the direction” of that MDB.  In fact, as reflected in the table in 
this section E(i) above, Terms of Reference of the Sanctions Board members of each of 
AfDB, EBRD, IADB and WB incorporate an unqualified written statement of 
independence, which says that, “in considering cases, each member shall act 
independently and shall not answer to or take instructions from the Bank’s management, 
members of the Bank’s Board of Director, member governments, Respondents or any 
other entity.”718  Although this standard applies to all members of the Sanctions Board, 
and not just external members, in practice, it is not difficult to see that an MDB’s 
employee, who serves on the Sanctions Board, might feel greater pressure to rule in favour 
of the organisation that employs him/her.  The same applies to the first-tier decision-maker, 
who – except in the case of AfDB – is a regular MDB employee, whose performance and 
compensation are determined by other MDB employees.  It is thus difficult to conclude 
that, despite the wording in their Terms of Reference, employees of MDBs serving in the 
capacity of decision-makers in the sanctions proceeding will be truly independent.   
 
Moreover, as established in Clarke v The United Kingdom, described in Chapter 2, 
determination of impartiality requires analysing hierarchical or organisational connections 
between judges and other actors in the proceedings, as well as the indicia of any pressure 
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put on judges to decide cases one way or another in order to determine whether there is 
anything that objectively justifies doubts as to the impartiality of the tribunal.
719
   
 
Therefore, in order to avoid the scrutiny of the organisational connections between 
the investigators and Sanctions Board members (which exist in case of internal Sanctions 
Board members), it would be advisable for the Sanctions Boards to be composed entirely 
of non-staff members, as is the case with the WB’s Sanctions Board members.  Further, in 
order to ensure maximum impartiality and to prevent any appearance of conflict of the 
Sanctions Board members, the candidates for the Sanctions Board membership should not 
have previously held or, at the time of appointment, hold any appointment with the 
relevant MDB, including as a staff member, Board director or a consultant.  In addition, 
MDBs’ sanctions procedures should provide a mechanism that allows a challenge to the 
impartiality of individual Sanctions Board members, as was suggested in Siedler v 
Western European Union.
720
  Moreover, as noted in Chapter 2 in the context of the 
ECtHR’s decision in McGonnell v The United Kingdom, none of the Sanctions Board 
members or the first-tier decision-maker should be involved in the drafting of the relevant 
MDB’s Sanctions Procedures in order to ensure that MDBs’ sanctions procedures are free 
from their influence and interests. 
 
Further, for a period of several years after the end of his/her term, the Sanctions 
Board member should not be able to (i) accept any kind of employment, consultancy or 
interest with any firm that has been a respondent in the sanctions proceedings in which 
such member has participated or (ii) accept any employment with the relevant MDB or 
provide the MDB with any services.  This is in line with what a number of Sanctions 
Board Statutes already provide.
721
  A more nuanced question is whether a Sanctions Board 
member may simultaneously act as a counsel in a case pending before a different 
Sanctions Board.  In the context of MDBs’ administrative tribunals, it is believed that the 
combination of both roles is permissible as long as the advocacy does not concern a 
controversial question which is frequently raised before tribunals on which the person sits 
as a judge.  In any event, judges can always recuse themselves from a case if they 
advocated a position as counsel on a legal question raised in the case in a manner which 
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may reasonably appear to affect their independence in the case on which they are 
deciding.
722
 Further guidance could be taken from the IBA Guidelines on Conflicts of 
Interest in International Arbitration (the “IBA Guidelines”), which include the 
requirements for arbitrators to disclose certain circumstances upon appointment (or as 
soon as possible thereafter) if they exist.  A list of circumstances is included in the 
Guidelines, is coded by colour (red, orange and green), which provides examples of 
specific situations that do, or do not, warrant disclosure by, or the disqualification of, an 
arbitrator. 
 
With respect to the tenure of the Sanctions Board members, short renewable terms 
tend to decrease independence, while relatively longer non-renewable terms enhance it.
723
 
There are two ways to limit the perception that a Sanctions Board member may favour the 
organisation’s management: either appointments are made for life or appointments are 
restricted to one term without possibility for renewal.  The former alternative precludes the 
potential contribution of new members who may bring different experiences and 
perspectives.
724
  On the other hand, the latter alternative has the inconvenience of the short 
duration of the appointment given the complexity of the proceedings.
725
  A compromise 
solution could be to have the terms of service be as long as five or seven years, which is 
sufficiently long.  This would also be in line with the Statutes of the UN Dispute Tribunal 
and the UN Appeals Tribunal, which provide that their judges will be appointed for one 
non-renewable term of seven years.
726
  Similarly, an Evaluation Group appointed by the 
Council of Europe to assess the working of the ECtHR said that a nine-year non-
renewable judicial term for the ECtHR judges would “offer a further guarantee of the 
Court’s independence.”727 
 
In addition, the Sanctions Board Statute could recognise the administrative and 
budgetary independence of the Sanctions Board, with the Chair of the Sanctions Board 
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preparing the budget and submitting it to the Board of Directors of the relevant MDB as 
part of the proposed administrative budget of the MDB.  Moreover, the budget of the 
Sanctions Board should not be fungible with the budget of other administrative units.     
 
 Finally, as noted in Jivraj v Hashwani, the power to remove a member of the 
Sanctions Board is another essential consideration concerning the independence of the 
Board.  As reflected in the table in this section E(i) above, none of the MDBs, except for 
EBRD, clearly define the grounds for removal of their Sanctions Board members.  
Moreover, AfDB’s Sanctions Board Statute says that the renewal of the member’s term 
depends on the “performance”, but does not specify how such performance will be 
determined or by whom.
728
  As described in Chapter 2, in Luka v Romania, the ECtHR 
expressly stated that the independence of judges was questionable when the executive can 
remove judges without the law prescribing the criteria based on which such removal can 
be effected.  To date, it does not appear that any MDB has sought to remove a sitting 
Board member on any grounds.  In order to ensure the independence of the Board from the 
relevant MDB, it would be advisable not only to have clearly defined grounds for the 
removal of members, but also for the matter to be handled exclusively by the Sanctions 
Board itself.  For example, a Sanctions Board member’s appointment could be terminated 
if two-thirds of the Sanctions Board members agree to such removal, after the member in 
question has been notified of the alleged grounds for the proposed removal and afforded a 
reasonable opportunity to respond to the allegations.  Right now, MDBs allow their 
governing bodies to remove Sanctions Board members,
729
 which is in contrast with the 
procedures followed by the administrative tribunals.  For example, the UNAT member 
cannot be dismissed by the General Assembly unless the other UNAT members are of the 
unanimous opinion that he/she is unsuited for further service.
730
  The fact that a Sanctions 
Board member cannot be removed without a decision being taken by other members, 
without the involvement of the organisation’s management, would be paramount to 
ensuring the Board’s independence.   
 
 (ii) Appointment of Sanctions Board members 
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The appointment of Sanctions Board members is another issue to consider, given 
that such appointments are made by the governing body of the relevant MDB.  As such, 
there exists a risk that the appointment process will become politicised and will raise 
issues of impropriety.  As reflected in the table in section E(i) above, ADB is unusual in 
having the Investigations Unit nominate members who serve on the Sanctions Board, as 
well as provide secretariat support and advice directly to the Board.  Among the other 
MDBs, the selection and appointment process is generally handled independently of the 
Investigations Unit, and staff outside the Investigations Unit provide the necessary 
secretariat support or advice to the Board.  For the majority of MDBs, external members 
are appointed by the Board of Directors upon the President’s nomination, while internal 
members are appointed by the President.  ADB and IADB are exceptions in having 
external members appointed by the President, rather than the Board of Directors. 
 
As described in Chapter 2, in Clarke v The United Kingdom, the ECtHR found that 
the mere fact that judges were appointed by one of the parties in the proceedings did not 
automatically amount to a violation of Article 6(1).  Rather, one must examine a broader 
context of the judges’ appointment, including whether they were appointed after a 
competitive procedure, how their salaries were determined and on what grounds they 
could be removed.  Similarly, in the context of MDBs’ administrative tribunals, to avoid 
the risk of impropriety around the appointment process, at the time of the establishment of 
the UNAT, there was a discussion as to whether the ICJ should appoint the Tribunal’s 
members.  This suggestion was ultimately rejected in favour of an appointment by the UN 
General Assembly.
731
  Nevertheless, both WB and UN have created advisory committees 
to identify suitable candidates for the administrative tribunal membership.  Such advisory 
committees consist not only of the organisation’s management, but also of staff 
representatives (given that these tribunals resolve employee disputes) and external 
experts.
732
  An analogous committee, majority composed of external experts, could be 
created for the selection of Sanctions Board members.  Moreover, strict qualifications for 
the Sanctions Board appointments should also be mandated in the fields which are 
relevant for the service on the Board, notably law, compliance, international procurement, 
auditing or forensic accounting or related fields.   
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 Finally, thought has to be given to the appointment and functioning of the 
Sanctions Board Secretariat, which is the administrative arm of the Sanctions Board.  In 
all MDBs, the Secretary is always a staff member of the MDB, with his/her budget 
allocated by the organisation’s management, but his/her responsibility only to the Board.  
As is the case with the administrative tribunals, it is difficult to imagine how the Secretary 
can be completely insulated from the politics of the organisation which “hosts” his/her 
office and decides on the Secretariat’s budget and the Secretary’s salary.  The alternative 
would be to have the Secretary appointed from non-employees of the organisation; 
however, that would not achieve complete independence given that the Secretary’s 
compensation and the Secretariat’s budget would still be determined by the organisation.  
Therefore, this feature appears to be inevitable, just as is the case with judges and 
Secretariat officials of national courts, who are generally paid by governments, even 
though the same governments appear as parties before courts.  The arrangements that 
could contribute to the Secretary’s independence, however, include the renewal of his/her 
term being determined and his/her performance being assessed solely by the Sanctions 
Board and not the organisation which is a party in proceedings handled by the Secretary, 
and ideally to have the Secretary elected solely by the Board and not by the organisation’s 
management.   
 
 In some MDBs (e.g., AfDB, IADB and WB), the Sanctions Board workload is 
sufficient to justify having a Secretary work on a full-time basis.  However, at EBRD the 
volume of appeal-level work does not reach this level and, as a result, the Secretary works 
part-time for the Board and part-time in a different position at the organisation.  This, of 
course, is not ideal, but seems inevitable, given that the number of appeals can vary from 
zero to several a year, and thus does not warrant a regular part-time employee dedicated 
solely to this function.   
F.  Range of sanctions and their proportionality to the wrongdoing; baseline 
sanction 
 
(i) Range of sanctions; mitigating and aggravating factors 
 
Collectively, MDBs have imposed over 3,200 sanctions to date.  Among these, 
about 80% have been debarments of various types: permanent debarments, fixed-term 
182 
 
debarments or debarments with conditional release.
733
   MDBs may want to consider a 
broader range of sanctions that is not so biased towards debarment, and should also 
provide more detailed guidelines on mitigating and aggravating factors in order to ensure 
they are consistently applied. 
 
Looking at other benchmark regimes, it is well-established in international 
administrative law that disciplinary sanctions must be proportionate to the offence for 
which they are imposed.  This principle has been invoked by the WBAT on several 
occasions to overturn staff termination decisions on the grounds that they were 
disproportionate to the offence and failed to adequately take into account mitigating 
circumstances in the particular case.  For example, in Carew v IBRD, where a staff 
member assigned to the WB’s printing unit was fired for inflating his overtime claims, the 
WBAT concluded that:  
 
“disciplinary measure imposed by the Bank is significantly disproportionate to the 
misconduct . . .  Here, the Tribunal notes the long service of the Applicant as a staff 
member of the Bank for a period of 14 years, his diligent performance in the discharge of 
duties, and the positive performance reviews and evaluation he received.  Moreover, the 
Tribunal notes as well that the amount of money improperly claimed was modest, and that 
the Applicant’s employment was not one involving higher management 
responsibilities.”734   
 
The WBAT thus rescinded the termination decision and ordered reinstatement or the 
payment of compensatory damages equal to six months’ pay in lieu thereof. 
 
As for mitigating and aggravating factors, as noted in Chapter 1, FAR requires 
agency officials to consider a number of mitigating factors when determining the length of 
debarment.  In the same vein and in furtherance of greater harmonisation of their sanctions 
practices, all MDBs have adopted The General Principles and Guidelines for Sanctions 
(the “Sanctioning Guidelines”), which represent a set of principles to ensure consistent 
treatment of individuals and firms in the determination of sanctions.  As the name suggests, 
however, these are non-binding guidelines and leave the decision-makers with broad 
discretion to weigh mitigating and aggravating factors.   
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The tables below indicate how the decision-makers may consider mitigating and 




Aggravating circumstances:  










 Repeated pattern of sanctionable conduct  
 Sophisticated means 
 Central role in the sanctionable conduct  
 Management’s role in sanctionable conduct  
 Involvement of public official or IFI staff 
Harm Caused  
 Harm to Public Welfare  
 Harm to the Project  
1-3 years  Interference with Investigation, or obstruction of the investigative 
process 
 Intimidation/payment of witness  
 Refusal to accept notice/failure to respond 
Up to 10 years  Past history of sanction by any Institution  
 Violation of a sanction or Temporary Suspension 
 
(ii)  Mitigating circumstances:   
Decrease  Mitigating Circumstance  
1-2 years or alternatively up to 25% Minor Role in the sanctionable conduct  
1-3 years or alternatively up to 33% Voluntary corrective Action Taken  
 Cessation of sanctionable conduct independent to and 
in advance of investigation  
 Internal action against responsible party  
 Institution of corrective measures to prevent the 
sanctionable conduct  
 Restitution or financial remedy  
1-3 years or alternatively up to 50% Cooperation with investigation  
 Assistance and/or ongoing cooperation  
 Internal investigation  
 Admission/acceptance of guilt/responsibility  
 Voluntary restraint  
 
These factors are broadly similar to those in the US Federal Sentencing Guidelines, which 
provide for several categories of sentence adjustments: victim-related adjustments (e.g., if 
the offender knew that the victim was unusually vulnerable due to age or physical or 
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mental condition, the offence level is increased by two levels
736); the offender’s role in the 
offence (e.g., if the offender was a minimal participant in the offence, the offence level is 
decreased by four levels
737
); and obstruction of justice (e.g., if the offender engaged in 
witness intimidation, tampered with or destroyed evidence, or otherwise obstructed justice 
in connection with the investigation or prosecution of the offense, the offence level is 




By way of example, the WB has accorded mitigating credit to: a respondent 
company that demonstrated taking disciplinary measures against those responsible for the 
wrongdoing,
739
 a respondent company that demonstrably provided substantial and timely 
assistance with INT’s investigation,740 a respondent company that was shown to have 
taken voluntary corrective actions in the form of compliance policies to address the type of 
misconduct at issue in the case,
741
 and a respondent company which offered compensation 





Similarly, WB has applied aggravation to: a respondent company, where evidence 
showed that high-ranking individuals within the company participated in, condoned, or 
were wilfully ignorant of the misconduct;
743
 a respondent company whose misconduct 
caused WB to declare misprocurement and to cancel a portion of its loan when the 
misconduct was uncovered;
744
a respondent company with demonstrable repeated instances 
of fraudulent practices over the course of nearly two years;
745
 and a respondent company 
which impeded WB’s exercise of “audit rights” by denying INT access to relevant 




 Commentators have suggested that guidelines based on the loss amount associated 
with the sanctionable practice would produce better outcomes in most instances:  For 
                                                     
736
 United States Sentencing Commission: Guidelines Manual, §3A1.1 (Nov. 2016). 
737
 Ibid., §3B1.2 (Nov. 2016). 
738
 Ibid., §2D1.1 (Nov. 2016). 
739
 See, e.g., Sanctions Board Decision No. 48 (2012), ¶ 44. 
740
 See, e.g., Sanctions Board Decision No. 66 (2014), ¶ 42. 
741
 See, e.g., Sanctions Board Decision No. 71 (2014), ¶¶ 93-94. 
742
 See, e.g., Sanctions Board Decision No. 53 (2012), ¶ 62. 
743
 See, e.g., Sanctions Board Decision No. 65 (2014), ¶¶ 70-72. 
744
 Ibid., ¶ 75. 
745
 See, e.g., Sanctions Board Decision No. 56 (2013), ¶ 55. 
746
 Ibid., ¶ 61. 
185 
 
example, a fraudulent practice which resulted in the diversion of millions of dollars in 
MDB’s funds should result in a more severe sanction than a corrupt practice where a 
contractor paid a few hundred dollars to a government official, in a manner that did not 
materially affect the award of the contract.
747
  By way of comparison, in the US Federal 
Sentencing Guidelines, which are used to determine the length of a defendant’s sentence, 
sentences in fraud cases are dependent on the amount of money involved.  Thus, for a loss 
of less than $6,500, there is no change to the baseline sanction; incremental adjustments 
are made at levels including $15,000, $40,000, $90,000, $150,000, all the way up to more 
than $550 million.
748
    
 
Naturally, financial criteria will not be applicable in some cases (such as coercion 
or obstructive practice).  However, MDBs should consider a wider range of sanctions that 
are not so biased towards debarment.  In that context, it has also been suggested that 
MDBs should consider relying more heavily on letters of reprimand and conditional non-
debarments, especially in minor cases or where the respondent demonstrates that it has and 




Furthermore, because of the powerful deterrent effect of sanctions, their use should 
not be undermined by inconsistent application of, and low standards for, mitigating and 
aggravating factors.  Thus, mitigating factors should include a definition of self-reporting, 
which is based on the provision of information that MDBs’ investigators could not 
otherwise have known about.  Similarly, “assistance and/or ongoing cooperation” should 
also be elaborated upon to include, for example, the provision of detailed information 
about wrongdoing by individuals, unedited first witness accounts, provision of access to 
witnesses, full evidence of other wrongdoing discovered during investigations.
750
  Finally, 
such terms as “sophisticated means,” “voluntary restraint” and “internal action against 
responsible party” should also be elaborated upon before they are considered as a 
mitigating factor, in order to ensure they are consistently applied among MDBs. 
 
 (ii) Baseline sanction 
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The Sanctioning Guidelines provide that the baseline sanction should be a three-
year debarment, with or without conditional release.
751
  Sanctions Procedures of both 
AfDB and WB state that their baseline sanction is a debarment with conditional release.
752
  
This means that debarment with conditional release is the starting point, unless there are 
conditions that justify issuing another sanction.  The reasoning behind debarment with 
conditional release, rather than a “plain vanilla” debarment, being the baseline sanction is 
that the former places greater emphasis on rehabilitation, encouraging sanctioned firms to 
adopt adequate, effective policies and measures that make it less likely that they will 
engage in such misconduct again.
753
  Under the terms of debarment with conditional 
release, the sanctioned party will be debarred for a minimum period and must demonstrate 
compliance with one or more remedial or preventative conditions in order to be released 
from debarment.
754
  In most cases, these conditions require an improved compliance 
programme and remedial measures against the parties found to have engaged in the 
misconduct, such as reassignment or termination.
755
  Sanctioned parties are therefore 
incentivised to adopt specific conditions to deter misconduct, reduce integrity risks and 
send a message of compliance within the company and externally.
756
   
 
 A significant consideration for institutions that have imposed or anticipate 
imposing sanctions of debarment with conditional release is that they have in place the 
function necessary to monitor integrity compliance requirements.
757
  WB, for example, 
established an Integrity Compliance Office (the “ICO”) in 2010, whose primary function 
is to have oversight over the satisfaction of debarment conditions.
758
 Other MDBs may not 
have sufficient resources for setting up such function dedicated to regular engagement 
with the debarred party on identifying areas of improvement and on regular monitoring of 
compliance with the imposed conditions.   
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 The complex procedures the ICO has established for monitoring compliance 
illustrate the burden that such monitoring imposes on institutions.
759
  The sanctioned party, 
in turn, would have to engage sufficiently and provide all the relevant information.
760
  
Needless to say, this is both a time-consuming and costly exercise, which will not be 
practicable for all MDBs. 
 
Moreover, the effectiveness of debarment with conditional release in encouraging 
rehabilitation and the establishment (or improvement) of a satisfactory integrity 
compliance programme is questionable, particularly with respect to small and medium-
sized enterprises (“SMEs”).  Namely, given that the WB’s sanctions activity has increased 
in terms of both the number of cases and public profile, in 2013 WB’s Legal Department 
launched a review of the WB’s sanctions system, which is being conducted in two phases.  
This review raised questions about the implementation costs for debarments with 
conditional release for both the WB itself and the debarred party, given the time and 
resources implications.
761
  Some of the recommendations that the preliminary Phase I 
report, which was discussed at the WB’s Audit Committee in March 2013, has identified 
are: revisiting the designation of debarment with conditional release as the “baseline” 
sanction, in particular in smaller cases involving individuals and SMEs, which have not 
demonstrated much initiative in adopting effective compliance measures on which their 
release from debarment is conditioned; considering listing all known sanctioned or 
suspended affiliates by name on the debarment and suspension lists and considering steps 
to make the system more accessible to SMEs and individuals who lack the means to 




Curiously, the review also found a pattern of non-engagement by SMEs in the 
system, as more than half of respondents, most of them SMEs, are sanctioned “by default” 
because they do not respond in any way to Notices of Sanctions Proceedings.
763
  Moreover, 
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when the imposed sanction is a debarment with conditional release, SMEs often do not 
engage with the ICO, which results in a default indefinite debarment.
764
  This suggests that 
the debarment imposed on smaller organisations that cannot meet the conditions for 
release is disproportionate to the misconduct and consequently punitive.  Thus, if the 
sanctions regime does not take into account the costs of compliance, entities with deeper 
pockets that are able to pay these costs will be released from debarment, while entities in 
different financial positions will not be.
765
  This is particularly important in view of the 
data that shows that the smaller the firm, the more likely it is to be negatively affected by 
corruption, for a number of reasons, including their limited financial resources, inability to 




Arguably, the reason that some SMEs do not engage with the system is because 
they do not do enough MDB-related work to make it worth time and expense of litigating 
or adopt various compliance and anti-corruption measures imposed as part of debarment 
with conditional release.  However, it may also be the case that, as MDBs’ sanctions 
regimes have become more sophisticated and provide more robust due process rights, they 
have also become less accessible to respondents that cannot afford to pay for external legal 
advice.  MDBs’ sanctions procedures may prove daunting even for English speakers, as 
they are drafted in legalese.   
 
Moreover, the adoption of compliance programmes is expensive – it has been 
estimated that an independent compliance monitor for a multinational corporation may 
charge well in excess of USD 1 million in fees over a two-year period.
767
  For SMEs, even 
minor issues such as translation of programme materials may pose significant costs.   
 
Further, hearings before Sanctions Boards are typically held at the relevant MDB’s 
headquarters.  Travel costs, not to mention the need to obtain a visa, likely represent a 
significant barrier for SME and individual respondents.
768
  While hearings may be held via 
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video conference, research suggests that video testimony is less effective than in-person 
testimony at conveying information essential to credibility determinations. Moreover, 




In view of these hurdles to SMEs’ access to justice under MDBs’ sanctions 
regimes, MDBs should undertake measures to make the system more accessible to SMEs 
and individuals without legal counsel.  For example, the creation of a plain English “know 
your rights” literature for respondents, and the use of plain English throughout sanctions 
proceedings would help surmount, at least in part, the language barrier that some 
respondents face.
770
  Further, in addition to making compliance programmes more 
understandable and affordable to SMEs, MDBs may also consider reducing the use of 
conditional release in smaller cases involving SMEs in favour of alternative approaches 




These measures could also be coupled with technical assistance programmes for 
SMEs, such as training on effective anti-corruption and compliance regimes, and on the 
legal framework for dealing directly or indirectly with corruption in their respective 
country; awareness raising about the long-term costs of corruption; and extending credit 
lines to financial institutions for on-lending to SMEs that have robust ethnics and 
compliance programmes in place.
772
   
 
Similarly, it has been suggested that MDBs should move beyond the notion of a 
single baseline sanction altogether and instead use the full panoply of available sanctions 
in order to more closely tailor the sanction to the wrongdoing.
773
  This would be consistent 
with the US Federal Sentencing Guidelines, which prescribe a different baseline sentence 
not only for each different type of offence, but also for its severity.
774
  For example, the 
Guidelines provide 43 levels of offence seriousness — the more serious the crime, the 
higher the offence level.  Each type of crime is assigned a base offence level, which is the 
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starting point for determining the seriousness of a particular offence. More serious types of 
crime have higher base offence levels (for example, a trespass has a base offence level of 
4
775
, while kidnapping has a base offence level of 32
776
).  In addition to base offence levels, 
each offence type typically carries with it a number of specific factors that can increase or 
decrease the base offence level and, ultimately, the sentence an offender receives.  For 
example, one of the specific factors for fraud (which has a base offence level of 7) is the 
amount of loss involved in the offence: if a fraud involved a more than $6,500 loss, there 
is a 2-level increase to the base offence level.  If a fraud involved a more than $40,000 loss, 




Similarly, the UK Sentencing Council has issued sentencing guidelines, which 
contain a multi-step approach to determining the sentence by “weighing up all the factors 
of the case to determine the offender’s role and the extent to which the offending was 
planned and the sophistication with which it was carried out.”778  Thus, for example, in the 
case of fraud by false representation, the court first classifies the offender’s culpability 
into high culpability (in case the offence involved significant planning, or was conducted 
over sustained period of time, involved large number of victims, etc.), medium culpability 
(where, for example, the offender played a significant (but not a leading) role where 
offending is part of a group activity) or lesser culpability (where the offender was involved 
through coercion, intimidation or exploitation, was not motivated by personal gain, played 
a peripheral role in organised fraud, etc.).  The court then assesses the harm by the actual, 
intended or risked monetary loss that may arise from the offence.  Next, the court 
considers the level of harm caused to the victim(s) (e.g., serious detrimental effect on the 
victim by, for example, causing substantial damage to credit rating, particularly vulnerable 
victim, etc.).  Finally, having determined the category of the offence, the court uses the 





Admittedly, although these types of guidelines provide predictable sentences and 
arguably serve as a deterrent to crime, given that offenders know the formula for 
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sentencing, sentencing guidelines have not escaped criticism as possibly two-dimensional, 
mechanical approach to punishment.
780
  Another criticism in the US has been the shift in 
power from the judge to the prosecutor, given that it is not the prosecutor’s charging 
decision that is the most important one in the case, and arguably, prosecutors can 
manipulate the charges.
781
  MDBs’ sanctions regimes, however, do not run the risk of such 
manipulation of charges by the investigators, given the level of scrutiny by the first-tier 
decision-maker.  Nonetheless, too prescriptive sentencing guidelines with narrow sanction 
ranges could result in a too rigid approach to sentencing and fail to accommodate for 
important variations among cases.   
 
MDBs’ approach to sentencing should therefore probably fall somewhere between 
the US and the UK sentencing guidelines and MDBs’ existing Sentencing Guidelines: 
start with a more nuanced list of possible baseline sanctions, based on different types of 
offences and their severity and not biased towards debarment, and then have the decision-
makers use their judgment to determine a just sanction, which should be explained in a 
reasoned decision.   
 
(iii)  Restitution 
  
MDBs should develop more formal guidelines for determining the appropriate 
amount of restitution and should avoid the perception that they themselves are financially 
benefiting by imposing fines that are paid directly to them.  By way of comparison, under 
FAR, sanctioning officials may impose restitution or fines as stand-alone sanctions, but 
may also use them as mitigating factors in their debarment determinations.  FAR states 
that, before reaching the debarment decision, the sanctioning official should consider 
factors including “whether the contractor has paid or has agreed to pay all criminal, civil 
and administrative liability for the improper activity, including any investigative or 
administrative costs incurred by the Government, and has made or agreed to make full 
restitution.”782   
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It is not, however, the sanctioning official who determines whether the sanctioned 
party will pay restitution.  Rather, the US Department of Justice (“DOJ”) decides whether 
the contractor will pay restitution and what the amount will be, and DOJ has significant 
discretion in determining what the amount of restitution will be, especially when it is 
impossible to specifically quantify what proceeds the contractor has received as a result of 
the wrongful action.
783
   Nonetheless, restitution is typically determined by the amount of 
benefit conferred on the contracting party.
784
   
 
Unlike under the US sanctions system, the objective of restitution under the MDBs’ 
sanctions regime is not necessarily to restore the status quo of the parties harmed by the 
wrongdoing.  Instead, the sanctions regime allows restitution to be used for a deterrent 
purpose.  Similar to the US sanctions system, however, MDBs’ sanctions regimes allow 
the use of restitution based on damages or on compensation grounds.  Thus, for example, 
ADB’s Sanctions Procedures allow the imposition of “restitution and other financial 
remedies.” 785  Similarly, IADB’s Sanctions Procedures allow the imposition of “fines 
representing reimbursement of the costs associated with investigations and [sanctions] 
proceedings.”  Under the WB’s Sanctions Procedures, the respondent may be required to 
make restitution to any party or take actions to remedy the harm done by its 
misconduct.
786
  Further, the WB’s Sanctioning Guidelines state that “[r]estitution, as well 
as financial and other remedies, may be used in exceptional circumstances, including those 
involving fraud in contract execution where there is a quantifiable amount to be restored to 
the client country or project.”787 AfDB’s Sanctions Procedures allow for the imposition of 
“restitution and other financial remedies … where there is a quantifiable amount to be 
restored to the Bank Group … or directly to the Project or Programme.”788   Finally, 
EBRD’s Sanctions Procedures allow for the imposition of “restitution to another party or 
the Bank . . . of diverted funds or the amount representing the economic benefit that the 
Respondent obtained as a result of having committed a Prohibited Practice.”789  These 
differences in the definition of “restitution” could be the areas for future harmonisation. 
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In practice, MDBs have imposed monetary contributions almost exclusively in the 
context of negotiated settlements.  For instance, as described in Chapter 1 above, in 2009, 
in what remains the largest WB case in terms of monetary settlement, Siemens reached a 
settlement with WB over bribery allegations, agreeing to make USD 100 million available 
for anti-corruption projects and to forego bidding on WB projects for two years.  Since 
then (and as described in Chapter 1 above), WB has accepted (a) USD 9.5 million from 
Alstom, which represented 40% of the value of the contracts Alstom had obtained through 
corruption; (b) USD 500,000 from Oxford University Press (OUP), which represented the 
profit that OUP had obtained through corruption; (c) USD 350,000 from Lotti in 
restitution for the overpayments that Lotti and its joint venture partners fraudulently 
obtained; (d) 127,147 rupees from J Mitra in restitution of the orders won through 
fraudulent misrepresentation; and (e) USD 350,000 from Iberdrola, which is equal to the 
amount that Iberdrola had paid to an agent and failed to disclose this in its bid.  
Importantly, most of WB’s borrowers are sovereigns and they are not the ones found to 
have engaged in a sanctionable practice.  Consequently, WB typically engages in 
discussions with the relevant borrower/sovereign and agrees on the most appropriate way 
in which the restitution funds should be applied.  In one instance, the settlement involved 
the in-kind contribution of medical test kits to the affected country’s health authorities; in 





Similarly to WB, AfDB has imposed restitution as part of its sanctions.  For 
instance, as described in Chapter 1, in 2015, AfDB reached a settlement with SNC-Lavalin 
International Inc. (“SNCLI”), under which AfDB imposed a conditional non-debarment on 
SNCLI for a period of two years and ten months, while SNCLI is required to make a 
settlement payment of CAD 1.5 million to flow into support of activities and programmes 
combating corruption on the African continent.   Similarly, in the same year, AfDB 
reached a settlement with Hitachi, Ltd. (“Hitachi”), under which AfDB imposed a 
debarment of twelve months with conditional release, while Hitachi had voluntarily agreed   
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to make a substantial financial contribution to the AfDB, which will be used to fund 
worthy anti-corruption causes on the African continent.   
 
The AfDB’s collection of substantial fines led to the creation of a stand-alone trust 
fund in 2016 – the Africa Integrity Fund, whose aim is to enhance the implementation of 
the legal framework in AfDB’s member countries and by encouraging civil society 
participation in fiduciary, accountability and monitoring systems.
791
 The main activities of 
the Fund include outreach, training, capacity building and technical assistance.
792
  The 
Fund is exclusively financed through the collection of financial penalties derived from 
settlement agreements entered into between the AfDB and entities that are found to have 
engaged in sanctionable practices.
793
  Recognising the possible risk of perception that the 
AfDB is using the funds from settlements to boost its own budget, the AfDB has set up 
safeguards to mitigate reputational risks to the Fund through the Oversight Committee 
majority controlled by external appointees, and annual public report that the Fund will be 
required to issue.
794
  It remains to be seen whether the Fund is successful in its efforts and 
what would happen if a sanctionble practice were to take place in relation to the Fund’s 
operations.  It would be worrying, however, if fines were to be used increasingly to 
minimise or avoid debarment periods, which would undermine cross-debarment.   
 
Finally, to date, none of ADB, EBRD or IADB has imposed restitution as part of 
its sanctions.  This is consistent with the fact that restitutions are typically imposed as part 
of a settlement and EBRD and IADB introduced settlement regimes only recently (in 
2015), whereas ADB does not have the settlement regime in place.   
 
In the situations where an MDB is directly damaged by the sanctonable practice 
(because, for example, the borrower misrepresented the ownership of assets that were to 
be pledged to the MDB under the loan agreement – a scenario which can be contrasted to 
the one where the MDB’s borrower is the damaged party because, for example, a bidder 
misrepresented its qualifications in the tender run by the borrower), the relevant MDB 
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should have the right to seek reimbursement of its own funds, as well as any economic 
benefit, that the respondent may have obtained through the commission of a sanctionable 
practice.  This sanction is then intended to be used primarily in the context of settlements, 
conditional non-debarments and debarments with conditional release, rather than as a 
stand-alone enforcement action, given that MDBs do not have the authority to enforce 
such enforcement action.  Any such reimbursement of project-related funds would need to 
be demonstrably commensurate with the benefit that a respondent, found to have engaged 
in a sanctionable practice, may have unfairly derived from an MDB’s project.  The funds 
should always be used primarily towards repayment of any outstanding liability of the 
respondent towards the MDB and should not be used as a means by which a respondent 
could negotiate its way out of a warranted sanction.   
 
In any event, MDBs should develop more formal guidelines for determining the 
appropriate amount of reimbursement/restitution.  For example, in cases of fraud, where 
the actual amount is quantifiable, the restitution could be the amount that was overpaid as 
a result of fraud, as this is the amount lost by the project as a result of fraud.  In cases of 
corruption, collusion or coercion, the restitution could be based on the profit made or 
anticipated to be made by the respondent, the rationale being that but for the 
corruption/collusion/coercion, the respondent would not have been awarded the contract 
and derived any profit therefrom.  The profit could be calculated by reference to the 
average profit margin in the relevant industry determined by an independent valuer, unless 
the respondent can provide evidence of the actual profit it had made and the relevant MDB 
determines that such amount represents a fair calculation of all benefits to the respondent 
resulting from the contract at issue.  
 
Finally, MDBs should avoid any perception that they are financially benefitting 
from wrongdoing that occurred in relation to their own projects.  While keeping funds 
derived from financial penalties strictly separate from MDBs’ administrative budgets is a 
step in the right direction,
795
 the use of funds by the relevant MDB to develop certain 
programmes raises numerous practical issues, which MDBs should consider beforehand, 
including how to ensure that the unit which negotiated the fines does not have any role in 
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the management structure overseeing the use of funds, how to segregate and handle the 
funds prudently without creating a new and costly bureaucracy to manage it, and how to 
handle the consequences of sanctionable practices occurring in the administration of these 
funds themselves.   
G.  Settlements  
 
 Settlements are appearing more frequently on the sanctions landscape, which 
suggests they have become less of an exceptional recourse to resolve sanctions 
proceedings.
796
  While the settlement processes of these four MDBs are broadly similar, 
there are some differences, as described in the table below:  
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With respect to the timeframe within which settlements should be allowed, there is 
not necessarily the single right approach, and one could argue that settlements should be 
allowed at any stage in the sanctions proceedings.  On the other hand, however, it could 
also be argued that parties should not wait until the last minute and should be incentivised 
to negotiate a settlement early in the process.  Otherwise, if settlement negotiations 
commence at the stage when the case has progressed to the appeals level, the first-tier 
decision-maker’s time would be a waste of resources.   
 
At the same time, settlements must be handled with discretion and transparency.  
For this reason, settlements should be subject to a number of procedural and substantive 
safeguards to ensure fairness, transparency and credibility, including established criteria 
for entering into settlements and a number of procedural “checks and balances” to ensure 
fundamental fairness and equal treatment.  This is why each settlement agreement should 
be cleared by the Head of the Investigations Unit, and the first-tier decision-maker, with 
the MDB’s General Counsel having to verify that the terms of the settlement agreement do 
not manifestly violate relevant MDB’s policies.  
 
Another issue worth considering is whether the admission of culpability should be 
a prerequisite for settlement.  A comparison could be drawn with deferred prosecution 
agreements (“DPAs”).  In the US, the DOJ has not issued standards or policies to suggest 
that self-disclosure will result in a more lenient treatment for the FCPA violations.  In 
many situations, companies therefore weigh the likelihood of getting caught, the cost of 
cooperating with the government, and the potential for a criminal fine when deciding 
whether or not to self-disclose, not just the likelihood that DOJ may bestow a more lenient 
sentence.
797
  In fact, DOJ has rewarded companies that provide significant cooperation 
after an FCPA violation is discovered, even if the company did not self-disclose.  For 
example, Bridgestone Corporation received a penalty 37.34% below the base fine, despite 
not self-disclosing, because its cooperation was “extraordinary, including conducting an 
extensive worldwide internal investigation, voluntarily making Japanese and other 
employees available for interviews, and collecting, analyzing, and organizing voluminous 
evidence and information for the United States.”798 
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In the UK, the SFO initially said that, generally, companies would be offered a 
DPA only when they self-report.
799
  More recently, however, the SFO appears to be taking 
a more relaxed approach to the use of DPAs and has offered DPAs even in the absence of 
self-reporting.   For instance, in 2017, the SFO entered into a widely publicised DPA with 
Rolls-Royce despite the fact that the company did not self-report its violations.  Still, the 
judge noted that “the company could not have done more to expose its own misconduct, 
limited neither by time, jurisdiction or area of business.”800  Arguably, the company is 
likely to have felt the need to cooperate to such a degree because it did not self-report in 
the first place. Rather, the SFO first became aware of the issues as a result of a 
whistleblower’s internet blog.  Nonetheless, the company was praised for its 
“extraordinary cooperation” with the SFO, which involved providing many of the 30 





Following the Rolls-Royce settlement, the SFO’s Joint Head of Bribery and 
Corruption explained that the key factor in determining whether to offer a DPA or 
prosecute is “the stance the company takes once it becomes aware of the issue”, which 
includes such factors as: (i) the point at which the company came and talked to the SFO; 
(ii) the work the company has already taken to investigate the matter; (iii) the approach the 
company is intending to take in order to provide the SFO with access to the factual 
elements of that work; (iv) how the company has handled data identification, collection, 
preservation, continuity and provision to the SFO; and (v) to what extent the company is 
willing to respond to the SFO’s interests in work that remains to be done in the 
investigation – for example, sequencing interviews with the SFO, drawing relevant 
material to the SFO’s attention even if the SFO has not asked for it, and allowing the SFO 
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While MDBs could follow a similarly flexible approach, they should avoid the 
appearance of giving companies a “slap on the wrist” through settlements, and could 
therefore consider using settlements only where the respondent:  
 
- has self-reported and cooperated (where self-reporting should be based on the 
provision of information that MDBs’ investigators could not otherwise have 
known about; and standards of cooperation should include, among other things, the 
provision of detailed information about wrongdoing by individuals, unedited first 
witness accounts, provision of access to witnesses, and full evidence of any other 
wrongdoing discovered in the course of investigating a specific offence);  
- has admitted guilt; and 
- has agreed on concrete measures of the strengthening and monitoring of 
compliance procedures, to be verified by MDBs’ monitors and with public 




By contrast, settlements should not be used where wrongdoing is egregious and has 
resulted in significant harm, or where a company has previously received a corruption-
related enforcement or regulatory action against it.  Otherwise, settlements will be 
perceived as another “cost of doing business”, where corporate recidivists repeatedly agree 




As noted in Chapter 1 above, however, AfDB and WB have recently announced 
several high-value settlements, which raise questions about how settlement payments have 
been calculated in these cases and how much of those payments was restorative and how 
much was punitive, and whether settlement arrangements favour those with deep pockets.   
Questions  have  also  been  raised  about  the  reputational  risks  that  may  attach  to  
settlements, particularly given that, as described in Chapter 1, recent AfDB’s settlements 
are conspicuously under the one-year threshold that would have triggered cross-debarment.  
Therefore, MDBs should be aware of the perception that large companies are able to buy 
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their way out of lengthy debarment periods.
805
 Consequently, MDBs should consider 
introducing greater transparency of settlements, especially with respect to any payments 
that the respondent is required to make as part of the settlement agreement, and even more 
so given that, when treated confidential, without publicity of their use or terms, 
settlements also limit the general deterrent and educational value of sanctions.
806
  
Nonetheless, as argued in section C above, publication of settlement agreements may not 
be the best option, given that many respondents see the lack of publicity as a significant 
advantage to settlements.  Rather, MDBs should develop further guidelines on the basic 
tenets for the disclosure of settlements. 
 
Moreover, MDBs should consider greater coordination, where the same respondent 
seeks to settle with more than one MDB on related matters.  Such respondent’s behaviour 
could undermine the core concept of cross-debarment, and could be mitigated through a 




H.  Conclusion 
 
 MDBs’ sanctions proceedings are not criminal, civil or human rights proceedings.  
Indeed, they are inherently administrative proceedings, aimed at safeguarding the MDBs’ 
funds.  Nonetheless, they do not operate in a vacuum, nor are they exempt from scrutiny, 
as has become increasingly apparent with the ever-growing emphasis on the due process 
requirements.  As discussed in Chapter 2, international organisations’ immunities have 
been consistently challenged before courts, with some courts waiving immunity on the 
ground of lack of internal administrative mechanisms for addressing (employment) 
grievances.
808
  International organisations therefore have to continuously adjust and 
develop better and more robust mechanisms that will keep them moving in a direction that 
maintains their legitimacy.  Due process of law is, however, one of those key notions that 
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have not been (and probably cannot be) strictly defined and whose scope tends to evolve 




 The preceding sections have proposed enhancements to MDBs’ sanctions regimes 
based on the principles identified in Chapter 2 and drew inspiration from various 
international arbitration rules.  More specifically, with respect to evidentiary standards of 
sanctions regimes, the rather vague evidentiary rules of MDBs’ sanctions regimes 
inevitably leave gaps, which can cause problems if parties have conflicting views on how 
these gaps should be filled.  To that end, MDBs’ sanctions regimes would benefit from 
specifying that respondents have the right to request documents from investigators and 
that investigators are expected to respond to those requests.  Only if the investigators 
claimed that the discovery requested is irrelevant, privileged or unduly burdensome, 
would the relevant decision-maker be brought in to decide.  Investigators should also have 
the right to redact parts of evidence, which the respondent should be able to challenge.  
 
MDBs would also benefit from more detailed rules on the use of experts’ reports, 
taking guidance from the IBA Rules by, for example, requiring the expert to disclose the 
methods, evidence and information used in arriving at the conclusions; and to disclose any 
relationship the expert may have with the parties.  The regimes should also take guidance 
from the IBA Rules by describing how the Sanctions Board will determine what evidence 
it will consider, how evidence will be assessed and how it will decide on privilege-related 
issues. 
 
Taking further guidance from not only the IBA Rules, but also the LCIA Rules, the 
UNCITRAL Rules and the SCC Rules, as well as the ECtHR’s and the administrative 
tribunals’ case law, MDBs’ sanctions regimes could allow Sanctions Boards to decide 
whether or not to have oral hearings based on whether they have insufficient evidence on 
the basis of the written proceedings to decide a case fairly.  Additionally, each party could 
be allowed to propose any witnesses or experts it wishes to call, and the Sanctions Board 
itself should also be allowed to call witnesses and experts.  Sanctions Boards may, 
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however, consider limiting the maximum number of witnesses and experts that each party 
may offer on each disputed fact.   
 
In addition, the requirement to provide reasoned decisions for administrative 
action, including responses to arguments raised by interested parties, has been established 
as a crucial factor in rendering meaningful any accountability mechanism
810, and MDBs’ 
sanctions regimes should be no exception to this.  Such publication would also provide a 
powerful incentive for all stakeholders in the sanctions process to maximise the quality of 
their work, and could also enhance the deterrent value of sanctions by revealing the 
circumstances underlying the sanctioning of respondents.
811
  Importantly, however, 
safeguards should be put in place to allow Sanctions Boards to redact their decisions in 
order to preserve a party’s anonymity and/or protect its reputation. 
 
As regards referrals to national authorities, MDBs’ sanctions procedures should 
contain explicit authority to refer to the appropriate national enforcement authorities the 
cases involving possible violation of national laws.  Any such recommendation should 
require the identification of the information that may be disclosed to such authorities and 
possibly also the relevant MDB’s General Counsel’s opinion regarding the legal aspects of 
the recommended referral.  Moreover, given the graveness of this decision in view of the 
Kevin Wallace case, MDBs should refer matters and share information with national 
authorities only in cases where they are appraised of the subsequent criminal procedures in 
the relevant country, and fully prepared to share additional information, cooperate with the 
authorities and have its staff testify, if necessary. 
 
With respect to the optimal composition of Sanctions Boards, in order to avoid any 
perception of partiality, it would be advisable for Sanctions Boards to be composed 
entirely of non-staff members and for the candidates for the Sanctions Board membership 
not to have previously have held or, at the time of appointment, hold any appointment 
with the relevant MDB, including as a staff member, Board director or a consultant.  
MDBs’ sanctions procedures should also provide a mechanism that allows a challenge to 
the impartiality of individual Sanctions Board members.   
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As discussed in the preceding sections, taking guidance from the UN Dispute and 
Appeals Tribunals, Sanctions Board members should have fixed, non-renewable terms of 
five-seven years.  Moreover, the Sanctions Board Statute should recognise budgetary 
independence of the Sanctions Board.  The right to appoint Sanctions Board members 
should be granted to a majority external selection committee, and the right to remove a 
Sanctions Board member should be vested with the Board itself, rather than the MDBs’ 
management. 
 
 The preceding sections have also proposed measures for greater harmonisation of 
MDBs’ sanctions regimes in the areas of sanctioning guidelines and settlements.  
Specifically, MDBs should consider a broader range of sanctions that are not biased 
towards debarment, let alone debarment with conditional release, which – because of the 
associated costs and resources – favours more sophisticated and wealthier companies.  
One evident area of concern is how few respondents subject to debarment with conditional 
release seek to meet the conditions required to regain eligibility. The low rate of 
compliance raises questions as to the general effectiveness of conditional sanctions as a 
tool intended to change behaviour; the fairness of essentially indefinite debarments for 
many respondents; and the risk of anticompetitive effects from a continually expanding 
pool of debarred contractors and consultants.
812
  Consequently, moving away from the 
notion of a single baseline sanction altogether may be desirable, as well as the introduction 
of measures that would make the system more accessible to SMEs and individuals without 
legal representation.  Taking guidance from national sanctioning guidelines, particularly 
the US Federal Sentencing Guidelines and the UK Sentencing Council Guidelines, MDBs 
should consider having a different baseline sanction based on the type of offence and its 
severity. 
 
 Moreover, MDBs should consider harmonising the definition of “restitution” and 
developing clear guidelines for determining the appropriate amount of reimbursement and 
restitution, and should avoid the perception that they themselves are financially benefitting 
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from wrongdoing that occurred in relation to their own projects by having the restitution 
amount paid directly to them. 
 
Finally, MDBs should develop robust guidelines for the availability of settlements, 
which should not be used when wrongdoing is egregious and has resulted in significant 
harm, nor as a way for MDBs to extract maximum restitution in exchange for a more 
lenient sanction.  Rather, settlements should be available only when the respondent has 
self-reported and cooperated (where MDBs’ should consider providing guidance on what 
constitutes “self-reporting” and “cooperation”), has admitted guilt, and has agreed on 
concrete measures of the strengthening and monitoring of compliance procedures, to be 
verified by MDBs’ monitors.     
 





MDBs’ sanctions procedures should specify that respondents have the right 
to request documents from investigators and that investigators are expected 
to respond to those requests.  Only if the investigators claim that the 
discovery requested is irrelevant, privileged, or unduly burdensome, would 
the relevant decision-maker be brought in to decide.   
 
Investigators should have the right to redact parts of evidence, but the 
respondent may challenge a redaction before the decision-maker. 
Experts’ reports MDBs’ sanctions procedures should provide guidance on the content of 
expert reports – for example, by stating that the report must describe the 
methods, evidence and information used in arriving at the conclusions, and 
disclose any relationship the expert has with the parties, their legal advisors 
and the relevant decision-maker.  MDBs could also consider allowing parties 
to object to the expert’s qualifications, impartiality or independence.  
Finally, MDBs’ sanctions procedures should require the decision-maker to 
send a copy of the expert report to the parties and give them an opportunity 
to submit written comments on the report. 
Assessment of 
evidence 
MDBs should consider introducing guidance on the exclusion of evidence, 
similar to that in the IBA Rules. 
Oral hearing Parties should be allowed to request a hearing, while the Sanctions Board 
should retain discretion of whether to have a hearing.  Such decision should 
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be based on the Sanctions Board’s determination of whether it has sufficient 
evidence on the basis of the written proceedings to decide a case fairly.   
Witnesses Sanctions Boards should have discretion to decide whether to allow live 
witness testimony and cross-examination, depending on whether, in the 
Sanctions Board’s opinion, this is necessary to ensure a fair hearing of the 
respondent’s case.  As a starting point, however, parties in the proceedings 
should be allowed to provide the Board with the names of witnesses whom 
they wish to appear before the Board, bearing in mind that the Board does 
not have judicial powers of subpoenaing witnesses.   
 
Sanctions Boards may want to limit the maximum number of witnesses that 
each party may offer on each disputed fact.  If the Sanctions Board thought 
that a request to call witnesses were in bad faith (e.g., in order to obstruct or 
subvert proceedings), it should not be required to call witnesses. 
Publication of 
decisions  
MDBs should publish reasoned decisions of both the Sanctions Board and 
the first-tier decision-maker in contested cases (once the deadline for appeal 
has passed without the appeal having been lodged).  Safeguards should be 
put in place by allowing the decision-makers to redact their decisions in 




MDBs’ sanctions procedures should contain explicit authority to refer cases 
involving possible violation of national laws to the appropriate law 
enforcement authorities. The credibility of the relevant evidence suggesting 
that a party had violated national laws should be corroborated by a local 
counsel.  Further, the recommendation to refer should require the 
identification of information that may be disclosed and the General 
Counsel’s opinion regarding the legal aspects of the recommended referral.  
The MDB’s President (in consultation with the senior management) should 
have a final say on whether the matter should be so referred.   
 
MDBs should refer matters and share information with national authorities 
only in cases where they are appraised of the subsequent criminal procedures 
in the relevant country, and fully prepared to share additional information, 
cooperate with the authorities in their investigation and have their staff 
testify, if necessary.  Finally, MDBs should inform the respondent of any 
materials made available to the authorities and provide copies of such 







Sanctions Boards should be composed entirely of non-staff members.  In 
order to ensure maximum impartiality and prevent any appearance of 
conflict, the candidates for the Sanctions Board membership should not have 
previously held or, at the time of appointment, hold any appointment with 
the relevant MDB, including as a staff member, Board director or a 
consultant.  MDBs’ sanctions procedures should also provide a mechanism 
that allows a challenge to the impartiality of individual Sanctions Board 
members. 
 
In addition, none of the Sanctions Board members (or the first-tier decision-
maker, for that matter) should be involved in the drafting of the relevant 
MDB’s Sanctions Procedures in order to ensure that MDBs’ sanctions 
procedures are free from their influence and interests. 
 
For a period of several years after the end of his/her term, the Sanctions 
Board member should not be able to (i) accept any kind of employment, 
consultancy or interest with any firm that has been a respondent in the 
sanctions proceedings in which such member has participated, or (ii) accept 
any employment with the relevant MDB or provide the MDB with any 
services. 
 
Sanctions Board members may serve as a counsel in a case pending before a 
different Sanctions Board, unless such case concerns a controversial 
question which is frequently raised before Boards on which the person sits as 
a member.  Further guidance could be taken from the IBA Guidelines.   
 
Sanctions Board members should be appointed for a non-renewable term of 
between five and seven years. 
 
The Sanctions Board Statute should recognise the administrative and 
budgetary independence of the Sanctions Board, and the budget of the 
Sanctions Board should not be fungible with the budget of other 
administrative units. 
 
MDBs should prescribe clear grounds for the removal of Sanctions Board 
members.  Such removal should be handled exclusively by the Sanctions 
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MDBs should consider establishing an advisory committee composed of 
external experts for the selection of Sanctions Board members.  Moreover, 
strict qualifications for the Sanctions Board appointments should be 
mandated in the fields which are relevant for the service on the Board, such 
as law, compliance, international procurement, auditing, forensic accounting 





MDBs should consider having the Secretary elected, and the renewal of 







MDBs should consider a wider range of sanctions that is not so biased 
towards debarment, in particular letters of reprimand and conditional non-
debarments in minor cases or where the respondent demonstrates that it has 
and will continue to take corrective actions to remedy the sanctionable 
conduct.   
 
Moreover, a significant factor in MDBs’ Sanctions Guidelines should be the 
loss amount associated with the sanctionable practice.  Further guidance is 
also needed on such terms as “sophisticated means,” “internal action against 
responsible party” and “assistance and/or ongoing cooperation” in order to 
ensure they are consistently applied among MDBs.   
Baseline sanction MDBs should move beyond the notion of a single baseline sanction and 
instead use a range of available sanctions, based on different types of 
offences and their severity, taking guidance from the likes of the US Federal 
Sentencing Guidelines and the UK Sentencing Council Guidelines. 
Restitution MDBs should consider harmonising the definition of ‘reimbursement/ 
restitution’. 
 
Further, MDBs should develop guidelines for determining the appropriate 
amount of reimbursement/restitution. 
 
MDBs should also avoid any perception that they are financially benefitting 
from wrongdoing that occurred in relation to their own projects, and – before 
imposing sanctions that require payment of fines directly to MDBs – should 
resolve such practical issues as how they will ensure that the unit which 
208 
 
negotiated the fines does not have any role in the management structure 
overseeing the use of funds, how they will segregate and handle the funds 
prudently without creating a new and costly bureaucracy to manage it, and 
how they will handle the consequences of sanctionable practices occurring in 







MDBs should undertake measures to make the system more accessible to 
SMEs and individuals without legal counsel.  Such measures should include, 
for example, the creation of a plain English “know your rights” literature for 
respondents, and the use of plain English throughout sanctions proceedings.  
Further, MDBs may consider reducing the use of conditional release in 
smaller cases involving SMEs in favour of alternative approaches like more 
severe sanctions for repeat offences.   
 
Other complementary measures could include technical assistance 
programmes for SMEs, involving training on effective anti-corruption and 
compliance regimes, awareness-raising about the long-term costs of 
corruption, etc.  
Settlements MDBs should avoid the appearance of giving companies a “slap on the 
wrist” through settlements, and should therefore consider using settlements 
only where the respondent:  
 
- has self-reported and cooperated (where self-reporting should be 
based on the provision of information that MDBs’ investigators 
could not otherwise have known about; and standards of cooperation 
should include, among other things, the provision of detailed 
information about wrongdoing by individuals, unedited first witness 
accounts, provision of access to witnesses, and full evidence of any 
other wrongdoing discovered in the course of investigating a specific 
offence);  
- has admitted guilt; and 
- has agreed on concrete measures of the strengthening and 
monitoring of compliance procedures, to be verified by MDBs’ 
monitors and with public reporting on how the respondent has done 
so.  
 
By contrast, settlements should not be used where wrongdoing is egregious 
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and has resulted in significant harm, or where a company has previously 
received a corruption-related enforcement or regulatory action against it. 
 
Finally, in order to balance increasing calls for transparency, on the one 
hand, and the fact that many respondents see the lack of publicity as a 
significant advantage to settlements, on the other hand, MDBs should 
develop guidelines that set out the basic terms for the disclosure of 
settlements – for example, whether a press release will be issued in each 
case, how the underlying misconduct or agreed sanction may be 
summarised, and whether the respondent should publicly accept culpability 





2.  Treatment of corporate groups 
A.  Introduction 
 
All MDBs’ sanctions procedures provide that affiliates of respondents may also be 
sanctioned, and that sanctions may be applied to successors and assigns of sanctioned 
parties.  Nevertheless, a number of challenging issues surround the need to prevent the 
circumvention of sanctions through the use of affiliates or changes in corporate forms, on 
the one hand, while on the other hand ensuring that sanctions are commensurate with the 
degree of responsibility, especially where a sanctioned party has numerous affiliates in 
different business sectors around the globe.  In order to provide guidance on these matters, 
in September 2012, the MDBs adopted Harmonised Principles on Treatment of Corporate 
Groups (the “Principles”), which set out general principles for the application of sanctions 




While the Principles provide a useful starting point, they would benefit from 
further guidance in order to facilitate clearer standards for the MDBs.  For example, the 
Principles recommend that sanctions should be applied to the sanctioned party’s parent 
company if that company was involved in the sanctionable practice.  Such involvement 
may include wilful blindness and failure to supervise.  However, without sufficient 
guidance on this issue, the “failure to supervise” standard may allow a company to 
successfully argue that it had properly supervised its employees, but that its employees 
acted “rogue” in committing a sanctionable practice.  Similarly, without more detailed 
standards to address successor liability, companies could evade sanctions by dissolving 
and taking on another legal form. 
 
This Chapter makes recommendations for further guidance under the Principles, 
based on the analysis of the US and the UK laws.  The choice of the US and the UK as 
benchmark jurisdictions was guided by two factors: (i) first, the fact that MDBs’ sanctions 
regimes are based on the US Federal Acquisition Regulation
814
 and thus founded on 
common law principles, and (ii) second, the fact that three out of the five MDBs are 
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 The US Federal Acquisition Regulation served as the basis for the World Bank Group’s Sanctions 
Procedures, which in turn served as the basis for the sanctions procedures of the other four MDBs. 
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headquartered in these two jurisdictions.  After an overview of the Principles in section B, 
the subsequent sections analyse four main areas of corporate liability: (i) liability of a 
company for its employees’ wrongdoings, (ii) liability of a parent company for its 
subsidiaries’ wrongdoings, (iii) liability of a subsidiary for its parent company’s 
wrongdoings and (iv) successor liability.  Each section concludes the analysis by making 
recommendations for further enhancements of, and clarifications under, the Principles.   
 B.  Overview of the Principles 
 
 The Principles recognise that sanctions should be applied to entities within 
corporate groups, based on the facts of the relevant case and not a rigidly automatic 
approach.  Nevertheless, the Principles state a rebuttable presumption that sanctions 
should be applied to all entities controlled by the respondent, unless the respondent 
demonstrates that the entities are free of responsibility for the misconduct, application to 
the entities would be disproportional and is not reasonably necessary to prevent evasion.
815
  
In practice, however, very few respondents focus on the possibility that their subsidiaries 
may be captured by the sanction and hence fail to rebut this presumption in their response 
to the allegations of sanctionable practices, which then by default results in the sanctions 
typically extending to affiliates controlled by the sanctioned parties.   
 
 The Principles additionally recommend that sanctions should be applied to entities 
controlling the respondent and to entities under common control, if the relevant entity was 
involved in the sanctioned misconduct.
816
  Such involvement may include wilful blindness 
and failure to supervise.
817
  The WB Sanctions Board’s stance has been to impose a 
sanction based on a finding of either (i) culpability for direct involvement (e.g., through 
instructions or orders, approval or guidance, or inferred authorisation in cases of close 
supervision),
818
 or (ii) responsibility for another party's actions (e.g., where there is a duty 
to supervise combined with deliberate non-intervention).
819
  Needless to say, it is 
challenging as a practical matter to establish that a parent company had a duty to supervise 
the subsidiary found to have engaged in a sanctionable practice.  In addition, critics have 
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suggested that concepts such as wilful blindness and failure to supervise should be applied 
sparingly and, instead, the MDBs’ sanctions determinations should respect the doctrine of 
corporate separateness, which is observed in civil and common law systems worldwide.
820
   
 
Furthermore, the Principles recommend that the sanction should be applied to the 
successor or assign of a sanctioned party, unless the successor or assign demonstrates that 
such application would be unreasonable.
821
  In that context, the WB’s general principles 
and presumptions in regard to sanctions and corporate groups include the presumption that 
sanctions should be applied to successors and assigns, and the principle that sanctions 
should be applied flexibly to avoid evasion.
822
  Moreover, the Principles also state that 
“the business operations of the originally sanctioned entity should continue to be 
sanctioned.”823  It is unclear how a sanction can apply to “business operations”, given that 
business operations of an entity are not legal entities themselves.   
 
Additionally, the Principles recommend that, if a prima facie case has been made 
that an individual who is subject to a sanction has been employed or engaged by an entity, 
then the MDBs may apply the sanction to the employing or engaging entity, if the 
individual was engaged to evade a sanction.
824
  Clearly, this principle is intended to 
prevent sanctioned individuals from evading a sanction by working on a project on which 
their company is working with an MDB.
825
  For example, the WB Sanctions Board has 
typically held that an employer could be found liable for the acts of its employees under 
the doctrine of respondeat superior, considering in particular whether the employees acted 
within the course and scope of their employment, and were motivated, at least in part, by 
the intent of serving their employer.
826
  Where a respondent entity has denied 
responsibility for the acts of its employees based on a rogue employee defence, the 
Sanctions Board has assessed any evidence presented regarding the scope and adequacy of 
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 Lastly, with respect to cross-debarments, the Principles state that only such 
sanctioned entities within a corporate group that are identified by name by the sanctioning 
institution are subject to cross-debarment pursuant to the Cross-Debarment Agreement.
828
  
This approach is understandable, because if the debarment applied to the respondent “and 
all of its affiliates” or “all of the affiliates controlled by the respondent”, without 
identifying such affiliates by name, it would be impossible to know which companies are 
captured by the cross-debarment without undertaking a thorough analysis of the 
organisational structure of a company attempting to work on an MDB-financed project.  
This would be impractical in view of the hundreds of debarred companies on the list.  On 
the other hand, if the debarment were to apply only to the specifically named affiliates, 
this would generate the risk that a debarred party may simply create a new affiliate with a 
name different from any of the names on the list and consequently avoid debarment.  
EBRD’s Sanctions Procedures attempt to deal with such risk by placing the onus of 
detecting circumvention attempts on the Investigations Unit by stating that if, after the 
issuance of the first-tier decision-maker’s decision or the final decision by the Sanctions 
Board, the Investigations Unit determines prima facie that an entity that is seeking to get 
funding (directly or indirectly) from an EBRD-financed project (the “New Entity”) is a 
successor or assignee of sanctioned entity, including through the acquisition of or merger 
with that entity, the Investigations Unit may apply to the first-tier decision-maker to have 
the original sanction applied to the New Entity.
829
 
C.  Liability of a company for its employees’ wrongdoings 
 
The basic feature of separate corporate personality is that the corporation is a legal 
entity distinct from its shareholders. The main advantage that a company has is that it is 
capable of having rights and being subject to duties which are not identical as those 
enjoyed or borne by its shareholders.  It has distinct personality from any individual 
person, and thus longevity beyond that of its members.  Nonetheless, there are instances 
when the law makes companies vicariously liable for their employees’ wrongdoings.  
After all, one could argue that, given that a company has no mind of its own, in order to 
evaluate the company’s acts, it is necessary to refer to the acts of its employees, directors, 
officers or agents (as applicable).  This section analyses the liability of a company for its 
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employees’ wrongdoing under the US and UK law, and makes suggestions for 
enhancements of the Principles. 
 
(i) US law 
 
 In the US, under the doctrine of respondeat superior, a company may be held 
criminally liable for the illegal acts of its directors, officers, employees and agents.  To 
hold a company liable for these actions, the government must establish that the company 
agent’s actions (1) were within the scope of his duties and (ii) were intended, at least in 
part, to benefit the company.
830
   
 
An employee is considered to be acting within the scope of his/her duties if he/she 
has actual or apparent authority to engage in the act in question.
831
  Moreover, an 
employee is acting with apparent authority if a third party reasonably believes that he/she 
has the authority to perform the act in question.
832
   
 
As to the second element, as established in Automated Medical Laboratories, the 
company does not necessarily need to profit from its agent’s actions for it to be held liable.  
In that context, the US Court of Appeals for the 4
th
 Circuit stated:  
 
“Benefit is not a ‘touchstone of criminal corporate liability; benefit at best is an evidential, 
not an operative fact.’  Thus, whether the agent’s actions ultimately [accrued] to the 
benefit of the corporation is less significant than whether the agent acted with the intent to 
benefit the corporation.  The basic purpose of requiring that an agent have acted with the 
intent to benefit the corporation, however, is to insulate the corporation from criminal 
liability for actions of its agents which may be inimical to the interests of the corporation 
or which may have been undertaken solely to advance the interests of that agent or of a 
party other than the corporation.”833 
 
Companies can be held liable for crimes committed by low-level employees,
834
 
contrary to corporate directives,
835
 or notwithstanding the company’s adoption of an 
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effective compliance programme, although – as further described below – a company that 
had an effective compliance programme, self-reported and cooperated is eligible for a 
reduced fine.
836
  In addition, under the wilful blindness doctrine, a company can be held 
criminally liable for deliberately disregarding the criminal activity at hand.837  Therefore, if 
a company should have known of a wrongdoing, it should not recklessly fail to address it. 
 
Notably, in the recent years, the emphasis has been on seeking accountability from 
the individuals who perpetrated the wrongdoing.  In that context, in September 2015, Sally 
Yates, the then Deputy Attorney General of the DOJ, issued the Memorandum on 
Individual Accountability for Corporate Wrongdoers (the “Yates Memo”) which signals 
that the DOJ would proceed more aggressively in targeting individuals involved in 
corporate wrongdoing, emphasising that “one of the most effective ways to combat 
corporate misconduct is by seeking accountability from the individuals who perpetrated 
the wrongdoing.”  This is because “such accountability . . . deters future illegal activity, it 
incentivizes change in corporate behaviour, it ensures that proper parties are held 
responsible for their actions, and it promotes the public’s confidence in the justice 
system.”838   
 
The Yates Memo was likely issued in response to widespread criticism that, 
following the 2008 financial crisis, the DOJ pursued enforcement actions against financial 
institutions without a successful prosecution of any senior officers employed by those 
organisations.
839
   The Memo has raised concerns that lower-level personnel may feel 
pressured to provide government investigators with what they want as opposed to facts 
that might be less helpful to investigators, and that higher-level officials will be less 
cooperative due to fears of potential individual liability.
840
   In response to this criticism, 
in November 2018, the Deputy Attorney General, Rod Rosenstein, announced that, in 
contrast to the requirements in the Yates Memo, a corporation now need not identify every 
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individual who might face civil liability in order to receive maximum cooperation credit in 
civil cases, but rather only those individuals who were “substantially involved in” or 
“responsible for” the alleged misconduct.841 However, DOJ will not award any credit to a 
corporation that “conceals involvement in the misconduct by members of senior 
management or the board of directors” or that “otherwise demonstrates a lack of good 
faith in its representations regarding the nature or scope of the misconduct.”842   
 
 Moreover, the US Sentencing Commission has published the Organizational 
Guidelines, under which a potential fine range can be mitigated by up to 95% if an 
organisation demonstrates that it has put in place an effective compliance and ethics 
programme.  This mitigating credit under the Guidelines is contingent upon prompt 





 Importantly for MDBs’ sanctions procedures, under the FCPA, a company is 
vicariously liable when its directors, officers, employees or agents, acting within the scope 
of their employment, commit FCPA violations intended, at least in part, to benefit the 
company.
844
 As there is no requirement for the culpable employee to be of a certain 
seniority, it is relatively easy for the prosecution to discharge its burden of proof regarding 
the company’s liability.845  For criminal liability to apply to a company, there must be 
corporate “knowledge” – either through individual corporate employees or through the 
doctrine of “collective knowledge”, which imputes to a company the sum knowledge of all 
or some of its employees by aggregating individual employee’s knowledge for the purpose 
of creating the necessary guilty intent for the corporation.
846
  Thus, a company may be 
liable even if there is no single employee entirely at fault and intent may be accumulated 
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  Finally, the prosecution of an individual is not a prerequisite for 
corporate criminal liability.
848
   
 
The only two affirmative defences under the FCPA are that: (1) the payment was 
lawful under the written laws of the foreign country (the “local law” defence), and (2) the 
money was spent as part of demonstrating a product or performing a contractual obligation 
(the “reasonable and bona fide business expenditure” defence). Because these are 




(ii) UK law 
 
Emphasising the separate legal personality doctrine, in a landmark UK corporate 
law case, Salomon v A Salomon & Co Ltd, Lord Macnaghten stated that: 
“The company is at law a different person altogether from the subscribers…. and, though 
it may be that after incorporation the business is precisely the same as it was before, and 
the same persons are managers, and the same hands receive the profits, the company is not 
in law the agent of the subscribers or trustee for them. Nor are the subscribers, as members, 
liable in any shape or form, except to the extent and in the manner provided by the Act.”850 
 
Pursuant to the Legal Guidance on Corporate Prosecutions issued by the UK 
Crown Prosecution Service (the “CPS Guidance”), in the absence of legislation which 
expressly creates criminal liability for companies, corporate liability may be established 
by either: (1) vicarious liability for the acts of a company’s employees/agents, or (2) non-
vicarious liability arising from the so-called “directing mind” principle, which determines 




 Vicarious liability will typically arise from offences of strict liability, which do not 
require intention, recklessness or even negligence as to one or more elements in the actus 
reus.  In this case, it is likely that any corporate prosecution will be linked to the 
prosecution of a controlling officer and/or other employees.
852
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 In addition to strict liability offences, companies can also be liable for offences 
requiring mens rea, whereby “the acts and state of mind” of those who represent the will 
and directing mind will be imputed to the company.
853
  As a starting point, the CPS 
Guidance instructs prosecutors that, in seeking to identify the “directing mind” of a 
company, they should consider the constitution of the company in question (by reviewing 
the company’s foundation documents, as well as actions of directors or the company in 
general meetings) and consider any reference in the company’s statutes to offences 
committed by company’s officers.854  
 
The “directing mind” test has been criticised as too narrow to deter corporate crime 
and as encouraging companies to decentralise responsibilities to avoid liability, making it 
difficult to identify a senior individual who is in charge of a particular operation.
855
  For 
example, in the 2012 LIBOR-fixing scandal, an individual LIBOR-fixer employed by 
UBS (Hayes) was held liable in a criminal court in England, but UBS itself could not be 
prosecuted in the UK, because the SFO did not have sufficient admissible evidence that a 
person who was identified as a directing mind was party to Hayes’ conduct and therefore 
could not conclude that there was a realistic prospect of conviction.
856
  Moreover, it has 
been suggested that this test may encourage bad corporate culture and practices, such as 
manipulation of meeting minutes which fail to record the identity of those present, in order 
to conceal the presence of board members; and complex organisational structures designed 




The one exception to the applicability of the “directing mind” doctrine particularly 
relevant to MDBs’ sanctions regime is section 7 of the UK Bribery Act 2010, which 
introduces wider liability in the context of bribery, without requiring the identification of 
the “directing mind”, for failure by a company to prevent bribery by persons associated 
with it to obtain or retain business or to obtain or retain an advantage in the conduct of 
business for that commercial organisation, which is very similar to the strict liability under 
the FCPA.   Thus, while a company itself will not be held liable for a bribery offence, it 
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will be guilty of a separate offence of failing to prevent bribery.  This is different from the 
FCPA, where a company can be held vicariously liable for acts of its employees and 
agents.  Further, under the Bribery Act, the company will have a full defence if it can 
demonstrate that it had adequate procedures in place to prevent persons associated with it 
from bribing, which is also different from the FCPA approach that does not offer this type 
of defence and offers only mitigation of sentence for remediation.  The question of 
whether an organisation had adequate procedures in place to prevent bribery in the context 
of a particular prosecution is a matter that can only be resolved by the courts taking into 
account particular facts and circumstances of the case. The onus remains on the company 
to prove that it had adequate procedures in place to prevent bribery.
858
   
 
The government has indicated that the following six core principles demonstrate 
the existence of adequate procedures: (1) risk assessment, (2) proportionality of risk-based 
prevention procedures, (3) top level commitment, (4) due diligence in respect of persons 
who perform services for or on behalf of the organisation, (5) communication throughout 




The principle of holding a company liable for its employees’ offences was 
illustrated in the first conviction of a company under the Bribery Act, which occurred in 
February 2016, when a construction and professional services company, Sweett Group 
PLC pled guilty to a charge of failing to prevent bribery by its subsidiary’s employees in 
the Middle East.  In sentencing, the judge described the offence as a system failure 
patently committed over a period of time.
860
  Interestingly, some have criticised the fact 
that no individuals have been charged in relation to corporate wrongdoings in the Sweett 
and other similar cases.
861
  As described in section (i) above, it was exactly this type of 
criticism for leaving senior executives untouched that led to the increased emphasis on 
individual accountability by the DOJ.   
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More recently, the Criminal Finances Act 2017 came into force and, similar to the 
Bribery Act, introduced an offence of the failure to prevent facilitation of tax evasion.  If a 
person “associated with” the relevant company commits the offence, the company will be 
vicariously liable.
862
  Just like the Bribery Act, the Criminal Finances Act provides for a 
defence where, at the time of the offence, the company had in force “reasonable 
prevention procedures.”863  Thus, it would appear that the government is moving away 
from the “directing mind” doctrine and imposing strict liability on companies accused of 
facilitating tax evasion, unless they can demonstrate that they had adequate prevention 
procedures in place.   
 
Notably, the broad principles of corporate liability in general and the vast literature 




(iii) Application of the foregoing principles to MDBs’ sanctions procedures  
 
While the Principles’ general stance towards the sanctioning of companies that 
employ sanctioned respondents is in line with the ethos of the FCPA and the UK Bribery 
Act, MDBs’ sanctions regimes would benefit from greater clarity in this area.  In 
particular, without further clarification, the “failure to supervise” could incentivise 
companies to argue that they had properly supervised their employees, but that the 
employees acted “rogue” in committing a sanctionable practice. 
 
To that end, two distinct bases of liability emerge as an option for MDBs’ 
sanctions regimes: (i) the vicarious liability under the FCPA and (ii) the strict liability 
under the UK Bribery Act.  As is generally the case with all options, each of the two has 
its advantages and disadvantages.  Specifically, under the vicarious liability doctrine, a 
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company would be liable for a sanctionable practice of its culpable employee if he/she 
acted within the scope of his/her employment and with the intent to benefit the company. 
 
One of the main problems with vicarious liability is that an individual who 
commits wrongful acts could simultaneously be held individually responsible for them.  
Arguably, this can give the appearance of scapegoating, particularly if it is the company’s 
culture (which is set by the management) that condones or even encourages corrupt 
practices.
865
   This was recently evidenced in the context of the 2012 LIBOR scandal, 
which arose out of the banking culture that prioritises profit ad rewards employees who 
achieve profits through risky behaviour, as a result of which only individual traders were 
prosecuted, rather than the senior management.   The risk of relying solely on impersonal 
corporate liability is that corporate sanctions are ineffective in eliciting a sufficient 
corporate response to non-compliance by simply replacing management without 
addressing the underlying problem.  Therefore, in addition to imposing a sanction on a 
company for a sanctionable practice committed by its employees, a vicarious liability 
regime should also emphasise the strong behavioural influence of corporate management 
and adequate procedures to prevent misconduct.
866
   
 
By contrast, the regime that holds companies strictly liable for sanctionable 
practices committed by employees undermines the companies’ ability to deter corporate 
misconduct, because it would hold companies liable for sanctionable practices committed 
by their employees within the scope of employment, regardless of the efforts and 
resources mobilised by the company.
867
  For example, a company that has detected 
misconduct could report it and cooperate with the authorities; however, by doing so, the 
company should expect to be convicted for its employees’ wrongdoing.868   
 
In order to avoid companies being caught on the horns of such dilemma, the UK 
Bribery Act gives companies a full defence if they can demonstrate that they had adequate 
procedures in place to prevent their employees’ misconduct, thus practically turning the 
strict liability standard into a negligence standard.  This approach, however, is also 
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problematic because what constitutes “adequate procedures” will depend on the unique 
risks and challenges of each organisation, and, despite the UK government’s broad-brush 
guidelines on the indicia of adequate procedures, law enforcement authorities, let alone 
MDBs, are not necessarily best placed to determine whether a company’s procedures 
adequately address the risks presented.  In addition, the company is best placed to argue 
why its systems work despite the violation that occurred, while in fact, the occurrence of a 
violation should serve as an indicator that the company’s procedures could be 
improved.
869
  Moreover, offering companies complete exoneration from liability if they 
have put “adequate procedures” in place may also incentivise companies to focus on 
adopting measures that are easily demonstrable to the authorities, such as elaborate 
policies and formal trainings, rather than focusing on adopting the most effective measures, 
such as the creation of the culture of integrity from the top.
870
   
 
Additionally, it has been suggested that compliance programmes are not sufficient 
in and of themselves, and that companies need to do such additional measures as: (i) 
reforming compensation/promotion/retention policies to ensure that they encourage 
productivity without also encouraging misconduct, (ii) self-reporting all detected 
misconduct, and (iii) fully cooperating by investigating the wrongdoing and turning over 
all materials to the enforcement authorities.  Otherwise, arguably, regimes that exonerate 
companies from liability if they have an effective compliance programme do not provide 
companies with needed incentives to self-report, fully cooperate or take other actions to 




In light of the above, it might be better for the existence of effective procedures to 
be considered as a mitigating factor in assessing the appropriate sanction that should be 
imposed, rather than a full defence, as under the UK Bribery Act.  Thus, a desirable MDBs’ 
system for holding companies liable for sanctionable practices committed by their 
employees should deter companies from engaging in sanctionable practices while 
motivating them to effectively exercise control over their employees.  This could be 
achieved by a hybrid  system  that  would start off with strict liability (i.e., holding 
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companies strictly liable for sanctionable practices committed by their employees in the 
scope of employment, even if the company did all it reasonably could to prevent the 
wrongdoing), while rewarding  companies – through the use of mitigating factors – for 
measurable actions to prevent the occurrence of sanctionble practices, as well as for 
voluntarily self-reporting and cooperating with the investigation.  Only where a company 
could show that there was no failure to supervise and that appropriate measures were taken 
as soon as the wrongdoing was discovered, could this lead to further mitigating factors and 
possibly even provide grounds for exculpation.  Such measures would also need to be 
accompanied by self-reporting and cooperation with the investigation; otherwise, if 
companies were protected from liability on the grounds of having an effective compliance 
programme, this would not create incentives for companies to self-report and fully 
cooperate. 
 
MDBs could also provide some guidance on how to determine whether a 
company’s compliance system was adequately designed and implemented.  A good 
example is the FCPA Resource Guide (the “FCPA Resource Guide”) by the DOJ and the 
Securities Exchange Commission (the “SEC”), which describes the ten “hallmarks of 
effective compliance program”, which include: (i) commitment from senior management 
and a clearly articulated policy against corruption; (ii) clear, concise and accessible code 
of conduct and compliance policies and procedures; (iii) proper authority, autonomy from 
management and adequate resources by the responsible manager; (iv) risk-based approach, 
with greater focus on high-risk areas than on low-risk markets; (v) local language training, 
with web-based or in-person delivery, tailored to particular jobs and situations with 
relevant hypotheticals; (vi) incentives and disciplinary measures, where staff are rewarded 
for ethics and compliance leadership and disciplinary measures for misconduct; (vii) due 
diligence of agents, consultants and distributors, which entails: (a) understanding the 
parties’ qualifications and associations, (b) understanding the business rationale for 
including them in the transaction, and (c) undertaking ongoing monitoring; (viii) reporting 
mechanism that allow for confidentiality and protect against retaliation; (ix) regular 
review and improvements of the compliance programme; and (x) in the context of mergers 
and acquisitions, a robust FCPA due diligence of the target company and prompt 
224 
 
integration of the acquired company into the acquiring company’s internal controls, 
including its compliance programme.
872
 
D.  Liability of a parent for its subsidiaries’ wrongdoings 
 
The typical corporate group includes one or more parent companies that hold a 
majority or controlling equity interest in one or more subsidiaries, which together function 
as a single economic enterprise, often with a common public identity.
873
  Regardless of 
how the boundaries of the corporate group are defined, each subsidiary within the 
corporate group enjoys separate legal personality from its shareholder parent.  More often 
than not, however, the decision to form a subsidiary, as opposed to an internal division 
within a company, is driven by tax, regulatory or managerial factors.
874
  A corporate 
group’s organisational structure is therefore not an accurate indicator of the group’s 
economic organisation or actual decision-making authority within the group.  In an equity-
based corporate group, one or more parent entities generally exercise control of 
subsidiaries through voting control, which often, but not always, corresponds to the parent 
entity’s financial stake.875   The parent(s) also exercise(s) direct or indirect control of 
subsidiary management through operational integration, overlapping directors and officers, 
or contractual means.
876
  A significant equity stake in a higher-tier subsidiary may be 
enough to convey effective control over lower-tier subsidiaries, which may be wholly 




The following sections analyse the liability of a parent company for its subsidiaries’ 
wrongdoing under the US and UK law, and make suggestions for enhancements of the 
Principles. 
 
 (i) US law 
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(a) General approach 
 
With respect to piercing the corporate veil from subsidiary to parent, it has been 
suggested that the “traditional ‘piercing’ jurisprudence rests on a demonstration of three 
fundamental elements: (1) the subsidiary’s lack of independent existence; (2) the 
fraudulent, inequitable, or wrongful use of the corporate form; and (3) a causal 
relationship to the claimant’s loss.  Unless each of these three elements has been shown, 
courts have traditionally held “piercing” unavailable.”878   
 
The first element contemplates a lack of real-world existence of the subsidiary 
resulting from an exercise by the parent of such a high degree of control over the affairs of 
the subsidiary that it is reduced to a “mere agency” of the parent, comparable to a 
division.
879
 The second element is a use by the parent of the subsidiary for an improper 
purpose that amounts to an abuse of the privilege of carrying on business as a 
corporation.
880
 The final factor requires a claimant to show a causal connection between 
the defendant’s wrongful act and the injury sustained by the claimant. 
 
Unfortunately, it does not seem that the tests used by courts to determine the 
existence of these elements are entirely clear.  Namely, the application of these tests often 
consists largely of lists that courts recite, which has resulted in a number of overlapping 
lists of factors that are passed off as tests.
881
  For example, in Victoria Elevator C. v 
Meridian Grain Co, the court listed the following factors: (1) insufficient capitalisation for 
purposes of corporate undertaking, (2) failure to observe corporate formalities, (3) non-
payment of dividends, (4) insolvency of debtor corporation at time of transaction in 
question, (5) siphoning of funds by dominant shareholder, (6) non-functioning of other 
officers and directors, (7) absence of corporate records, and (8) existence of corporation as 
merely a façade for individual dealings.
882
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Scholars have suggested that “[t]his is one of the most unsatisfactory areas of the 
law. With hundreds of irreconcilable decisions and shifting rationales, it functions in an 
almost inscrutable manner behind conclusory metaphors such as ‘mere instrumentality’, 
‘sham’, ‘adjunct’, ‘agent’, ‘alter ego’, ‘puppet’ or dozens of similarly murky terms.”883  
Specifically, courts have held a parent company liable for the actions of a subsidiary 
pursuant to the regulatory policies of the Federal Water Pollution Prevention and Control 
Act,
884
 the Robinson-Patman Act (the anti-price discrimination law),
885
 the Federal Trade 
Commission Act,
886
 and the Commodity Exchange Act,
887
 among others.  However, they 
have not used a single test; rather, federal regulatory policies have resulted in a broad 
range of tests used, with courts often citing public interest concerns as key in their 
determination of whether a parent company should be found liable for the acts of its 
subsidiaries.  Thus, for example, in P.F. Collier & Son Corp. v F.T.C., which concerned 
the Federal Trade Commission Act, the court held:  
 
“Manifestly, where the public interest is involved, as it is in the enforcement of Section 5 
of the Federal Trade Commission Act, a strict adherence to common law principles is not 
required in the determination of whether a parent should be held for the acts of its 
subsidiary, where strict adherence would enable the corporate device to be used to 
circumvent the policy of the statute.”888 
 
The court found the following factors relevant in finding the parent’s liability: the 
parent not only wholly-owned the relevant subsidiaries, but also (i) interchanged personnel 
with its subsidiaries and maintained common or overlapping officers and directors; (ii) 
operated through its subsidiaries, which were often created and dissolved for purposes 
unrelated to the business carried on by the corporate complex; and (iii) approved the use 
by its subsidiaries of the parent's name and goodwill in order to develop favourable public 
associations between the parent and its subsidiaries. 
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(b) Criminal liability, including FCPA 
 
 The problem of establishing the criminal liability of a parent company for criminal 
acts of its subsidiary is that many economic crimes require a mental element (such as an 
intention to commit an offence or mens rea).  Nonetheless, federal law permits 
prosecution of the parent if it exercises sufficient control over the subsidiary under the 
same respondeat superior doctrine described in section C(i) above.  Thus, just as a 
corporation may be responsible for the criminal acts of its employees when they act for the 
corporation, so is subsidiary sometimes treated as the legal agent of the parent.
889
   
 
Specifically, under the agency theory of liability, a parent may be liable for the acts 
of its subsidiary because the subsidiary’s employees are considered either agents or sub-
agents of the parent.
890
 A subsidiary’s employee may become the parent’s agent if the 
parent has taken some demonstrable step that effectively authorises that employee to act as 
the parent’s agent for the type of activity in which the illegal conduct occurred.  
Alternatively, under the vicarious liability doctrine, a subsidiary could be viewed as the 
parent’s agent when the illegal conduct occurred.891 
 
Under the mere instrumentality or unity of business theory of liability, a parent 
may be held liable for its subsidiary’s misconduct when the parent uses the subsidiary to 
violate the law and does not treat the subsidiary as a separate entity.
892
   Courts consider 
several factors in determining whether to impute the actions of a subsidiary to its parent, 
including whether: the parent and subsidiary have common officers and directors; the 
parent and subsidiary have consolidated financial statements; the subsidiary is grossly 
undercapitalised; the parent finances the subsidiary; the subsidiary receives only the 
parent’s business; the parent uses the subsidiary’s property as its own; the daily operations 
of the parent and subsidiary are not separate (for example, both companies are located in 
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the same building and use the same equipment); and the parent and subsidiary fail to 




However – and this is particularly relevant in the context of MDBs’ sanctions 
regimes – authorities have been quick to hold parent companies liable for their 
subsidiaries’ violations of the FCPA.   In that context, in the FCPA Resource Guide 
provides the following guidance: 
 
“There are two ways in which a parent company may be liable for bribes paid by its 
subsidiary. First, a parent may have participated sufficiently in the activity to be directly 
liable for the conduct—as, for example, when it directed its subsidiary’s misconduct or 
otherwise directly participated in the bribe scheme. 
 
Second, a parent may be liable for its subsidiary’s conduct under traditional agency 
principles. The fundamental characteristic of agency is control.   Accordingly, DOJ and 
SEC evaluate the parent’s control—including the parent’s knowledge and direction of 
the subsidiary’s actions, both generally and in the context of the specific transaction— 
when evaluating whether a subsidiary is an agent of the parent.   
 
Although the formal relationship between the parent and subsidiary is important in this 
analysis, so are the practical realities of how the parent and subsidiary actually interact.  If 
an agency relationship exists, a subsidiary’s actions and knowledge are imputed to its 
parent.  Moreover, under traditional principles of respondeat superior, a company is liable 
for the acts of its agents, including its employees undertaken within the scope of their 
employment and intended, at least in part, to benefit the company.  Thus, if an agency 
relationship exists between a parent and a subsidiary, the parent is liable for bribery 
committed by the subsidiary’s employees.” 
894
  (emphasis added)  
 
 Case law suggests that the standard is rather low for the SEC to determine that a 
parent company controlled a subsidiary for purposes of finding that the parent company 
should be liable for its subsidiary’s FCPA violation.  For example, in 2014, the SEC found 
Alcoa Inc. liable for corrupt practices of its subsidiaries under agency principles.  In 
determining that Alcoa’s subsidiaries were agents of the parent company, the SEC 
considered the following factors: First, Alcoa appointed the majority of seats on a 
Strategic Council that provided “direction and counsel” to the subsidiaries.  Second, Alcoa 
and a subsidiary transferred personnel between them.  Third, Alcoa set the business and 
financial goals for the subsidiaries and coordinated their legal, audit, and compliance 
functions.  Fourth, the subsidiaries’ employees managing the business with the company 
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involved in the corrupt scheme (Alba) reported functionally to Alcoa officials.  Fifth, Alba 
was a significant Alcoa customer.  Sixth, members of Alcoa senior management met with 
Alba officials and a consultant involved in the scheme to discuss matters related to the 
Alba relationship.  Seventh, Alcoa officials were aware that the consultant was the 
subsidiaries’ agent and that the terms of related contracts were reviewed and approved by 
senior Alcoa managers.895 
 
 The first five factors relate to the parent company’s influence over the subsidiaries 
generally and not in connection with the alleged wrongdoing.  The sixth and seventh 
factors are described quite neutrally, and there does not seem to be any indicia of Alcoa’s 
management taking inappropriate actions with respect to the consultant in question.  If 
these factors suffice to establish parent liability under the FCPA, many subsidiaries are 
likely to be considered parent company’s “agents.”896 
 
Similarly, in February, 2016, the SEC found SciClone Pharmaceuticals, Inc., a 
California-based company liable for its Chinese subsidiary’s FCPA violation.  In finding 
that SciClone controlled its subsidiary, the SEC noted that:  
 
“SciClone directs the relevant operations of SPIL and its subsidiaries and oversees SPIL’s 
operations through various means including through the appointment of directors and 
officers of SPIL, review and approval of its annual budget, business and financial goals, 
and oversight of its legal, audit, and compliance functions.  SciClone also reviews and 
approves annual marketing and promotion budgets of SPIL and its subsidiaries. During 
relevant periods, some SciClone officers also served as officers and/or directors of SPIL, 
travelled frequently to China to participate in the management of SPIL.”897 
 
These factors also appear quite neutral and do not entail any pleading by the parent 
company in the subsidiaries’ FCPA violations. 
 
 Finally, in November 2016, the SEC found JPMorgan liable for the FCPA 
violation of its Chinse subsidiary JPMorgan APAC, which was found to have won 
business from clients and corruptly influenced government officials in the Asia-Pacific 
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region by giving jobs and internships to their relatives and friends.
898
  Even though the 
SEC recognised that “JPMorgan APAC employees failed to follow the firm’s internal 
accounting controls, … and took steps to hide the magnitude and purpose of the Client 
Referral Program from others within the firm, and devised a way to avoid having certain 
Referral Hires in APAC counted within JPMorgan APAC’s internal year-end headcount 
calculations”, it still found JPMorgan liable because it “failed to devise and maintain a 
system of internal accounting controls around its hiring practices sufficient to provide 
reasonable assurances that its employees were not bribing foreign officials in 
contravention of company policy.”899  Thus, it would appear that inadequate proceedings 
for the prevention of the FCPA activities will result in the parent company’s liability, 
without the SEC necessarily finding the parent company’s knowledge of the subsidiary’s 
actions. 
  
(c) Proposals for reforms of the US system 
 
It has been suggested that the test for finding the existence of an enterprise should 
have at its basis an enquiry of economic control, focusing on the integration of parent and 
subsidiary companies to pursue one economic purpose.
900
  In that context, the relevant 
enquiries might include whether: (1) the subsidiary exists in order to further the economic 
goals of the parent, (2) the corporate group presents itself to the public as a unified 
enterprise through, for example, common logos, policies and guiding principles, (3) the 
two companies are functionally part of the same business and, most importantly, (4) the 
subsidiary was created or is utilised to advance business goals of the parent company, in 
order to essentially externalise the parent company’s risk.901  Each of these questions is 
aimed at determining the functional economic integration of the two companies.  
 
 Still, the problem with trying to determine the functional economic integration of 
the two companies and elements of the parent company’s control over subsidiary is that, 
the further down the chain we are, the more difficult it becomes to establish the elements 
of control, which points to the deficiencies of the control/agency theory.   
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Basing her findings on several international corporate liability regimes, Dearborn 
thus advocates that the company should bear the burden in disproving the existence of an 
enterprise, without the claimant having to prove the economic structure of the corporate 
group.
902
  Therefore, once the claimant demonstrates to the court that it was harmed by an 
activity of the corporate group and that the parent and subsidiary were both members of 
that group, the company should have to prove that it is not part of an economic enterprise.  
The main reason for this shifting of the burden of proof is that the parent company has 
better access to information about the internal structure of the group than the claimant.
903
  
While this seems logical, merely looking at the corporate structure without considering 
other factors, such as, for example, control and operational arrangements, is quite a 
simplistic approach, which has been criticised by the UK courts, as described in 
continuation.   
   
(ii) UK law 
 
(a) General approach 
 
The fundamental principle in the UK is that “each company in a group of 
companies is a separate legal entity possessed of separate legal rights and liabilities.”904  
However, courts have developed certain exceptions for finding a parent company liable 
for its subsidiaries’ actions.  Thus, in a landmark corporate law case, Adams v Cape 
Industries plc, in which an English company was sued for the actions of one of its 
subsidiaries in South Africa, the court set forth three main grounds for veil piercing: (1) a 
single economic unit, when a group of companies should be treated as a single economic 
entity; (2) special circumstances that point to subsidiaries being a mere façade to the true 




 In this particular case, the court rejected all three grounds.  More specifically, with 
respect to a single economic entity, the court established that corporate veil should not be 
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pierced just because a group of companies operated as a single economic unit.  The court 
pointed out that: 
 
“the court is [not] entitled to lift the corporate veil as against a defendant company which 
is the member of a corporate group merely because the corporate structure has been used 
so as to ensure that the legal liability (if any) in respect of particular future activities of the 
group (and correspondingly the risk of enforcement of that liability) will fall on another 
member of the group rather than the defendant company. Whether or not this is desirable, 
the right to use a corporate structure in this manner is inherent in our corporate law.”906 
 
Further, the court accepted that the veil could be lifted if the subsidiary was a mere 
façade concealing the true facts, but did not find that this applied to the company at hand.   
Similarly, the court did not find any evidence of the agency relationship, given that the 
subsidiaries were independent and with no general power to bind the parent, and held that 
such an agency relationship can be established only where there was an express agency 
agreement between the companies.   
  
Despite this apparent tendency of UK courts to strictly follow the separate legal 
personality and limited liability doctrine laid down in Salomon, as described in 
continuation, the more recent cases, particularly in connection with personal injury, 
criminal liability and the UK Bribery Act violations, suggest a greater tendency to hold 
parent companies liable for their subsidiaries’ illegal actions.   
 
(b) Tort liability 
 
Establishing liability of a parent company for its subsidiaries’ actions is 
particularly acute in tort cases, where tort victims are unable to predict in advance the 
likelihood or nature of the loss or injury they suffer, and so are unable to protect 
themselves by means of insurance or alleviate the harm they have suffered in any other 
way.
907
  If tort victims were unable to claim against the parent company, parent companies 
could simply limit tort liabilities to certain companies in the group and thereby insulate the 
rest of the group from actual and potential liabilities.   
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In HRH Emere Godwin Bebe Okpabi and Others v Royal Dutch Shell PLC and 
Shell Petroleum Development Company of Nigeria, this case proceedings were brought 
Royal Dutch Shell plc (“RDS”), the ultimate holding company of the Shell Group, and its 
subsidiary, Shell Petroleum Development Company of Nigeria Ltd (“SPDC”). The 
claimants were seeking damages arising as a result of ongoing pollution and 
environmental damage caused by oil spills.  The court considered several precedents on 
this issue and said that the starting point was the Caparo Industries Plc v Dickman case 
and its “three ingredients”: foreseeability, proximity and reasonableness.908  The court 
further noted that in the landmark case, Chandler v Cape plc, the Court of Appeal had 
stated that in appropriate circumstances the law may impose on a parent company 
responsibility for the health and safety of its subsidiary’s employees. Those circumstances 
included situations where: 
(1) the businesses of the parent and subsidiary were in a relevant respect the same;  
(2) the parent had, or ought to have had, superior knowledge on some relevant aspect 
of health and safety in the particular industry 
(3) the subsidiary’s system of work was unsafe as the parent company knew, or ought 
to have known; and 
(4) the parent knew or ought to have foreseen that the subsidiary or its employees 
would rely on its using that superior knowledge for the employees’ protection.909 
 
Thus, the imposition of a duty of care in such cases will require a claimant to demonstrate 
more than general manifestation of a group identity.   
 
On the facts of the case, the court found that none of the factors from the Chandler 
case were present in the relations between RDC and SPDC, because RDC was an 
investment holding company, with only a very superficial view of the business of this 
indirectly-held and highly-autonomous subsidiary.
910
  The court also found that the 
subsidiary’s knowledge was more specialist than the parent’s and the subsidiary was not 
relying on the parent for any expertise.
911
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 Most recently, in VTB Capital plc v Nutritek International Corp, the Court of 
Appeal echoed the principle relating to piercing the corporate veil that had been set out in 
the judgment of Faiza Ben Hashem v Shayit by finding that if the court is to pierce the 
veil, it is necessary to show both control of the company by the wrongdoer and 
impropriety in the sense of a misuse of the company as a device or façade to conceal 
wrongdoing.
912
  Similarly, in Prest v Petrodel Resources Limited and Others, the court 
held that piercing of the corporate veil is appropriate only if the corporate structure had 




(c) Criminal liability, including UK Bribery Act 
 
 As in the US, the problem of establishing the criminal liability of a parent 
company for criminal acts of its subsidiary is that many economic crimes require a mental 
element (such as an intention to commit an offence or mens rea), and there is an inherent 
difficulty in establishing corporate criminal liability for such offences to attribute a human 
state of mind, such as intention, to a company.”914 
 
In recent years, two important pieces of legislation have sought to overcome the 
historical difficulty of establishing corporate criminal liability by creating specific 
corporate offences: (1) corporate manslaughter (Corporate Manslaughter and Corporate 
Homicide Act 2007 (“CMCHA”)) and (2) failure to prevent bribery (Bribery Act 2010), 
the latter being particularly relevant for MDBs’ sanctions regimes.915   
 
Under the CMCHA, an organisation is guilty of an offence if the way in which its 
activities are managed or organised (i) causes a person’s death and (ii) amounts to a gross 
breach of a relevant duty of care owed by the organisation to the deceased.
916
  Section 8 of 
the CMCHA allows the jury to consider the attitudes, policies, systems or accepted 
practices that were likely to have encouraged the breach or produced a tolerance of it.   
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As described in section B(ii) above, under section 7 of the UK Bribery Act, a 
company is liable for the offence of failing to prevent bribery.  Similar to the FCPA, 
section 7 of the Bribery Act says that a company is guilty of an offence if a person 
associated with it bribes another person intending to obtain or retain business for the 
organisation.  The Ministry of Justice’s Guidance on the Bribery Act clarifies the scope of 
parent company’s liability for its subsidiaries’ violations as follows: 
 
“Even if it can properly be said that an agent, a subsidiary, or another person acting for a 
member of a joint  venture, was performing services for the organisation, an offence will 
be committed only if that agent, subsidiary or person intended to obtain or retain business 
or an advantage in the conduct of business for the organisation. The fact that an 
organisation benefits indirectly from a bribe is very unlikely, in itself, to amount to proof 
of the specific intention required by the offence. Without proof of the required intention, 
liability will not accrue through simple corporate ownership or investment, or through the 
payment of dividends or provision of loans by a subsidiary to its parent. So, for example, a 
bribe on behalf of a subsidiary by one of its employees or agents will not automatically 
involve liability on the part of its parent company, or any other subsidiaries of the parent 
company, if it cannot be shown the employee or agent intended to obtain or retain business 
or a business advantage for the parent company or other subsidiaries. This is so even 
though the parent company or subsidiaries may benefit indirectly from the bribe. By the 
same token, liability for a parent company could arise where a subsidiary is the ‘person’ 
which pays a bribe which it intends will result in the parent company obtaining or 
retaining business or vice versa.”917  
Clearly, the mere fact of a parent and subsidiary relationship will not automatically 
result in the finding that the subsidiary is performing services for and on behalf of the 
parent.  Rather, it will be necessary to demonstrate that the subsidiary acted with the 
intention of obtaining an advantage for the parent.  This is a higher standard than that 
applied by the SEC, as described above.  The SFO managed to demonstrate this in its first 
conviction under section 7, when in 2016 it convicted Sweett Group PLC (a UK-based 
company) for the offence of failing to prevent its subsidiary from paying bribes on its 
behalf in the Middle East.  Sweett was unable to rely on the defence of having adequate 
procedures in place to prevent bribery.
918
 
Section 7 liability is not limited to a parent company. As illustrated by the SFO 
first deferred prosecution agreement with Standard Bank PLC, it can also extend to other 
companies within the corporate group.  In that case, Standard Bank’s Tanzanian sister 
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company, Stanbic Bank Tanzania was charged with bribing a local partner in Tanzania to 
induce members of the government to favour Stanbic’s private placement proposal.  
However, given that both sister companies stood to benefit from the transaction (with the 
fee split 50/50), and were acting jointly (with different but complementary roles), the 
employees and the Tanzanian company were regarded as associated persons of the UK 
company and their bribery act regarded as benefitting both companies.
919
 
In conclusion, where corporate groups are involved, Salomon remains the starting 
point in UK courts.  However, courts have been more willing to lift the veil recently, 
especially where personal injury or criminal liability is involved.  This seems fair, as 
otherwise shareholders would enjoy double protection: through the doctrine of corporate 
personality established under Salomon and the high threshold of the “directing mind” test.
  
 
(iii)   Application of the foregoing principles to MDBs’ sanctions procedures 
 
As described in section A above, the Principles recommend that sanctions be 
applied to a respondent’s parent company if the parent company was involved in the 
sanctioned misconduct, including as a result of wilful blindness and failure to supervise.  
Both concepts are problematic and require further guidance: Wilful blindness itself is quite 
a fluid concept and, as described above, jurisdictions vary in the information that may be 
considered to infer the parent’s guilt.920   As with the “failure to supervise” employees, 
described in section B above, the “failure to supervise” a subsidiary could easily 
incentivise companies to argue that they had properly supervised their subsidiaries, but 
that the employees of the relevant subsidiary acted “rogue” in committing a sanctionable 
practice.  Thus, it would be important to distinguish between the parent’s culpability based 
on the actual knowledge and deliberate participation in the wrongdoing, on the one hand, 
and organisational responsibility, on the other hand, which may arise from a failure to 
supervise or to maintain adequate controls or ethical culture within the corporate group, 
such that the wrongdoing is made possible.  The former should result in a sanction, 
although knowledge will obviously thin out the longer the chain of entities between the 
parent company and the ultimate subsidiary becomes.  Each analysis of the relationship 
between the parent and the subsidiary will be fact-specific and MDBs could take guidance 
                                                     
919
 See SFO v Standard Bank, Royal Courts of Justice, PLC Case No: U20150854 (30 November 2015). 
920
 See Fletcher N. Baldwin Jr. and Daniel Ryan Koslosky: Mission Creep in National Security Law,  
114 W. Va. L. Rev. 669 (2012), at 689. 
237 
 
from the FCPA Resource Guide and the US case law regarding the factors considered in 
determining the level of the parent’s control.  The greater such control, the easier it will be 
to establish that a subsidiary’s misconduct was intended to benefit the parent company, if 
one is also to apply the above-described UK Ministry of Justice’s Guidance. 
 
On the other hand, mere responsibility should not normally lead to debarment, but 
instead to conditional non-debarment.  Under this sanction, the parent company would not 
be debarred, but would have to comply with certain conditions and report on its 
compliance to the MDB for a period of time.  This way, an MDB could require that 
companies develop and implement effective anti-corruption compliance systems as a 
condition of non-debarment, which would allow the MDB to help a company reform its 
controls, and at the same time avoid imposing a sanction that may have draconian 
consequences for the company, the market, the project, and the community at large.
921
  As 
described in section C(iii) above, the FCPA Resource Guide lists some useful factors to 
determine the adequacy of a company’s compliance programme. 
 
E.  Liability of a subsidiary for its parent’s wrongdoings 
 
 (i) US and EU sanctions regimes 
  
As noted above, the Principles state a rebuttable presumption that sanctions should 
be applied to all entities controlled by the respondent, unless the respondent demonstrates 
that the entities are free of responsibility for the misconduct, application to the entities 
would be disproportional and is not reasonably necessary to prevent evasion.  Interestingly, 
MDBs seem to follow slightly different guidelines on what constitutes “control.”  For 
example,  ADB’s Integrity Principles and Guidelines say that, in determining interest or 
control, the investigators will consider, among other things, “the degree of association, 
proximity of the sanctioned party and the similarity of business activities or operations 
with the sanctioned party.”922  EBRD’s Enforcement Policy and Procedures say that the 
indicia of “control” include, but are not limited to, the possession, directly or indirectly, of 
the power to direct or cause the direction of the management and policies of another entity, 
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whether through the ownership of voting shares, by contract or otherwise.”923  Finally, the 
WB’s Information Note says that the indicia of “control” include, but are not limited to, 
interlocking management or ownership, identity of interests among family members, 
shared facilities and equipment, common use of employees, or a business entity organised 
following the imposition of a sanction that has the same or similar management, 




When considering further guidance on imposing a sanction on the respondent’s 
subsidiaries, it is worth analysing the US and UK economic sanctions.  In that context, the 
US Treasury Department’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (“OFAC”) applies the “50% 
rule”, pursuant to which any company that is owned 50% or more by a blocked person or 
entity, is blocked even if the company itself is not on the OFAC list of sanctioned 
parties.
925
    
 
Further, OFAC aggregates the ownership interests of sanctioned parties when 
determining whether the 50% rule applies.  For example, if a Blocked Person X owns 25% 
of Entity A and a Blocked Person Y also owns 25% of Entity A, then Entity A is blocked, 
because it is owned 50% or more in the aggregate by blocked persons.  Aggregation 
applies even if Person X and Person Y are blocked under different sanctions 
programmes.
926
  In addition, the application of the 50% rule to indirect ownership interests 
will result in a cascade-down effect.  For example, if Blocked Person X owns 50% of 





Notably, however, the US sanctions apply only through ownership, and not 
through control, of entities, as is the case with the EU sanctions and MDBs’ sanctions.928  
Similarly, the US Bank Holding Company Act provides for a rebuttable presumption of 
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control if a parent or holding company holds 25% of the voting shares of another company, 
controls the election of the company’s directors, or retains the ability to control the 
management or policies of the company.
929
  Likewise, the Savings and Loan Holding 
Company Amendments Act provides for a rebuttable presumption of control if the parent 
or controlling company holds 25% of the subsidiary’s voting shares.930  This approach is 
curious, given that FAR, on the other hand, applies to “affiliates”, which as described in 
Chapter 1 above, are determined through control, and control is a question of fact.  FAR 
says that the indicia of “control” include, but are not limited to, interlocking management 
or ownership, identity of interests among family members, shared facilities and equipment, 
common use of employees, or a business entity organised following the debarment, 
suspension, or proposed debarment of a contractor which has the same or similar 
management, ownership, or principal employees as the contract or that was debarred, 




 By contrast, the EU Regulation 833/2014, as amended by Regulation 960/2014 
(“Regulation 960”) mandates that EU persons are prohibited from transacting with an 
entity that is 50% or more owned by a sanctioned party (which is the same as the OFAC 
rule), or “controlled” by such party (which is in addition to the OFAC rule).  The indicia 
of control are:  
 
 (a)  having the right or exercising the power to appoint or remove a majority of 
the members of the administrative, management or supervisory body of a company; 
 
(b)  having appointed solely as a result of the exercise of one’s voting rights a 
majority of the members of the administrative, management or supervisory bodies of a 
company who have held office during the present and previous financial year; 
 
(c)  controlling alone, pursuant to an agreement with other shareholders in or 
members of a legal person or entity, a majority of shareholders' or members' voting rights 
in that legal person or entity; 
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(d)  having the right to exercise a dominant influence over a legal person or 
entity, pursuant to an agreement entered into with that legal person or entity, or to a 
provision in its memorandum or articles of association, where the law governing that legal 
person or entity permits its being subject to such agreement or provision; 
 
(e) having the power to exercise the right to exercise a dominant influence 
referred to in point (d), without being the holder of that right; 
 
(f) having the right to use all or part of the assets of a legal person or entity; 
 
(g) managing the business of a legal person or entity on a unified basis, while 
publishing consolidated accounts; and 
 
(h)  sharing jointly and severally the financial liabilities of a legal person or 
entity, or guaranteeing them. 
 
If any of these criteria are satisfied, it is considered that the legal person or entity is 





 (ii) Application of the foregoing principles to MDBs’ sanctions procedures 
 
 Despite the OFAC approach, there are numerous benefits to having “control” 
defined by actual control and not only a threshold share ownership.  Namely, a small, 
organised group of shareholders, whose combined ownership of shares exceeds 50% of 
the total number of shares is able to control a company by acting in concert.  Also, when 
share ownership is widely diffused among a large number of shareholders, control may be 
secured by owning 20% or less of the total shares.  Consequently, Regulation 960, 
together with its indicia of control seems to offer a more nuanced approach to determining 
true control of a subsidiary.   
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 Finally, with respect to the practical difficulties around the identification of 
subsidiaries covered by a sanction imposed on a respondent “and all of the entities 
controlled by it”, there are two possible solutions:  
 
(i) First, the creation of a comprehensive database of each of the entities that is 
sanctioned together with the exact names of all entities controlled by it, similar to the 
databases maintained by the OFAC and the European Commission.  In order to be 
meaningful, such database would have to be updated regularly in order to capture newly 
created subsidiaries, which would of course require additional resources. 
 
(ii) Second, whenever a company applies for a project financed by the relevant 
MDB (be it as a borrower, a contractor, sub-contractor, or in any other capacity in which it 
stands to benefit from such project), it should be asked to represent in the financing 
agreements that it is not a subsidiary of any of the entities sanctioned by that MDB.  
Obviously, this type of self-certification is not as robust as the actual checking of the 
database, but is less costly and provides a contractual remedy that could include clawback 
of funding or restitution.   
F.  Successor liability 
 
Companies acquire a number of liabilities when they merge with or acquire 
another company, including those arising from contracts, torts, regulations and statutes.  
Successor liability is an integral component of corporate law and, among other things, 
prevents companies from avoiding liability by reorganising.  What is often challenging, 
however, is determining whether the type of transaction through which one company 
acquired part or all of another company’s shares or assets renders the acquired company a 
“successor.”  Typically, an acquiring company will acquire a target company by one of the 
three transaction structures: a share purchase, a merger or an asset purchase.
933
  Very 
broadly speaking, in a share-purchase structure, the acquiring company purchases all, or at 
least a controlling interest in, the target company’s voting shares directly from the target’s 
shareholders, which means that the target company will become the acquiring company’s 
subsidiary, with the acquiring company effectively acquiring the target’s assets and 
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  In a merger, two companies combine to produce a single entity, with the 
surviving company becoming legally responsible for all liabilities of the constituent 
organisations.
935
  The successor liability analysis, however, becomes more complicated in 
the asset purchase structure, where the acquiring entity can selectively choose which 
assets and which, if any, liabilities it wants to acquire and where, consequently, it is more 
difficult to establish whether the acquiring entity should be considered the target’s 
“successor.” 
 
MDBs’ sanctions framework does not provide a definition of “successor”, and this 
was at the core of a recent WB Sanctions Board case, in which the Sanctions Board had to 
determine whether WB had committed an abuse of discretion in determining (in its 
previous decision) that the appellant entity was a successor to a sanctioned entity.  The 





In reaching this conclusion, the Sanctions Board sought guidance from the WB’s 
Legal Department on the definition of “successor”, which advised that the WB’s approach 
to successorship was based on a concept of economic successorship – specifically, 
whether the entity in question continues to carry out business operations of the sanctioned 
entity.
937
  To that end, the Sanctions Board considered the following factors: common 
business lines and business address, ownership and managerial connections, corporate 
relationship, assignment of legal and financial rights, and public understanding (which 
included consulting the government of the appellant’s domicile on their views as to 
whether the appellant is indeed the sanctioned company’s successor).938 
 
Clearly, MDBs would benefit from further guidance on successor liability.  The 
sections that follow consider successor liability rules in the US and the UK, and make 
recommendations for further guidance under the Principles in order to provide greater 
clarity 
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(i)  US law 
 
 The FCPA Resource Guide says that “[a]s a general legal matter, when a company 
merges or acquires another company, the successor company assumes the predecessor 
company’s liabilities.”939 Successor liability does not, however, create liability where none 
existed before: if, for example, an issuer were to acquire a foreign company that was not 
previously subject to the FCPA’s jurisdiction, the mere acquisition of that foreign 
company would not retroactively create FCPA liability for the acquiring issuer.
940
   
  
Despite this rule, however, an acquirer may try to avoid seller’s liabilities by 
structuring the acquisition as an asset purchase. Under both New York law and traditional 
common law, a company that purchases the assets of another company is generally not 
liable for the seller’s liabilities.  The policy rationale for this rule is quite straightforward: 
First, it appeals to fundamental notions of fairness, according to which “[n]o person 
should be bound by contractual obligations that they have not voluntarily assumed.”941  
Second, it increases certainty in the market-place and recognises the importance of the free 
alienability of property; an alternative broad rule of successor liability would have a 
“chilling effect on potential purchasers who might acquire the assets of a foreclosed 
business and find themselves liable for debts they never intended to assume.”942  However, 
there are four exceptions, and a buyer of a company’s assets will be liable as its successor 
if: (1) it expressly or impliedly assumed the predecessor’s tort liability, (2) the transaction 
is entered into fraudulently to escape such obligation, (3) there was a consolidation or 





 The first and second exceptions are straightforward: When an asset purchase 
agreement provides that the acquirer will assume certain liabilities, the acquirer will be 
responsible for them.  Similarly, when a company fraudulently transfers its assets to avoid 
its liabilities, courts will ignore the transaction and hold the successor responsible for the 
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company’s liabilities.944  The “de facto merger” and the “mere continuation” exceptions 
are closely related.  The formulations vary slightly by jurisdiction – for example, 
Delaware requires a transfer of all of the transferor’s assets and an assumption of all of its 
liabilities, in exchange for a payment made in the shares of the transferee directly.
945
  
Broadly speaking, however, these formulations typically involve elements or factors 
similar to the following: (1) continuity of shareholders and ownership, management, 
personnel, physical location and business operations; (2) whether sufficient consideration 
was given, particularly whether shares were given in exchange; (3) whether the 
predecessor ceased business operations and was dissolved shortly after the new company 
was formed; (4) whether the successor company paid any outstanding debts on behalf of 
the previous company in order to continue business without interruption; (5) the acquirer’s 
intent or purpose when the new company was formed; and (6) whether the successor held 
itself out to the public as a continuation of the previous company.
946
  These factors 
embody a policy that companies should not be able to avoid liability by simply changing 





 In addition to the four traditional exceptions, some US courts have recognised 
other exceptions, such as a “continuity of enterprise” exception, which makes liability 
easier to achieve than the “mere continuation” exception, because it considers whether 





 Commentators have suggested that the “patchwork system of successor liability” 
has left asset purchasers guessing at judicial outcomes due to inconsistent and conflicting 
rules.
949
  One of the proposed solutions is for a sale of substantially all of the assets to 
impose automatic liability on the acquiring company for the full extent of the seller’s 
liabilities.
950
 That way, the acquiring company would avoid potential liability under piece-
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meal theories of successor liability and would have certainty over which liabilities will 
stay and which will attach.
951
  Notably, there does not exist a clear standard on when a 
“substantially all” threshold has been met.  For example, in Katz v. Bregman, the 
Delaware Chancery Court held that a sale of assets that constituted 51% of the company’s 
total assets and generated about 45% of the net sales constituted the sale of substantially 
all assets.
952
 By contrast, in Hollinger Inc. v. Hollinger International Inc., the same court 
concluded that a sale of less than 60% did not meet the “substantially all” threshold, if the 
remaining assets were “quantitatively vital economic assets.”953 
 
 While there is no clear arithmetic test for determining how much is “substantially 
all”, the “substantially all” threshold should be determined on a case-by-case basis, by 
assessing, first, whether the asset in question constitutes most of the company’s assets and, 
even if the asset represents a small percentage of the company’s total assets, whether the 
sale will affect the company’s ability to carry out its corporate purpose. 
  
 (ii)  UK law 
  
 As in the US, in the UK, share acquisitions result in all assets and liabilities of the 
target company remaining with the target.  Unlike in the US, however, in the UK an asset 
purchase can effectively insulate the acquirer from liabilities it does not expressly assume, 
except with respect to employees.  Therefore, case law on successor liability in the UK 




Moreover, the SFO does not publish the equivalent of the DOJ/SEC FCPA 
Resource Guide, and there is no formal guidance from the SFO or the Ministry of Justice 
on successor liability.  Nevertheless, the UK Bribery Act offence for failing to prevent 
bribery subjects a company to strict liability where an “associated person” commits a 
bribery offense,
955
 where “associated person” means a person who performs services for 
or on behalf of the company.
956
 Consequently, an acquiring company that does not 
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implement an adequate compliance programme may find itself responsible for continuing 
misconduct of the target company even where it was unaware of its occurrence. 
 
(iii) Application of the foregoing principles to MDBs’ sanctions procedures 
 
From the above analysis, it appears clear that in share acquisitions, the successor 
assumes all liabilities of the target company.  Similarly, in the case of asset acquisitions, it 
would seem natural for the acquirer to be responsible for any liabilities it may have 
voluntarily assumed, as well as in the case where a company fraudulently transfers its 
assets.  It is less clear, however, whether MDBs should adopt the “de facto merger” and 
the mere continuation exceptions by analysing such factors as common business lines and 
business address, ownership and managerial connections and corporate relationship, as the 
WB Sanctions Board did.
957
  As described above, this is based on a “patchwork system of 
successor liability” of US courts, all of which seem to apply different criteria in their 
determinations.  Consequently, such analysis runs the risk of inconsistent and conflicting 
outcomes.   
 
Instead, MDBs could adopt a more uniform approach with a sale of substantially 
all of the assets resulting in automatic liability on the acquiring company for the full extent 
of the seller’s liabilities.  That way, the acquiring company would avoid potential liability 
under piece-meal theories of successor liability and would have some certainty over which 
liabilities will stay and which will attach.  The “substantially all” threshold would need to 
be determined on a case-by-case basis, by assessing, first, whether the asset in question 
constitutes most of the company’s assets and, even if the asset represents a small 
percentage of the company’s total assets, whether the sale will affect the company’s ability 
to carry out its corporate purpose. 
G.  Conclusion  
 
The preceding sections have analysed the treatment of corporate groups by 
examining analogous provisions in the US and the UK legislation, including the EU 
sanctions, and have proposed improvements to the Principles.  Specifically, MDBs’ 
sanctions regimes would benefit from greater clarity regarding a company’s liability for 
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sanctionable practices committed by its employees.  Such liability should start off with 
strict liability, while rewarding companies – through the use of mitigating factors – for 
measurable actions to prevent the occurrence of sanctionable practices, as well as for 
voluntarily self-reporting and cooperating with the investigation.  Only where a company 
could show that there was no failure to supervise and that appropriate measures were taken 
as soon as the wrongdoing was discovered, could this lead to further mitigating factors and 
possibly even provide grounds for exculpation.  Such measures would also need to be 
accompanied by self-reporting and cooperation with the investigation.  Moreover, MDBs 
would also benefit from further guidance on how to determine whether a company’s 
compliance system was adequately designed and implemented, and the FCPA Resource 
Guide could provide useful guidance in that respect. 
 
Further, as regards a company’s liability for sanctionable practices committed by 
its subsidiaries, MDBs’ sanctions regimes should go beyond the current “wilful blindness” 
and “failure to supervise” principles, which are quite vague, and instead should distinguish 
between the parent’s culpability based on the actual knowledge and deliberate 
participation in the wrongdoing, on the one hand, and organisational responsibility, on the 
other hand, which may arise from a failure to supervise or maintain adequate controls or 
ethical culture within the corporate group.  Unlike actual knowledge and deliberate 
participation, mere responsibility should not normally lead to debarment, but instead to 
conditional non-debarment, where the parent company would be required to develop and 
implement effective anti-corruption compliance systems as a condition of non-debarment.  
Just as in the case of its liability for the misconduct of its employees, a parent company 
should also be rewarded  – through the use of mitigating factors – for measurable actions 
to prevent the occurrence of sanctionable practices.   
 
 Additionally, as regards a company’s liability for sanctionable practices committed 
by its parent company, MDBs’ regime should be premised on the definition of “control”, 
based on the actual control and not only a threshold share ownership, which typifies the 
rather simplistic OFAC approach.  Such actual control can be ascertained by considering 
the indicia from the Regulation 960 – from the parent company’s right to appoint or 
remove a majority of the management or supervisory board members to having the right to 
exercise a dominant influence over the subsidiary pursuant to an agreement, rather than 




 Moreover, as regards successor liability, the Principles’ presumption that sanctions 
should be applied to successors and assigns should be supplemented with guidelines for 
determining whether a company is a sanctioned party’s successor or assign.  Such 
guidelines should stipulate that a share acquisition should result in the assumption of 
liabilities by the acquirer, while an asset acquisition should result in the assumption of 
liabilities by the acquirer with respect to the liabilities it voluntarily assumed, where the 
asset transfer was fraudulent or where the acquirer purchased substantially all assets of the 
target.  The “substantially all” threshold should be determined on a case-by-case basis, by 
assessing, first, whether the asset in question constitutes most of the company’s assets and, 
even if the asset represents a small percentage of the company’s total assets, whether the 
sale will affect the company’s ability to carry out its corporate purpose. 
 
Finally, sanctioning discrete business operations of the originally sanctioned entity 
is probably most meaningful in the context of settlement negotiations, where the 
respondent is fully cooperating with the investigators and may be expected to comply with 
the terms of the settlement agreement.  For example, if a company’s construction unit 
were to engage in a sanctionable practice, an MDB could negotiate a settlement with the 
company, such that the construction unit is debarred, but other company units in unrelated 
areas may still be eligible to benefit from the MDB-financed contracts.  Inevitably, this 
type of arrangement would seem appropriate under exceptional circumstances – for 
instance, if a respondent company proved that the relevant unit acted against the 





CONCLUSION AND WAY FORWARD 
 
 This thesis has provided a thorough analysis of MDBs’ sanctions regimes, starting 
with their origins, which are premised on MDBs’ duty to secure the confidence of donor 
governments that the proceeds of MDBs’ financings are used solely for the purposes for 
which they were granted.  Bearing in mind that the underlying objective of these regimes 
has been to develop an internal mechanism of law enforcement that targets sanctionable 
practices committed by those involved in the supply side of MDB-funded contracts, this 
thesis has first examined and compared their characteristics and differences across the five 
MDBs.  Against this background, this thesis has explored MDBs’ immunity from judicial 
review, which leaves little or no redress against MDBs’ decisions in courts, and thus raises 
questions about appropriate safeguards that should characterise MDBs’ sanctions regimes 
in order to ensure that the aggrieved parties are provided with adequate protections against 
any potentially unreasonable and arbitrary decisions on the part of MDBs.    
 
In order to prove the underlying hypothesis that this thesis set out to prove – that 
MDBs’ sanctions regimes should be characterised by robust due process rights and would 
benefit from substantial improvements in a number of areas, including respondents’ 
discovery rights, oral hearings and witnesses, publication of decisions, referrals to national 
authorities, the use of negotiated settlements, and the composition, appointment and 
independence of the Sanctions Board members, as well as the treatment of corporate 
groups – the thesis first determined the systems that should serve as the benchmarks for 
MDBs’ sanctions regimes.  In that context, the thesis has proposed possible sources of 
best practice standards for MDBs’ sanctions regimes, ranging from the US and UK 
judicial review standards, customary law and general principles, Global Administrative 
Law, the ECtHR case law, MDBs’ administrative tribunals’ jurisprudence and various 
international arbitration rules.  Extrapolating from, and drawing comparisons with, these 
regimes, the thesis has provided a number of suggestions for potential enhancements of 
MDBs’ sanctions regimes.   
Specifically, based on the examination of benchmark regimes, the thesis suggests 
that MDBs’ sanctions procedures should be strengthened with more robust rules on 
respondents’ discovery rights, assessment of evidence and treatment of experts’ reports.  
Moreover, MDBs’ sanctions procedures should allow Sanctions Boards to decide on 
whether to have a hearing, based on their determination of whether it has sufficient 
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evidence on the basis of the written proceedings to decide a case fairly.  The same 
principle should guide the Sanctions Boards’ decisions on whether to allow live witness 
testimony and cross-examination, depending on whether this is necessary to ensure a fair 
hearing of the respondent’s case.  Further, MDBs should publish reasoned decisions of 
both the Sanctions Boards and the first-tier decision-makers in contested cases, as this will 
increase transparency and provide a powerful incentive for all stakeholders in the 
sanctions process to maximise the quality of their work. 
 
The thesis further recommends that, in line with best practices among MDBs’ 
administrative tribunals, Sanctions Boards should be composed entirely of non-staff 
members in order to avoid any perception of Sanctions Board members’ partiality.  
Similarly, and also in line with best practices among MDBs’ administrative tribunals, as 
well as ICJ and ECtHR, the Sanctions Board members’ tenure should not be renewable, as 
this would create the perception of the members’ partiality towards the relevant MDB, 
which holds the power over the term renewal.   
 
Further, the thesis has also analysed the range of sanctions imposed by MDBs and 
recommends a more nuanced approach with more than one baseline sanction to more 
closely tailor the sanction to the wrongdoing, taking guidance from the US and UK 
Sentencing Guidelines.  Moreover, MDBs should consider harmonising the definition of 
“restitution” and developing clear guidelines for determining the appropriate amount of 
reimbursement and restitution in order to avoid the perception that they themselves are 
financially benefitting from wrongdoing that occurred in relation to their own projects by 
having the arbitrarily determined restitution amount paid directly to them.  
 
In addition, the thesis has also analysed the MDBs’ settlement regime and 
recommended the development of robust guidelines on the availability of settlements, 
which should not be used when wrongdoing is egregious and has resulted in significant 
harm, nor as a way for MDBs to extract maximum restitution (which is often imposed as 
part of a settlement) in exchange for a more lenient sanction.   
 
Finally, the thesis has provided recommendations for the treatment of corporate 
groups under MDBs’ sanctions regimes, based on the analysis of the US and UK laws.  
The recommendations focus on four main areas of corporate liability: (i) liability of a 
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company for its employees’ wrongdoings, (ii) liability of a parent company for its 
subsidiaries’ wrongdoings, (iii) liability of a subsidiary for its parent company’s 
wrongdoings and (iv) successor liability.    
 
It is important to remember that MDBs lack competence to sanction member 
countries and government officials at any level.  In fact, government officials are 
expressly exempt from most MDBs’ Sanctions Procedures.  Specifically, the WB’s Anti-
Corruption Guidelines, which are the WB’s “umbrella” document on anti-corruption, 
expressly exempt “officials and employees of the national government or of any of its 
political or administrative subdivisions, and government owned enterprises.” 958   WB 
rationalises this policy by “the cooperative structure of the Bank, respect for the 
sovereignty of its Member[s] and the fact that alternative means are available to address 
these cases, in particular the Borrower’s obligation to take timely and appropriate action 
and the Bank’s ability to exercise contractual remedies in the event that the Borrower fails 
to do so.”959 
 
Similarly, AfDB’s and IADB’s Sanctions Procedures expressly exempt 
“governmental entities”,960 while ADB’s Integrity Principles and Guidelines stipulate that 
“[i]f investigative findings indicate that an official of a government committed or was 
engaged in an integrity violation, OAI will report its findings to Management. OAI will 
work with Management and operational departments to assess ways that ADB may 
respond pursuant to the Anticorruption Policy and other ADB rules, policies and 
procedures.”961 
 
Arguably, if MDBs were to criticise countries’ anti-corruption measures too loudly, 
this may jeopardise their collaboration with the relevant governments, which may in turn 
have repercussions for various development programmes.  This policy of exemption for 
government officials is also grounded in respect for the sovereign status of MDBs’ 
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  Rather, MDBs resort to “soft measures” by encouraging the 
introduction of integrity-promoting laws and institutions, and seek to enlarge the space for 
civil society watchdogs.
963
  Additionally, as described in Chapter 3, MDBs sometimes 
refer matters to national authorities that have jurisdiction over the government officials 
that may be implicated in a corruption scheme investigated by the relevant MDB.  While 
sanctioning of officials through domestic authorities would yield the wanted result, it is 
subject to the relevant authorities’ willingness to act in the requisite way, and this is often 
not the case.  Moreover, if an MDB were to pressure its member countries to prosecute 
corrupt government officials, this may be at odds with the underlying principle of MDBs’ 
respect for member countries’ sovereignty.  Still, if the government representatives are 
beyond the reach of MDBs’ sanctions regimes, these regimes can hardly be seen as 




 MDBs’ distrust of national court systems is also evident from MDBs’ non-reliance 
on any government’s or court’s judgment and, consequently, excluding from procurement 
only those companies that have been found guilty by its own investigators.  In practice, 
this means that a company found guilty of corruption in a national court, and not debarred 
by an MDB, could be eligible to participate in tenders for the MDB’s contracts.  The only 
exception to this practice is EBRD, which enforces “final judgment[s] of a judicial process 
in a member country of [EBRD]” if such judgment has “relevance and seriousness to 
[EBRD].”965 
 
There is no easy solution to this issue.  Relying on national courts would open 
MDBs to possible discrimination between judgments of different courts, given that due 
process standards greatly vary among countries.  If MDBs were to officially trust the 
courts in certain countries and not in others, it could easily compromise its own attempts 
to maintain good dialogue with governments whose courts it considered untrustworthy.  
On the other hand, however, by refusing to trust any domestic courts altogether, MDBs’ 
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sanctions regimes uphold a public belief that domestic institutions lack the capacity to 
enforce the laws of their countries, which may in fact push both private parties and public 
officials towards alternative and informal strategies to solve their issues, often through 
bribery or corruption.  This undermines development and is precisely what the sanctions 




One approach to resolve this problem may be to use the contract award process as 
the catalyst for review. If debarment actions by national authorities were available to 
contracting officials as they considered an award to a contractor in an MDB-funded 
project, the contracting official should be required to take that information into account 
when considering the qualifications of the contractor.  Those debarment actions could be 
memorialised in central, online databases, much as there is a central resource on the US 
federal debarments under FAR (as described in Chapter 1). As databases proliferate, they 
could be linked electronically, relatively simply, or their review could be made a 
mandatory part of contract award procedures.  Because debarment actions are relatively 
straightforward and public acts, they would offer clearer points of reference, without 
forcing disclosure of sensitive, underlying investigative information.
967
  The databases 
could, however, still give contact information for those officials that led an investigation 
or debarment action, so that they could be contacted for background information, if 
appropriate.  In addition, an affected contractor could respond to the prior debarment, 
perhaps by describing the remedial measures taken to resolve the problems that resulted in 
the debarment.
968
  This flexible approach, which would not result in automatic cross-
debarments based on another country’s blacklist, but put contracting officials on notice 
and give them discretion in addressing such blacklist, would also allow contracting 
officials to focus their efforts on those firms that posed the most material risks. 
  
Another problem with MDBs’ focus on suppliers is that, arguably, sanctions 
regimes distort market competition: they result in eliminating potential contractors, thus 
reducing contractors and that sanctions regimes should take into account these competing 
objectives by adding, for example, restitution as a punitive measure to its framework, 
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which could potentially replace debarment altogether.
969
  For example, the debarred 
supplier may deliver unique products or services of high quality, or may be an important 
employer in the local community.
970
 Some scholars have therefore suggested that the 
WB’s recent use of settlement agreements which incorporate restitution is precisely the 
right approach to balancing deterrence with the need to promote competition.
971
  Arguably, 
excluding a competitor leads to reduced competition, and this in turn may result in higher 
prices or lower quality – quite the opposite of what procurement rules are supposed to 
deliver.
972
  In addition, the greater the number of excluded suppliers, the fewer the number 
of remaining firms, and the easier it is for them to facilitate cartel collaboration, which in 
turn implies huge benefits for those firms that are still involved in corruption.
973
   
 
 Thus, in addition to focusing solely on suppliers, MDBs could also strengthen their 
efforts towards improvements of anti-corruption regimes in the countries where they 
operate.  For example, they could strengthen their technical assistance support focused on 
training, awareness-raising and policy dialogue with local agencies responsible for 
enforcing anti-corruption legislation.  Moreover, MDBs could also condition development 
assistance support on countries’ fulfilment of certain governance and anti-corruption 
criteria, including the capacity and willingness of a country to prosecute demand-side 
corruption.  Another precondition to lending could be the strengthening of a country’s 
anti-corruption agencies’ enforcement capabilities.  Further, MDBs’ investigation officers, 
some of whom already collaborate with national law enforcement institutions, could 
further encourage these institutions to investigate and prosecute actors involved in the 
offence, who are outside the reach of MDBs’ investigation, including government 
representatives.
974
  The collaboration could be extended by, for example, having MDBs’ 
investigators serve as advisers to the prosecution and remain in the country as the case 
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moves through the domestic criminal justice system.
975
  Naturally, this would require 
additional resources for MDBs’ Investigations Units. 
 
Further, government officials should be subject to sanction when they act in their 
individual, rather than official, capacity.  For instance, a government official that controls 
a firm that bids for an MDB-financed contract should be liable to sanction for any 
sanctionable practice that he/she engages in as a head of the bidding firm.
976
 There is 
already precedent for this type of distinction in MDBs’ practices: state-owned enterprises 
are liable to sanctions when they operate autonomously and participate in bidding for 
MDB-financed contracts, while they are not liable to sanction if they are essentially arms 
of government acting within their own country.
977
  Moreover, this is in line with the 
European Commission’s and the US and French court jurisprudence, which have held that 
acts performed by officials for their own benefit and in their own interest cannot be 





In addition, just as MDBs collaborate on cross-debarments, they could also 
collaborate on “cross-referrals”, whereby loans would not be offered unless a given case is 
brought through the domestic criminal justice system.
979
  If this becomes too difficult to 
maintain, given urgent development needs, MDBs could place restrictions on the 
government’s flexibility and control over spending – the less reliable the government, the 
more external control placed on its spending.
980
 
As noted in Chapter 1, tackling corruption requires considering the institutional 
framework of a country, and tackling institutional framework requires a complex process 
of understanding political institutions and the distribution of political power, as well as the 
nature of economic institutions.  In that context, sanctions regimes are only part of MDBs’ 
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efforts in the global fight against fraud and corruption, and MDBs’ should pursue a more 
proactive, prevention-focused approach that looks beyond individual sanctions cases to 
better identify areas of systemic vulnerability and red flags, and find longer-term solutions 
to address recurring types of misconduct.
981
  Some MDBs are already taking such 
proactive steps by assisting countries in fighting fraud and corruption through programmes 
running parallel to the sanctions regimes.  For instance, the WB has been working with 
countries on numerous projects with governance components, in areas such as public 
financial management, corporate financial reporting, and open government – all intended 
to help member countries build more effective and accountable institutions.
982
  Similarly, 
IADB has supported anti-corruption efforts in different ways such as its program for 
Strengthening of Prevention and Combat of Corruption in Public Management in 
Brazil;
983
 and a report on Transparency in the Extractive Industries in Latin America and 
the Caribbean,
984
 covering a wide range of challenges and opportunities along the chain of 
production of extractive industries (oil, gas and minerals), from the issuance of licenses to 
revenue management.  With its focus on private sector, EBRD has been helping its 
private-sector clients devise anti-corruption and compliance action plans, aimed at 
improving the clients’ compliance policies and procedures.985 
 
Moreover, in some cases, MDBs also provide financial and technical assistance to 
countries as they develop anti-corruption regimes of their own.  For instance, with the 
WB’s assistance, the Senegalese government has created a new anti-corruption office and 
is working to enforce a new law that requires public officials to declare their 
assets.
986
  Similarly, in 2014, EBRD launched an Anti-Corruption Initiative with the 
government of Ukraine to ensure greater accountability and transparency and a more 
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effective rule of law within the Ukrainian economy.
987
  As part of this initiative, Ukraine 
established an independent business ombudsman institution to help address the problem of 
unfair treatment of businesses.
988
  The preventative power of MDB-supported government 
initiatives like these, combined with the protection and deterrence of sanctions regimes, 





Concluding with the main theme of this thesis – MDB’s sanctions regimes – the 
following should be noted. Amidst the growing recognition that combating the negative 
effects of corruption requires a global and concerted effort at both the national and 
international levels, the MDBs have an opportunity to play a useful role, both as 
promoters and examples of international best practices.  In considering the future of 
MDBs’ sanctions systems, it is important to remember that these systems are inherently 
administrative, aimed at protecting MDBs’ funds, which are coupled with MDBs’ limited 
powers compared to national enforcement authorities.  Nonetheless, given the far-reaching 
consequences of MDBs’ sanctions, particularly in view of the Cross-Debarment 
Agreement, which can amount to the deprivation of property, this thesis asserts that MDBs 
should continue their efforts to further harmonise their practices on due process grounds.    
 
In addition to deeper harmonisation among MDBs, there is also the prospect of 
broader harmonisation beyond the current five signatories of the Cross-Debarment 
Agreement.  The Agreement already has a mechanism for other international organisations 
to join, although none has done so to date.
990
  That said, some national and even private 
organisations and institutions, including the Millennium Challenge Corporation
991
 and the 
Nordic Development Fund use the WB’s debarment list.992  
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Moreover, considering the goals of general deterrence and development 
effectiveness, MDBs may benefit from conducting more in-depth analysis of sanctions 
cases aimed at identifying systemic vulnerabilities and recurring types of misconduct, as 
well as evaluating the actual impact of the imposed sanctions.
993
   For example, the data 
could track sanctions per country, industry sector and company size, proportion of 
companies to individuals among respondents, as well as the volume of, and types of 
allegations in, sanctions cases received per each MDB, duration of sanctions proceedings, 
and – perhaps most importantly for assessing the impact of conditional sanctions as a tool 
intended to change behaviour – respondent engagement on conditionalities required to 
regain eligibility.  If done properly, such data could present a treasure trove of trends and 
data points about MDBs’ sanctions tendencies.  Tracking the information year-over-year 
would also present informative insights into the nature and quality of sanctions cases at 
different MDBs, and illuminate (in)consistencies in the application of sanctions standards 
across institutions.  Moreover, trend lines gathered through such sharing of case statistics 
across MDBs could also contribute in a substantive way to the overall fight against 
corruption worldwide.  It is hoped that the research in this thesis will assist the MDBs in 
the future development of these processes. 
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